News from the Eastern Blog

Copy of a Sham Reality

2010-05-30T14:25:00.006+04:00

Photo: Andrei Shchukin - Kopia mnimoi realnosti

So the three of us should be ashamed. All this talk of re-launching the blog and the along comes final exams, new jobs, travels and everything else gets pushed to one side. But I thought I should comment on the video below that has been doing the rounds on the internet.

For those who haven’t yet seen this - an explanation. The Russian parliament, like, I imagine, many parliaments, suffers from a certain degree of absenteeism. Now I wouldn’t like to speculate what MPs do when they’re skiving from their official duties, but this time in the State Duma it’s rather what those who are present are doing that has caught everyone’s attention. It turns out that whilst Russian citizens thought that their MPs were unswervingly representing their interests they were in fact all along replaying their own childhood fantasies of being a contestant in the Crystal Maze, collecting as many golden tokens as possible before the time runs out. In other words, it’s possible that someone may be falsifying the vote.

What I want to dwell on here is not the levels of absenteeism in parliament, but the brazen manner in which MPs feel able to fix votes, on film, without a red face in sight (not talking about the drinking here), and with full complicity of the Vice-President of the Duma. In a land of extremes someone took the idea of voting on behalf of an absent friend just a little too far. Yes, in other countries MPs are also too busy travelling back and forth to the Canary Islands to be present for every little vote, but they don’t film themselves shamelessly perverting the course of democracy and then joking about it. The difference is all in the way you go about it. (Or is it? Is it better for politicians to openly show that they’re barefaced liars and good-for-nothings than to pretend that they’re not and us to know anyway?)

Maybe it’s the electronic voting system that’s at fault. Perhaps the Duma should consider regressing to the UK parliament-style of voting. President Medvedev thought that hi-tech buttons were part and parcel of his beloved “modernisation” drive when really he should have realised long back that shouting “aye!” louder than those shouting “nay!” and then having an old bloke in a black silk gown and optional knee breeches decide who wins is in fact the epitome of a flawless, foolproof, democratic voting system.

The law in question is President Medvedev’s pet project to lower the drink-drive limit; effectively reducing the amount of drinking you can do before legally driving to nil. This has created quite a furore. It turns out that Members of Parliament like to have a lunchtime tipple as much as the rest of us. Unlike in Britain, budget cuts won’t be soon forcing them to take platzkart from Krasnoyarsk when parliament is in session (or will they? That would be great). Furthermore, claims that drinking refreshing yet mildly alcoholic kvas or even eating black bread can be enough to push you over the limit have bolstered opposition to the law.

Some of my Russian friends claim that it has been scientifically proven that some people naturally have a certain amount of alcohol in their blood, even if they don’t drink. Naturally, I have had great fun winding them up about this. What was the alcohol level in the blood of the control group? “Are you sure you haven’t been drinking this morning Boris?” “Nyeeeet! Znachit, (hic) - it must be naturally occurring!” Russian scientists have proven a lot of things that my British brain has difficulty accepting. It’s like the time doctors diagnosed my friend’s recurring dizziness as a potential brain tumour, subjected him to a cocktail of drugs and brain scans for a fortnight before he went back to the UK and discovered he had a mild ear infection. But, really, digression over.

Whatever the dangers of bread-eating and driving may be, will a law like this actually do much to lower the number of deaths on Russia’s roads every year? Will reducing the permitted alcohol level from low to nil make people think twice about having two drinks instead of one, or will it just push more people “over the limit” and fatten the wallets of the gaishniki (traffic police known for their high moral qualities)?

And as I pointed out in a post last year, the problem is not always in the drinking. A closer look at the road traffic statistics for 2009 shows that of 203,603 road traffic accidents, 12,326 were caused by drunk drivers. As a result, 2,217 people were killed, out of a total of 26,084 deaths that year on the roads. This makes drunk drivers responsible for around 8% of deaths on the roads. To compare, 21,921 deaths were caused by sober drivers “not following the rules of the road” and 5098 were killed in accidents caused by “unsatisfactory road conditions” (seems to be some overlap in the statistics, but you get the idea). So is this yet again a case of politicians simply missing the mark?

Swedish Short Circuit

2010-03-14T00:15:00.005+03:00

Image: Alexander Blosiak, openspace.ru

From IKEA’s Russian woes to maniacal cops on a deadly rampage, Andrei Loshak sees today’s Russia as a state of the absurd, a wonderland where Alice (the population) is up against the madness of the authorities. Both sides have been pushed to the edge, and both are beginning to snap.

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Extracts from the article “Short Circuited” by Andrei Lokshak, full original version available on openspace.ru, translation by me (sorry for any mistakes).

State of the Absurd

“We were born to bring Kafka to life,” has been a famous saying since Soviet times. Submerged in the absurd since childhood, we Russians have become experts in it. From our position on the other side of the looking glass, we manage to get by despite it. And it’s only Europeans, with their tiresome rationalism, that arrive in Russia and immediately start trying to find a comprehensible logic in what is happening. But in the end most of them get used to the way things work here and some of them even start to obey the laws of etiquette that require that the cake is shared out, and then sliced up – the laws of the other side of the looking glass – Russian wonderland.

The Russian branch of IKEA is a perfect example. IKEA declared from the outset that even in Russia it intended to unwaveringly uphold its clear Swedish rules, based on a protestant work ethic and strict logistics. As a result, before the opening of IKEA’s first store in Moscow the local authorities cut off its electricity supply. For no practical reason whatsoever – just in order to “rough up” the company as payback for its excessive integrity. Ever since, the Swedes knew their stores were going to be needing their own generators and have tried to do everything in order to depend as little as possible on the mood of the local authorities. The store in Samara built three years ago has proven more problematic - the opening has been postponed nine times. IKEA, a company that has launched 230 stores around the world, just couldn’t break through the unflinching greed of the Samaran bureaucrats, whose last issue in a long line of grievances was that the building was “insufficiently hurricane-proof”. The Swedes, lacking any information about the destructive tornadoes that wreak devastation on the left bank of the Volga, finally took offence. The legendary founder of the company Ingvar Kamprad declared that investments in Russia would be curtailed. But it’s doubtful that such a scare will have any effect on local bureaucrats. For they act not in their own greedy interests. They support the normal functioning of an irrational system.

A few months later another blow was in line for Kamprad. It turned out that in using the generators – the idea that IKEA was so proud of – the company overpaid 200 million dollars, which practically reduced the profits of the whole eastern European division of the company over the past few years to zero. The Swedes thought themselves such Lancelots, having cut off the head of the dragon of corruption, but had forgotten that according to the laws of wonderland a new head quickly sprouts. An official investigation revealed that the Russian IKEA employee responsible for renting the generators had been receiving a cut from the leasers and had been significantly raising the cost of their services. IKEA cut its contract with this firm and as a result was fined another 5 million euros by the Russian courts for breaking the conditions of contract.

Then – the final blow. A couple of weeks ago the Swedish tabloids revealed that the director of IKEA for Russia and Eastern Europe, Per Kaufmann, famous for his public criticism of Russian corruption, had been turning a blind eye to evidence of backhanders being made to contractors of the regional administration. Kamprad stayed true to his principles and immediately sacked Kaufmann, who had been his closest colleague for the past 20 years. He admitted defeat. Maybe for the first time in his life. The Swedes repeated the mistake of land surveyor K in Kafka’s “The Castle”, who tried to conquer the absurd by the strength of reason. It turned out to be a crazy plan. The possibilities of reason are limited, but the absurd knows no boundaries.

Operating system

Corruption is irrational, as its very existence is deadly for a state. This is precisely why it ideally suits a state of the absurd, and is its operating system. The survival strategy for those living in such a state is not to look for the sense in anything. For those who dare attempt it, a glace at the Russian newsreel quickly turns into a psychedelic bad trip. A person will experience a cascade of dazzling negative emotions: fear, horror, shock, indignation, but meanwhile cannot find any logic: “Managers of the state bank VTB pulled off fraud, stole from the state and shareholders millions of dollars. One person has been fired.” , “Commander of the airborne forces of Russia General Shamanov will not be brought to trial due to no crime having taken place. The General tried to obstruct the work of a police investigator who was investigating a case concerning the General’s father in law, a criminal heavyweight who goes by the name of “Glyb”, for whom an international search warrant has been issued. The General called upon two squadrons of the air force special task force to deal with the police officer. The case has been closed because, as Shamanov himself explained, he later personally called off the order to capture the investigator."

It is the most Orwellian oxymora heard from the highest levels that are the final straw in the waves of paradoxical information and are enough to drive you insane: “conservative modernisation”, “sovereign democracy”, “parliament is not the place for discussions”. Such apparent contradictions are regularly thrown at our consciousness and heighten the feelings of disorientation and existential weightlessness which lead to a person being prepared to accept any information from above, however monstrous and contradictive it may be. As a result no one is even mildly surprised to hear that United Russia has won 102% in the elections. For what could surprise a nation where the title of main liberal democrat has been held by Vladimir Zhirinovsky for the past 20 years? The most ominous oxymoron of our time? “Law enforcement authorities”, in other words - organised crime. But, as strange as it may seem, it is precisely the police, in pushing the limits of moral decay, who can save the country. At some point in time the absurd, when it reaches critical proportions, transforms into outright nonsense, that is - utter insanity.

The State vs. the People

The turning point came with the massacre committed by Major Evsyukov. The shooting of shoppers in the supermarket didn’t just contradict common sense – it was devoid of it whatsoever. It was just after this massacre that the law enforcement went on the offensive against its own people. Every day we now hear about how someone in uniform has killed, robbed, run over in a car, or violated someone. For me, personally, what topped this all off was Evsyukov’s court case: “Former officer of the criminal investigation department of the district department of internal affairs Roman Potemkin, who participated in the arrest of Evsyukov, took a stand as witness. Potemkin was brought to court in handcuffs as he himself has been under investigation for extortion since October.” The collapse of the law enforcement system has actually already begun.

As is often the case, in the individual insanity of Evsyukov there was also the cast-iron logic of social processes. The system had to go mad. National security services in a healthy state, as Lenin once wrote, are steamrollers, unquestioningly carrying out the commands from above. As machines do not have and should not have brains, and commands are not given to them every day, their daily life is strictly regulated by instructions and rules. A malfunctioning occurs when commands from their owner dramatically contradict the rules of their maker. A short circuit occurs that causes over 2 million evil robocops to unleash terror against the civilians.

It’s strange – did the ruling elite really seriously assume that the law could be broken selectively? That whilst some carve up, squeeze dry, racketeer and topple the country, others, like complete idiots, will start to honestly carry out their duties under the social contract? This lie, taken to the absurd, has infiltrated the state apparatus from the top to the bottom, poisoned the heads of the junior and middle-ranking personnel. Our police force is now a massive army of bad lieutenants, ready at any moment to turn into insane majors.

People vs. the State

When the absurd grew into insanity the system hit the self-destruct command. The impenetrable fortress started to crumble from within. The eagle’s two heads are tearing one another to pieces and feathers are flying. But here’s the strange thing: the direr the state entropy, the faster everything falls apart and the easier it is to breathe. It’s as if there is now more air. I think that fear in society has disappeared. In the inability of the authorities to control their own kind the people have seen weakness. Such a state cannot have power to repress. The wild bites of the crazed system brought people out of their hypnosis. In the place of fear and apathy has come anger.

Mikhail Bakunin once wrote “Nothing is more dangerous for man’s private morality than the habit of command”. When the authorities start to degrade, you want to be higher than them, to counter cynicism with dignity, moral degradation with composure and humanity. The philosopher Murray Bookchin called this “self-organised reconstruction of society”. The vestiges of this process are already observable. Whereas before people only participated in public rallies when the bulldozers were already driving up to their house, now expressing protest has almost become fashionable. People have started standing up for one another. A couple of weeks ago a drunken police officer in a Mercedes ran over a woman standing at a bus stop. How did the officials act? The cop driving was incapable of stringing two words together; the man in uniform next to him hopped out of the car and ran off. Then their colleagues from the district department of internal affairs turned up and together with the road traffic police tried to sweep it all under the rug. How did people act? Three top bank managers who happened by chance to have seen the accident gave the woman first aid, called an ambulance, and when they noticed that the number plate was being unscrewed from the car, they called some journalists. It was only thanks to the noise they made over the matter that the public prosecutor found out about what happened. A scandal broke out. Heads went flying again (as if in their place new ones aren’t going to grow). A small victory was won over the system. The idea that a people deserves the government it has is a foul lie. At moments of great difficulty, simple people who have not been maimed by the “habit of command” don’t tear at each other’s throats, but hold out a hand of help.

As soon as the “steamroller” stops inspiring fear, out comes the age-old opposition of the Russian people to the state. The philosopher Berdiaev wrote, “Russia is the most un-governable country in the world. Anarchism is a characteristic of the Russian soul, it has been inherent in different ways both in the extreme left and the extreme right. Both the Slavophiles and Dostoevsky are also, essentially, anarchists like Bakunin, Kropotkin, or Tolstoy.” All imperialists and supporters of sovereign power in Russia are enemies of the people – and history just goes to show this. Our interests are diametrically opposed, “when the state gets stronger the people feebler” was the reverse dependency observed long ago by Kliuchevsky. Nothing has changed since. The popular teenage band “Lumen” sings, “I love my country so much, but I hate the State”. You couldn’t put it any better.

The most interesting thing is that those who work for the state are also anti-state in spirit. Just try talking to any cop or civil servant off the record. You’ll find more deception and cynicism than the classicists could ever have dreamed of. And the ruling elite similarly hides under patriotic rhetoric whilst carrying out its daily ritual of the absurd. As soon as the time comes they’ll scarper to Antibes and Marbella. They say that the Prime Minister’s daughters live in either Germany or Switzerland. In any case, not in Russia, that’s for sure. He’s no enemy to his own children.

Medvedev and his Mistrals

2010-03-06T16:27:00.004+03:00

This year is the year of Russia in France and France in Russia - an “année croisée”, marked by around 400 events in the political, economic and cultural spheres. As both a Russophile and a rosbif (won’t extend that to Francophile quite yet, sorry) studying on a Franco-Russian programme in Paris, Dmitri Medvedev’s 3-day official visit here this week should have been just my cup of tea.

“Operation Charm” was what Le Monde chose to call the Sarko/Dima schmooze-fest, referring to the abundance of PR companies on hand to promote Medvedev and his country in France and Europe. But who was trying to charm who more? A quick glance at the snippets of the press conference on TV and I wanted to shout “get a room!” as Sarkozy spieled: “I know, Mr President, the extent to which you have engaged yourself for modernising Russian society. […] Your attachment to a state with rule of law, respect for the law, judicial security and defence of human rights, very much facilitates the rapprochement between our two countries […] Russian culture, the Russian language, the Russian people need freedom. You are currently giving and building this freedom and modernity for them.”

Bleugh. Had the debate surrounding the level of continuity or rupture in the Russian political system with Medvedev’s coming to power eclipsed the French President? Or had someone forgotten to point out the figures that show that the largest number of refugees accepted by France every year for the past few years have been those persecuted and unable to benefit from the protection of their own state… Russia? And, wait a second - can it be that the French president’s memory is so weak that he forgot the circumstances surrounding his last visit to Moscow – to negotiate a certain ceasefire?

Some of us have a tendency to forget, though the prospect of the sale of four warships to Russia - a much-needed boost for France’s ailing military industry – obviously has memory-loss-inducing qualities. I should probably point out here that I am not making any judgement on the sale of the warships, but just the vomit-inducing diplomacy that is surrounding it. The whole situation is also rather interesting as many commentators have pointed out - the sale of the ships is the highpoint in the two-year about-turn in French-Russian diplomatic relations, smoothed out by PR whitewashing to sell Medvedev as the “new Gorbatchev”.

Around two years ago I wrote a university presentation on France’s diplomatic relations with Russia (amongst others). At that point, ten months into his presidency, Sarkozy, who had presented himself in the run up to the elections as the candidate for human rights, was having trouble staying true to his loudly-defended principles. Criticising countries that favoured contracts over defence for human rights he was meanwhile getting chummy with Colonel Kaddafi. Then he jumped to felicitate Medvedev with his presidential victory, (foreign minister Bernard Kouchner contented himself with the comment that the election figures were “very surprising, not quite Stalinist, but 70% ain’t bad!”).

And two years on Medvedev’s visit, with all it’s pomp and ceremony, shows how far the situation has evolved. Putin never forgave Sarkozy’s pre-election declarations: “It’s not because Russia is a superpower that we should prevent ourselves from denouncing human rights violations that are committed there”; “the France of human rights cannot be silent faced with the assassinations of journalists, with the 200,000 war dead in Chechnya; the time of realpolitik that crosses our humanitarian principles for contracts is over” (from Le Monde). But Medvedev is the perfect excuse for France to patch over relations – and (supposedly) save face. The new democratically reform-minded President ticks boxes both home and abroad – allowing Western countries, like France, to justify a rapprochement. This “western wishful thinking” that we spoke of back in October takes on another, more cynical tone – not only does Europe want to believe that Medvedev is one of the club, but it is also prepared to actively pedal the myth in an attempt to avoid criticism when business relations come into question. Meanwhile, the reality is that a big fat question mark still hangs over many aspects of the new Russian presidency - 2009 was the worst year in recent times for politically-motivated assassinations and what will come of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reforms is, at least at this stage, anyone’s guess.

Pipeline Prejudices

2010-03-02T23:45:00.005+03:00

Photo: Fitar Gubayev

As a British student studying European Integration at what the FT recently dubbed “the Eurocrat College,” I feel I spend a large part of my live defending “the baddie”: Britain.* As a non-Russophobe studying the EU as a Global Actor (would I go so far as to say Russophile? Probably not, since we’re talking politics), I spend the rest of my life defending the even badder baddie: Russia.

This semester I have been taking a course in EU energy policy. Right from the start, the professor warned us that this class would not be about geopolitics: we were not going to be taught that Europe was currently being held hostage by Russia. Or that this was likely to happen in the future. Sure, security of supply is essential, and Russia does have the world’s largest reserves of natural gas. However, we should forget everything we have ever read about Russia in our European media. Russia, you see, needs to export its gas just as much (if not more) than the Europeans need to buy it; and the only feasible place it can do this is in Europe. Instantly, the professor had lost most of the class: energy diversification and unbundling just isn’t as sexy as bond-style Russian villains presiding over pipelines. And nobody believed him anyway.

Last week, a colleague and I gave a presentation on ‘The 2009 Ukrainian-Russian Gas Dispute: A Russian Perspective.’ An opposing presentation went first, giving the Ukrainian point of view. The brief was to persuade the audience, why ‘our’ country was in the right. Since the class is more than half made up of Poles, Belarusians, Ukrainians and other assorted Central and Eastern Europeans (not generally known for their love of Russia or Gazprom) the professor realised that we, the Russians, had a tough crowd. Accordingly, it was agreed that to give us a chance in hell we would have a vote to decide who was responsible both before and after the debate. The challenge would be to persuade some of our classmates to change their opinion.

After the initital vote, despite the professor’s repeated statements throughout the course that Russia was a relatively reliable supplier of gas, the results were 13 believing Russia was responsible; 5 abstaining or uncertain; and 3 holding Ukraine responsible. I won’t go into details about what each debating team actually said during the debate (the two sides’ positions have been articulated thousands of times before); but suffice it to say that we’d both done our research and given pretty comprehensive arguments. However we might as well not have bothered to present: the final opinions were exactly the same. Russia was overwhelmingly in the wrong. And Ukraine was absolved of all transit risk.

Now, before I am attacked for having an over-rosy, idealist view on Russia, I want to point out that I really don't! Russia certainly uses gas as an energy tool in its affairs with Ukraine, Belarus and Armenia, however it is not in a position to do so with Europe. This was the issue at stake and to confuse the two is to prevent open-eyed discussion about the Russian-EU relationship. Furthermore, to imagine that Ukraine was an innocent victim all this as it sat on stocks of gas as Europe froze, is utterly absurd.

Another class I have been following has been in Russia-EU relations. Following the class, you might think Gorbachev had never been elected and the Berlin wall had never fallen. It is ridden with alarmist rhetoric and Russia clearly emerges as the big bad wolf. Any talk about how the EU might engage with the EU has so far been non existent. All we have learnt is how awful the interior Russian situation is - so much so, that a Czech student who has never visited Russia asked me how I could possibly have lived there and wasn’t it the most depressive, repressive state in the world?

Domestically, Russia does face enormous problems: demographically, socially, politically and economically. Reading reports about Russia by Freedom House or Amnesty International are enough to make you cry; however, to write off Russia as a bullying, disaster-zone of a country, as many of my colleagues here seem to do, is not only incorrect but also hugely dangerous.

My college presents itself as an ‘incubator for Europe’s future elite’ (yes, a professor actually used those cringe-worthy words), however if this is what we are being taught (or what we are choosing to understand, in the case of the energy course) then this spells very bad news for the future of Europe. Simply being told (or simply choosing to believe) that Russia, or any other country is bad (what a ridiculously normative word, but it sums up so many attitudes here) will lead us nowhere. If Europe is ever to develop a meaningful relationship with Europe, we need a certain open mindedness. We must abandon our Eurocentric view of the world and realise that it has been a long time since we were at the world's centre. We need the ability to understand and enter into dialogue with tomorrow’s great powers.

And now my rant about College attitudes to Russia is over, please see below for a justification of my opinion on Britain!

* For the record, I detest most British attitudes to Europe. The UK is far too full of ignoramus Europhobes – yes, I mean you, Nigel Farage, but you’re not the only one, even if you are the rudest – and I would love it if we could express a little more love for the Euro family; however, accusations that Lady Ashton is a British ‘submarine’ sent to sabotage the EU are frankly ludicrous. And De Gaulle was not the saviour of Europe – he was almost as rabid as Thatcher…

Whistle While You Work (If You Dare)

2010-02-13T20:02:00.020+03:00

Artwork: 'Conversation' by Aleksandr Zhernokluev

Last November, Aleksei Dymovsky, a former Russian police officer from Novorossiik, publicly disclosed the widespread corruption that sits deep in the militsiia. His six-minute YouTube film has received over a million hits and caused quite a stir in Russia. These brave whistle-blowing tactics resulted unsurprisingly in his immediate dismissal from the police force, and last month, Dymovsky was arrested on fraud and corruption charges – revenge for his actions, some say. However, is there hope for this young policeman and others who want to disclose the dirty work of those entrusted with power?

Dymovsky’s bold but clumsy YouTube post has proven to be something of an inspiration. His arrest has led to a flourishing internet campaign, causing others to step forward in support and talk about their experiences of corruption. It would appear that this one whistleblower has lead to a newly assertive citizenry, unwilling to allow bribery and bullies triumph over integrity and truth…

Another hope for the battle against corruption lies with the Kremlin. President Medvedev has always vowed to address the issue more seriously and more concretely. Over the past year, several new federal laws have been introduced, namely ‘On Counteracting Corruption’. All these laws are based around Medvedev’s long-term national anti-corruption plan. In addition, the president’s State of the Nation Address last November pledged to stamp out this ugly problem. Surely there must be something of substance here?

As well as provoking an internet following, Dymovsky’s arrest has attracted much international media attention, forcing the rest of the world to address Russia’s appalling corruption record. Will lifting Russia’s shady profile onto the world stage shame the country’s leaders into addressing the situation properly?

However, neither Dymovsky’s case nor the battle for transparency is this simple. Although his arrest has inspired others to talk, this could be viewed simply as an online fad. The likelihood that Dymovsky will endure a long spell in Russia’s notoriously brutal prisons is simply going to deter others from speaking out in the long run. Many equate doing time in some of Russia’s worst prisons to a death sentence. The story of Sergei Magnitsky, a Russian lawyer who accused the Interior Ministry of corruption, died during a period of incarceration. Surely sometimes it’s better to sit down and shut up?

Furthermore, there is much criticism of the effectiveness of Medvedev’s grand anti-corruption plans. What has actually been achieved? Much of his electoral campaign prior to the 2008 victory was built upon promises to rid Russia of corruption and bring about change. However, as is seen all over the world, electoral promises do not always translate into policy. The death of Magnitsky and the arrest of Dymovsky are just two more chapters in the sad corruption saga that seems to have no denouement in sight.

It has also been pointed out that the successful media coverage of the case is nothing to celebrate. Since Dymovsky’s case converges with the Kremlin’s preferred policy of the month – championing the fight against corruption and reforming the Interior Ministry – the story has garnered much more interest and support than would otherwise have been the case.

What needs to be done?

Firstly, legislation protecting whistleblowers needs to be enforced. Future Dymovskys need to know that if they do speak out, they will not wind up in a prison cell.

Secondly, Messrs Medvedev and Putin need to act with true political will. As mentioned, anti-corruption policies are a vote-winner, but they need to be much more than this.

Thirdly, something must be done to alter the culture of tolerance that surrounds corruption in Russia. Last year, Caroline wrote an excellent post about university students achieving their grades by stuffing essays and exam papers with thousands of roubles. Even the young and intelligent are happy to buy their way through life, simply because this is the way that things are done in Russia.

This is not to say that Russians necessarily find corruption acceptable, but in order to survive and keep day-to-day living ticking over, people are prepared to put up with it. But how do you go about changing something that is so deep-rooted in daily life – the famous Russian byt’?

In Capital We Trust

2010-02-08T01:16:00.005+03:00

Art Work: Maria Dmitryeva
‘Money is the gateway to heaven. It opens up a world of travel and luxury shops, paving the way to an elite education and private medicine. A surplus or absence of money defines a person’s desires, needs, interests, thoughts and more – it defines what is in the soul and mind. Spare cash makes us satisfied, calm and level-headed: an absence of money leads to stress and despair.’

Taken from a 10th grade (ages 15/16) Social Studies textbook, recommended by the Ministry of Education and Research of the Russian Federation

What powers Russia? Money? Oil? Putin? (All on his own… a real superman!) The elusive Russian soul? According to Dmitri Trenin, Director of the Carnegie Moscow Centre, Russia is fuelled entirely by money. Or at least its foreign policy is. In an old article in a 2007 issue of The Washington Quarterly, he reflected on the rationale behind Russian foreign policy:

In stark contrast to its Soviet past, post-imperial Russia stands among the least ideological countries around the world. Ideas hardly matter, whereas interests reign supreme. It is not surprising then that the worldview of Russian elites is focused on financial interests. Their practical deeds in fact declare “In capital we trust.” Values are secondary or tertiary issues, and even traditional military power is hardly appealing. Fluctuating energy prices, not nuclear warheads, are what really matter to Moscow.

Attitudes to money in Russia are different to those in the UK. Perhaps its because I’m British and we have a horribly squeamish attitude towards money, but I’ve always been incredibly uncomfortable around Russians when talk turns to money. I blush and bluster and don’t know how to join in as wages, rent, the cost of your new shoes are openly discussed. There is no beating around the bush when it comes to money in Russia. People do not feel the need to hide their wealth. Nor do they pretend to have money when they do not.

Quick parantheses: the various Russian attitudes to money are beautifully portrayed in ‘Rublyovka – Road to Bliss ’, a film by German-Russian director, Irene Langemann. The film looks at the various inhabitants of Rublyovka Shosse, the most expensive strip of Real Estate in Moscow. They include a bimbo party girl, a philosophising purveyor of fur coats, Shostokovich’s granddaughter, Tajik migrant workers and bohemian architects amongst others. I urge you to watch this film – occasionally the black-and-white portrayal of characters – rich = bad and studpid; poor = humble and good – grinds a little, however it is a realistic portrayal of all the different strata in today’s Russia.

To return to money attitudes: whilst uncomfortable and horribly wrong-footed by the Russian attitude to money, it is far less hypocritical than the British “shove-it-under-the-carpet” attitude. To return to money attitudes at the level of foreign policy: the Russian attitude is far less hypocritical than those of the EU or US. Trenin’s thesis did not necessitate a genius. According to the Russian Foreign Policy Conception, Russia seeks to protect the interests of Russian citizens. Clearly, this means protecting economic interests. (In the Russian mind, this may also mean preventing its near abroad from turning to the West, however that is another a story.) The EU, however, refuses to be quite so honest. Instead it couches all its external strategies in high falutin rhetoric about values and principles. Which it just doesn’t stick to at all!

Take, for example, the proposed Free Trade Agreement with India. This would be quite a coup for the EU27, who would have tariff free access to one of the fastest growing economies. For India, however, the benefits would be marginal (for a lengthy economic explanation see this report at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) and its impact on development would be negative.

Look at Central Asia – despite the EU’s continued insistence on the need for respect of human rights, after a brief moment of uproar it conveniently forgot about the 2005 Andijon massacre and resumed trade with Uzbekistan as well as allowing high officials (who were supposed to be banned from travel to the EU) to visit Germany for healthcare. And this goes beyond the EU. Kazakhstan is currently chairman of the OSCE , an organisation that seeks ‘to ensure full respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; to abide by the rule of law; to promote the principles of democracy by building, strengthening and protecting democratic institutions; and to promote tolerance throughout the OSCE region.’ Is this the same Kazakhstan that Freedom House rates as 'not free' and which recently sentenced the country's best known human rights advocate, Yevgeny Khortis on charges of manslaughter and traffic violations in what is widely considered as a political set up?

These incidents are schizophrenic policy making at its very best!

In way of conclusion (I hope you’ve managed to follow – I think I’ve lost myself), I think Russian foreign policy makers are far more direct in expressing their external plans. Their belligerence towards the West is real; their desire to control Georgia, Ukraine et al. is not hidden; their desire and need to promote Russian economic interest clearly stated. Whether you agree with what they are doing or not (or not, as is often the case for me) it is refreshing to hear a real opinion for once, amidst the couched diplomacy and hypocrisy of western foreign policy makers.

Call for Contributions

2010-01-28T18:31:00.005+03:00

Photo: Andrey Tarkovsky

As you may have noticed we’ve got a new look for 2010 and that’s not the only thing that’s changing: without compromising anyone’s territorial integrity we’re going for expansion. We’re looking for guest writers to feature regularly and are offering in return fame and glory, the chance to get published and read by a network of Russophiles, Russophobes and everyone in between, as well as to be a part in building and bettering the eastern blog. So are you a budding Luke Harding, or an Orlando Figes in the making? Could you give Jonathan Dimbleby a run for his money? Have you got something to say about Russia’s relations with Papua New Guinea, or the particularities of the Russian washing-up liquid market? Have you careered across Chukotka on a rusty dog sled wrapped in bearskin with nothing but a pot of caviar for sustenance and lived to tell us the tale? Can you tell your Lukashenko from your Timoshenko and your Vladimir from your Vladislav? Can you write something on this concisely in around 700 words? Then we want to hear from you!

Contributions and further information on: news.easternblog (at) gmail.com

Autocompletology

2010-01-13T00:37:00.013+03:00

Photo: By the group, The Fourth Height

Recently I came across a site dedicated to the weird and often wonderful world of google's autocomplete. You know those suggestions that pop up when you enter a search term on google? Well, those are autocomplete: the most popular searches corresponding to what you've entered so far. And my goodness some of them can be odd! Take, for example, the case of an innocent search for 'What do I do if I get swine flu?'. Half way through your typing, google will handily propose a number of suggestions of what you might be looking for. Top of the list? 'What do I do if a ginger kid bites me?' Says reams about our society. This got me thinking about how useful this function could be as a means of analysing popular opinion. With an estimated 100 million searches per day, surely google can tell us something about what people are really thinking about. And, whilst I'm sure it is lacking something in terms of real quantitative research, in a world where it is possible to study David Beckhamology, I think it merits further attention. So, I shall name this new science Autocompletology and my first area of interest will be Russia-related searches.

The most logical place to start is with 'Russia.' A nice simple search. Initially nothing too controversial pops up: in first place, thanks to Rihanna no doubt, Russian Roulette; then Russian translation. But in third place: Russian Brides. Third place?! Surely it is not normal for one of the most popular searches containing the word Russia to be connected to the (legal) purchasing of women? Even worse, if you begin to type 'Russian women', google's top returns are: Russian women personals/dating/scams/for sale...

Of course, this says far more about the western mentality (or perhaps that should be the english-speaking mentality? Actually no: on entering 'les femmes russes', French Google usefully suggested 'les femmes russes' after just entering 'femm', so I think it's fairly western) and perceptions of Russia, than it does anything about Russian women. (Who, I want to stress, are not the topic of this post.) I've been accused in the past of being overly sensitive with regards to (some) western men's attitudes to Russian women, but there is something about (many of) them that is just skin-creepingly horrible. If you go to the websites themselves, the way in which they objectify Russian women is blatant and frankly quite horrible. What I find even stranger is that this attitude isn't unique to dating sites, which I can generally overlook when I imagine the average profile of users (lonely, sad, delusional, sexist...) and given that most of them are scams anyway. No, a lot of the ex-pat crowd I knew in St Petersburg expressed similar attitudes when talking about Russian women. "Russian women are this" etc. etc. This constant generalisation and objectification of women that men just wouldn't dare use if talking about western women. Or, indeed, women they had ever spoken to.

To return to our Autocomplete studies: as a point of comparison, when I switched to Russian google and tried out 'британские мужчины' (British men), nothing happened! And then 'French men', followed by 'Italian men'... still nothing! Eventually when I typed American men, something did pop up, but way down the list and only when I'd almost completely finished the word. (Important Autocompletology note: the speed with which a word is suggested, i.e. how far through the word you get, is big indicator of the popularity of a search.) Ho hum. So, the sites probably are scams and the men using them delusional. Still, says a lot about how Russian women are presented in the West...

...Somehow this Autocompletology study seems to have been hi-jacked by another rant about sexist men but I have time for one last search. Next stop, 'Putin', since we do love a bit of V.V-watching on the Eastern Blog. And the results? Disappointingly quiet concerning those pictures (no bare chests, hunting or swimming, alas) but nevertheless a rather pleasing selection: 'Putin height/French/quotes/calendar/tiger'. And so, in the popular Google imagination, the mighty Russian president is reduced to a small man (various sites dispute exactly how small), whose name, when transliterated into French is amusing close to putain, who shot a tiger down with a tranquilizer and of whom a not insignificant amount of people (127, 000, 000 hits) wouldn't mind owning a calendar. And who came up with such blinders as: 'You must obey the law, always, not only when they grab you by your special place.' Worryingly not one one mention of his actual role, his politics or indeed anything beyond the banal. Autocompletology analysis: Is this the product of his much-famed PR (a rejection of it, perhaps?), of Western portrayals of the man, or just a sad indictment of popular engagement in politics and foreign affairs? (I fear the latter, looking at London's current mayor...)

That's all for now folks, however, I shall definitely be taking this new found social science further. And if you come across any, do please tell me about any good Autocompletologist discoveries!

A Fresh Start

2010-01-10T12:14:00.010+03:00

С Новым Годом! Happy New Year, faithful blog reader! Yes indeed, if you are still out there, despite our prolonged absence, then thank you very much! As of today, I hereby resolve, in the spirit of the season, to write at least one post a fortnight on all things Russia. I wanted to kick off with a review of Russia's last year and some predictions of what might happen in the next. But then I logged on and read this by Sublime Oblivion, this at foreign policy blogs, and this blow-by-blow monthly account at RIA Novosti, and decided the topic had been well and truly done. Not to mention in detail beyond my wildest dreams. Or that it's already almost Old New Year... the time has definitely past! So instead I've settled for an attack on the use of the word Anglo-Saxon. Which is, I promise, tenuously linked to Russia and the Eastern Blog.

Since starting my course at my small European compound, I have repeatedly heard the term Anglo-Saxon. As in: "the Anglo-Saxon's believe..."; "with regards to the Anglo-Saxon model..." etc. Since I'm studying European integration, it's usually used to describe Britain and Ireland as being somehow linked with the US and so different from the rest of Europe. And when it's spoken about, it's usually accompanied by a knowing nod in mine and my fellow Brits' direction, as though we can confirm that, yes, indeed, that is what those Anglo-Saxons think. But, hang on a moment, just who are these Anglo-Saxons of which they speak? And am I really one of them?

I vaguely remember something back in primary school about the Saxon's invading and indeed, a BBC website confirms:

The term Anglo-Saxon is a relatively modern one. It refers to settlers from the German regions of Angeln and Saxony, who made their way over to Britain after the fall of the Roman Empire around AD 410.

So these Anglo-Saxons were a Germanic tribe, who arrived in the UK over a thousand years ago. So, where did it's association with the US et al. come from? Presumably from the spread of Brits back in our Atlantic-crossing, empire-building days. But surely we aren't all Anglo-Saxon? The word just doesn't seem right.

Firstly I thought it was a uniquely European idea. Perhaps even initially a Gaullist plot that stuck, designed to show how different those damn Brits were and so keep. them. out. Perhaps, I'm just a little paranoid here, but in any case, I didn't think this Anglo Saxon business was a real phenomenon. But then I saw it in a Russian newspaper. And then again! The poisonous term was spreading... everyone was seeing Anglo Saxons everywhere! Except, of course, these so-called anglo-Saxons themselves. According to wikipedia:

Outside Anglophone countries, both in Europe and in the rest of the world, the term "Anglo-Saxon" and its direct translations are used to refer to the Anglophone peoples and societies of Britain, the United States, and other countries such as Australia, Canada and New Zealand. The term can be used in a variety of contexts, often to identify the English-speaking world's distinctive language, culture, technology, wealth, markets, economy, and legal systems.

I couldn't quite put my finger on why, but there was something about the term that I had a strong aversion to. A quick internet search for "англо саксон" (that's 'anglo saxon' for those of you terrified by the sight of cyrillic) and the plot thickened. Google's third highest return lead me to the Anglo Saxon homepage, which belongs to a British band formed in the wake of the July 2006 London bomb attacks, which intends to write, record and release songs with a distinctly patriotic feel and a celebration of English/British culture and heritage. (Bizarrely, if you search for the English 'anglo saxon', the site doesn't appear, which is somewhat worrying from the point of view of how Russians must view British identity.) Despite the band's adamant insistent that it is not racist, I'd advise those of you not of a rabid, patriotic bent to stay well clear of the site (it'll just make you angry). Nevertheless, it's interesting just to show the total confusion surrounding this alleged Anglo Saxonism. The band in question seem to fully confuse the term with, I don't know what, Englishness? Britishness? They write:

Anglo Saxon is not part of any political party or organisation. I cannot believe in a country of 50 million people no one has used the name Anglo Saxon. Anyway we’ve got it, patented it and we are keeping it. There has never been any patriotic/nationalist music that has made it into the mainstream, we would like to be the first but hopefully not the last. If other musicians/songwriters can follow through the door we have opened then at least we have contributed something.

In whichever way they understand the term, their usage of it is far from it's orginal description of an invading tribe. BNP leader, Nick Griffin, has likewise used the term 'Anglo-Saxon folk community' to refer to the English member of what he calls Britain's 'indigenous population'. In this was we are witnessing the construction of another meaning to the word 'Anglo Saxon' that is confused, racist and fully exclusive of all the British citizens who are not of a white, Anglo-Saxon ethnic background, of whom there are very, very many.

The question of your average Brit's genetic make up is a hotly contested one in both political and scientific circles. Whilst nationalists might try to draw a marked distinction between the English (mainly derived from the Germanic invasions in the fifth century) and the Celts or Britons who occupied the Island previously (today's Welsh, Scots and Irish), the reality is that we're more likely to be a complicated ethnic mix of all the different invading tribes, probably further jumbled with some genes from other immigration. We're all a complicated bundle of ethnicity generated from our complex history of invasions, immigration and native birth.

To use the word Anglo Saxon to refer to all the western anglophone countries is quite wrong indeed! The word has far too many meanings, ranging from its historical and genetic origins, to the manipulation of it for nationalist and or/racist purpose and ending with its innocent usage by non-English speakers. (Which, I object to anyway, on the grounds that all the allegedly Anglo Saxon countries are culturally and socially very different from one another.) And so, I call on any Russians, Europeans or anyone else out there to abstain from using it. If we must have some phrase to describe a commonality between English speakers and systems can we use one which is less emotionally charged? Suggestions on a post card, please...

Go, Russia! Or Just a Piece of Pie?

2009-11-21T18:06:00.015+03:00

Much of the coverage of Russian President Dmitri Medvedev’s State of The Nation Address has been fairly negative. ‘We’ll believe it when we see it’ crowed the cynics. ‘Nice ideas, but what about specifics?’ challenged the journalists. Other commentators have insinuated that the address from the vertically-challenged orator was nothing more than a rambling piece of PR used to placate the Kremlin’s critics. But should we give his plans for modernisation a chance?

Although not the most scintillating of reads, the address is worth a quick glance. The speech tackles many of Russia’s serious problems, reaching out to the old, sick, poor, jobless and homeless. Medvedev placed an emphasis on the menace of alcoholism and the need to improve the country’s efficiency, a commitment that seemed to hark back to the good old days.

In addition to these unremarkable government pledges and a overly intense fixation with broadband (has the Russian president discovered a love of downloading?), Medvedev has promised to implement far-reaching reform by embracing free markets, stamping out corruption, denouncing Russia’s notorious state corporations, nurturing the growth of civil society, reforming the political system, strengthening democratic institutions and challenging the judicial system.

Phew. It appears that Medvedev has lot of work to do. The length of this list alongside vague phraseology and lack of time frames makes it easy to see why there has been a media backlash. The speech also focuses more on the ‘what’ and much less on the ‘how’, revealing gaps and weakness in his grand plan.

I feel sceptical for another reason; his words seem to say exactly what detractors want to hear, both within and beyond Russia’s borders. Medvedev even puts the words of his critics into his own mouth:

‘We must not simply be full of hot air, as they say.’

This kind of pandering suggests that Medvedev’s modernisation plans may only be superficial improvements in order to silence his critics whilst preserving the status quo. Jailbird Khodorkovskii has unsurprisingly voiced an opinion that highlights this problem. In response to the address he stated that it was simply a way to justify modernisation without bothering to dismantle Russia’s authoritarian system.

However, I do not believe that there is no room for optimism. The address was not totally devoid of specifics, but more importantly, the man holding the top seat in the Kremlin has stood up in front of the world and made a series of important, and in certain cases, embarrassing admissions. Criticising the USSR and talking of 'chronic backwardness' has not exactly been the norm in recent years. Such a public and honest acknowledgement of Russia’s afflictions and shortcomings should be welcomed, not simply pooh-poohed as another piece of Kremlin spin. The fact that the president has thrown these questions out into the open in such a disparaging way, whilst risking the wrath of his prime minister, is commendable.

In sum, this year’s State of The Nation Address is a step in the direction of reality, if not a genuine movement towards a comprehensive plan to adopt the reform so badly needed. The economic downturn has exposed Russia’s weaknesses – mainly its over-reliance on energy resources – and brought a much needed wake-up call, which has been articulated in this speech. Still, whether Medvedev plans to implement his promises once he has polished off his humble pie remains to be known.

Good cop, bad cop: a sovereign tandemocracy

2009-10-12T02:31:00.004+04:00

Image: Sinye Nosy

A Sunday afternoon in autumn pottering around at home. Or perhaps at the dacha. Time to relax, to reflect. What is on Dmitri Medvedev’s mind as he sits and sweats in the banya? Is he smugly chuckling at those stooopid political commentators who have been scrabbling over his every word this month after the publication of the article and a few other provocative hints let slip that he is making a move away from old Putin? Ho ho ho, keep fobbing the liberals off with words and in the meantime I can get away with anything! Or is he making a mental note to change his locks and get a restraining order out on some of his administration staff after making that scathing critique of Putinism and a bold assertion of his own power?

That same old mystery that has got everyone guessing for the past year has popped up again, namely: who’s really in charge in Russia? And now - is there a split between the gruesome twosome?

A popular theory in Russia of the power-sharing arrangement between the two men has been one of a “tandemocracy”, where Putin has consciously taken on the role of “bad cop”, leaving “good cop” Medvedev to show off his shiny liberalism. But what would explain some of Medvedev’s more harsh comments – his complete writing-off of the possibility anywhere in the near future of bringing back elections for regional governors, for example?

Dmitri Kamyshev, writing in Vlast’ magazine, points out that rather than simply a good cop/bad cop scenario, the current set up of power in Russia is in fact almost perfection of the American two-party system that the country has been striving for since the 1990s. Since attempts at raising an acceptable second party up to standard have failed, Russia has settled on replacing the two parties with two lone figures. And so “Party # 1” defends Putinism, whilst “Party # 2” criticises it: between them the tandem has occupied the positions of both ruler and opposition. This neatly keeps any criticism within the two-figure framework and, most importantly, allows them to define the key issues that neither side can criticise.

And these key issues are clearly stated in Medvedev’s “breakthrough” article when he emphasises the need for “cross-party consensus on strategic foreign policy issues, social stability, national security, the foundations of the constitutional order, the protection of the nation's sovereignty, the rights and freedoms of citizens, the protection of property rights, the rejection of extremism, support for civil society, all forms of self-organisation and self-government.” When you put it like that there’s not much left for opponents to get their teeth into.

So what is it that is keeping us Westerners convinced that the doors of democracy in Russia are already ajar, and sooner or later to be thrown wide open? What is it that’s making us imagine the second image of Medvedev in the banya – the one of a man sweating it out to bring about the dawn of democracy?

Yuri Zarakhovich posting on the Jamestown foundation blog called the West’s reaction “liberal wishful thinking”. I think he’s hit the nail on the head. We want him to be the liberal saviour and we can’t get it into our democratic Western heads that there’s an entirely different mindset at play. We can’t quite understand that someone can use the same words – democracy, for example – and have in mind something rather different to what we want them to mean.

In comparison to Putin, Medvedev’s talking the talk and dressing the part. Put it this way: with Putin doing the evil spy eyes and the evil spy face in the background all the time Dima looks a darn sight more like someone you’d want to have drinks with in the hotel bar after a G8 summit. But these outward appearances have combined with our wishful thinking to lead us to get the wrong end of the stick. The Kremlin is probably patting itself on the back for this clever move: it turns out you can have a war with Georgia, chummy up with Iran, sell tanks to Chàvez, cut off gas to Ukraine and Europe, restart military exercises in European airspace and get everyone’s backs up over the Arctic and the Second World War and still get the West thinking your leader’s a closet liberal just by him being short, smiley, dressing smart cas and looking in Putin’s direction when things get a bit iffy.

Maybe I’m a sceptic, but I think if we try to image what is really going on in Medvedev’s mind on a lazy Sunday afternoon at the dacha it might help us snap out of this wishful thinking. He might be modern lawyer in a leather jacket, but he did not get to being President of the Russian Federation on his own. He might differ in style to the others, he might criticise where no-one has criticised before, but at the end of the day he’s a part and product of the same system. “I don’t think he cries himself to sleep at night because he can’t realise his democratic calling,” said one of my equally sceptic Russian friends. There’s an almost comforting thought.

Little Bear Cubs

2009-10-01T00:16:00.002+04:00

Victor Shreider, Mayor of Omsk, has just announced a plan to create a children's organisation of 'Bear Cubs' to instil ideological values into little children. The Russian translation of the name, medvezhata is, as the astute amongst you will have already noticed, very close to the surname of dear, respected Russian president, Dmitry Medvedev. Yes, that's right, the president's surname is a derivative (not sure that's linguistically the correct term, but you get my meaning) of the word 'bear' and so the proposed name for the group is a wonderfully witty word play. And of course, the leaders of the little Bear Cubs, will seek to imbue their charges with the values of the party of the big Daddy Bear: Edinaya Russia. Gives a whole new dimension to the Brownie movement in the UK. (Sorry, terrible joke!)

To continue. In a recent press conference, Shreider decried the lack of ideology in the modern child's upbringing: "It's all very well to organise sports clubs, but what's the point if they're not accompanied by some sort of ideological upbringing?", he asked. According to the plans, the Bear Cubs would be a voluntary organisation incorporating sports, arts and craft and 'cognitive' activities – all with a propagandistic element.

The organisation will be based on the Octobrists, a children's group in the Soviet Union that prepared younger children for the much better known Young Pioneers. "The socialist period has been much criticised – and with good reason. But there was one well thought out element there – the patriotic upbringing of the youngest generation. We were all Octobrists, Pioneers, and Komsomolists. Whether we like it or not, today this task must fall on the leading party." According to their motto, the main attributes of a Little Octobrist were to be active, brave, hard-working, honest and cheerful. Not so different from our scouting and guiding movements, it would seem. Although, given the state-sponsorship of the movement, presumably some impetus to become a good little Communist, graduate through the Pioneer and Komsomol movements before getting a good Soviet job supporting the status quo, would have been tacked on the end. And now the mayor of Omsk would like to employ the same totalitarian technique on the little Omsk kiddies. But this time round participation will be voluntary, of course.

And what will the ideology of the Bear Cubs be? The Mayor's press conference wasn't too clear on this issue, although we can assume it will retain the same emphasis on good, clean (honest) fun. Probably with some sort of inculcation of Edinaya Rossiya's values and aims, which are defined on the party's official website as the assurance of a stable future for Russian citizens, rooted in the psychology of success and recognition of the history of the people. Mind boggling, and I'm not at all sure how that would translate to the level of children. Any ideas of what the Bear Cubs might be learning about (always through play, mind) please let me know!

Unfortunately, however, the chairman of the local authority predicts a few difficulties in the implementation of the group since in the current situation, youth workers are not trained in ideological propaganda. However she is currently in Moscow discussing the issue, so this can surely be resolved soon. Wouldn’t want to keep the poor ideologically-deprived kiddies waiting too long, surely. Watch this space for further news on the movement and it's eventual realisation. Long Live the Bear!

A Weekend Break for Two in Borovsk

2009-09-30T00:39:00.009+04:00

OK, so for my first post after a rather long break this is not exactly pressing news, nor the height of journalism, but it will make my fellow bloggees smile. What happens when you book a cheap flight on Kaliningrad airlines and the day before you’re due to fly the company goes bust? If you’re lucky you'll get transferred onto Aeroflot and get a chance to flick through their onboard magazine where you will discover (in the English language section, nestled between a review of Vladimir Pozner's latest book and a guide to a weekend in, erhem, Borovsk)… News from the Eastern Blog! (Thanks to Johann for this!)

So Long, Georgia

2009-09-18T10:52:00.005+04:00

Last month on 18th August, Georgia finally withdrew from the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), an act of rebellion that was symbolised by the lowered Georgian flag at the CIS headquarters in Minsk, Belarus. The Georgian government first announced its decision to remove itself from the bloc following last year’s war with Russia, declaring that the status quo could not ensue while another CIS member refused to respect its territorial integrity and carried out ‘ethnic cleansing’ in its lands. As a matter of pride as well as principle, Georgia did not want to look like it could be bullied by the leader of the gang.

There are two main schools of thought as to why the CIS, which eventually came to include all the former Soviet republics bar the Baltic States, was set up in 1991. The more pro-Russian, pragmatic analysts see its creation as a means to cushion the shock of the collapse of the Soviet Union. With so much shared infrastructure and a network of interlinked economies – not to mention the threat of nuclear weapons being scattered all over Eastern European and Central Asian countries that had little idea of how to handle their new found sovereignty – the CIS was meant to provide a solid framework for dealing with a practical ‘divorce’. The organisation also offered support to those new republics, which had up until the fall of Communism, known nothing beyond dependence and centralisation.

However, those more critical of the inner workings of the Kremlin have always regarded the CIS as a means for Moscow to hold sway over the former Soviet sphere, denying the new republics their right to true independence. They see the bloc as a way for Russia to regain its old Empire and balance the power of the West, which in the 1990s was largely embodied in the form of an ever-encroaching NATO.

But whichever way you choose to view the CIS and its creation, it is worth thinking about the ramifications of the departure, considering that Georgia is the first country to make such a move.

What does this mean for Georgia?

The departure is likely to bolster the already Western-focused foreign policy, which some critics claim will damage ties with other CIS countries. However, the lack of reaction from these states indicates otherwise. It seems that there is a silent understanding of Georgia’s exit amongst the former Soviet states.

Even Russia’s reaction was surprisingly muted. Rather than condemning the actual move, the Kremlin simply mentioned that the withdrawal would have adverse impacts on Georgia’s citizens, as important economic links have been broken.

However, this ignores the fact that Georgia still remains part of a subunit of the CIS, known as GUAM, a supposedly anti-Russian group set up in 1997 comprising of Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Moldova (Uzbekistan was a fleeting member from 1999-2005, adding an extra ‘U’ to form GUUAM). Georgia still has the opportunity to pursue multi-lateral trade links within this organisation. Furthermore, there is nothing stopping the Georgian government from setting up bilateral agreements with CIS members.

And for the CIS?

Despite the loss of a member, the CIS is still looking robust, with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan still part of the club. However, if Georgia can walk away relatively unscathed, the question then arises: what purpose does the CIS serve?

Whichever side you took with regards to reasoning behind the organisation’s birth, both arguments look redundant now. On the one hand, the shock of the USSR’s collapse is no longer rippling through the region with force; although countries such as Belarus have failed to make the transition to liberal democracies, it has been two decades since the fall of communism and the former Soviet Union is making tentative steps towards integration with the rest of the world. On the other hand, if Russia is set on reasserting its power in the region, the flaky framework of the CIS bears absolutely no weight compared to the Kremlin’s use of ‘petro-politics’.

Does Georgia’s swift exit indicate the beginning of the end of the CIS? After announcing the withdrawal, Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili stated that he was waving the final goodbye to the Soviet Union. He may not be right about many things, but Saakashvili seems to have hit the nail on the head. It is time to let go of Soviet-style relationships, which serve only to hinder these countries’ economic development and march towards democracy. This rusty framework needs to be forgotten, and if – as many will argue – some kind of multi-lateral agreement needs to remain, it should be one that is fresh and relevant to the twenty-first century.

What Next?

It seems unlikely that any other members will follow suit in the immediate future, but the potential is there. As I mentioned in a previous post, the Russian-Belarusian partnership is looking decidedly rocky and the relationship between Russian and Ukraine is hardly a match made in heaven. The Central Asian states are also showing signs of rebellion against Russia; for example, Turkmenistan is considering diversifying its energy supplies. It would appear that the former Soviet republics, after almost two decades of taking a lead from Moscow, are really beginning to assert their independence. How much life is left in the Moscow-dominated CIS?

Not Quite So Eastern

2009-09-14T00:07:00.003+04:00

Photo: "Palace Square, St Petersburg", Andrew Moore
None of us have been on the blog recently, as we’ve all been very busy. To update you: Caroline successfully completed her year in Moscow and, despite a couple of near scrapes involving loose man hole covers and dodgy roads, has also survived a summer interning in Uzbekistan. She is now studying in Paris, but will continue blogging on all things Russian as her Masters course will be focused on Russia and Eastern Europe. Helen has finished her dissertation on Russian/Belarusian relations and is now job hunting, so hopefully will have lots of time for writing lovely blog posts. And I am now living in Warsaw, attempting to learn EU law and economics, whilst feeling horribly homesick for St Petersburg. Nevertheless, as my Masters thesis will be looking at Russia-EU cooperation, I’ll still be blogging all thing Russia. So, whilst we may not be in Mother Russia anymore, we’ll try our best to keep on writing, giving our thoughts and observations on Russia, as seen from our various locations across Europe.

At the moment I’m up to my ears in introductory courses so no time to write a real post, but I just found out that this is the first year that Russia will be celebrating Programmers’ Day. Yes, that’s right – 13th of September is officially the day for celebrating the work of all Russia’s dedicated computer programmers. Given that pretty much every third Russian man I know is a programmer, I imagine there will be a fair few celebrations going on tonight!

This Russian habit of commemorating almost every profession is something wonderfully Russian. There's public prosecutors' day, a service workers’ day, a geologists’ day, an astronauts’ day, a miners’ day, a chemical industry workers’ day, a power engineering specialists’ day… I could continue! I don’t want to be cynical or perpetuate drunken Russian stereotypes, but I came across a Russia joke that perhaps explains the popularity of all these days:

A Russian grandfather is asked how often he drinks vodka. He replies, "Not very often - only when it is a holiday or after a sauna. For example, what holiday is it today?" No one can recall any holiday today. The grandfather ponders, "Hmm, sounds like a good day to go to a sauna."

Anyway, Happy Programmer’s Day to all of you out there!

The Media Battle Continues

2009-08-25T01:22:00.008+04:00

Picture: Afhgan "War Carpet"
It hardly takes a genius to realise that there is little love lost between Russia's piarchiks (PR management) and most Western journalists: 'Putin: the brutal despot who is dragging the West into a new Cold War', the Daily Mail was heard to scream back in 2008. Hardly balanced journalism, and not an isolated incident either - rather just one (admittedly rather extreme) example of the British media's tendency to label any Russian activity not corresponding with British desires as anti-Western. Similarly, Russian media outlets (particularly TV news shows) rarely do the West any favours. I have lost count of the amount of times bewildered Russians have asked me why the Brits (and especially Alistair Darling) hate Russia so. Surely a product of over-hyped media representation of political manoeuvres?

Both Western and Russian journalists are guilty of, at best, selective editing and at worst, down right factual distortion, when reporting on the sensitive relationship between the West and newly-resurgent Russia. This tension was never clearer than during the so-called 'information war' which took place at the height of last year's Russian-Georgian war. Both Russian and Georgian officials criticised Western media for biased coverage of events. “We lost the information war in the first few days”, lamented Russian Defence Ministry spokesman Andrei Klyuchnikov, while on the other side of the border, Malkhaz Gulashvili, President of The Georgian Times Media Holding opined how: "Georgia has lost the information war since, unfortunately, foreign agencies frequently relied on Russian news sources controlled by the Kremlin. These would spread inaccurate news which foreign media had to reject later." Meanwhile, western commentators had their own suspicions about domestic portrayal of events accusing both Moscow and Tbilisi of being involved in a game of 'mythmaking.'

In September last year, Vlast’, (Kommersant’s weekly magazine) published an article detailing a series of ‘falsifications’ in the Russian media’s coverage of the Georgian war. Particularly interesting was their focus on the rehashing of a program first aired on the American TV channel Fox News, in which an Ossetian girl living in San Francisco was interviewed about the war. The girl, an American citizen, had been visiting relatives in Ossetia when bombs started to fall. She managed to escape back to the US via Moscow and had been invited to speak on the news program as an eyewitness to the events. During the broadcast she thanked the Russian troops, who, she said, had invaded South Ossetia to defend the people living there from Georgian aggression. Her aunt, who was also present, added that she believed Mr Saakashvili was entirely to blame for the war and for the deaths of many innocent people. Both the Russian version and the original American version have been subject to much criticism regarding honest portrayal of the facts. In the original version, the visibly ruffled American news anchor responded to the girl’s comments by quickly switching to an ad break, whilst promising the aunt that he “would never cut her off.” She was then given just 30 seconds to wrap up. His actions caused a furore about freedom of speech in America and criticism of attempts to distort events to fit a political agenda. Meanwhile, back in Russia, the clip was aired as evidence of American bias. In the Russian version, however, the clip was edited to make the anchorman appear ruder. Moreover, his final words, which were in response to the aunt’s assertion that Mr Saakashvili must be punished, “that’s what Russians want. There are many grey areas in war time” were edited to: “that’s what Russians want to hear.” A clear case of the proverbial pot calling the kettle black in terms of accusations of media bias?

Nearly a year on, Vlast' is revisiting the information war. In an article entitled "A Jubilee of Falsification", the publication addresses a more recent battle in this alleged 'information war.' This time the focus of media attention was a photograph of a heavily wounded young soldier allegedly taken by American journalist and war photographer, David Axe. On 8th August, Pervyi Kanal (Channel One) featured the picture in a documentary entitled "Live" War which purported to expose how Western news agencies falsify photographs taken from war zones in order to try and discredit the Russian army. Axe's photograph, which Pervyi Kanal alleged had been part of a series of photos depicting the Georgian war, was shown on the program alongside a voice recording of Axe, stating: “I took this photograph in Iraq.” Proof of Western duplicity, Pervyi Kanal exulted smugly.

But the plot thickens. Two days later, Arkady Babchenko, a special correspondent for Novaya Gazeta wrote a blog entry, laying claim to the photograph stating that he had shot it himself. Elsewhere across the blogosphere pictures appeared showing an un-cropped version of the photograph in which the orthodox cross and emblem of the Russian army were visible on the 'Iraqi' soldier. Bloggers were even able to get hold of Axe via email and received the following response: “I never claimed to have taken this photo. I just said that it was an example of a picture that clearly hadn't been faked.”

And so the media war continues, as a variety of different news agencies vie for the hearts, minds and loyalties of a wide spectrum of readers and watchers. It would be interesting to know how many people reading and watching these articles believe a word of what they're learning, in both Russia and the West. I hope that if even a small proportion of Russians feel even half the contempt for Russian news channels that a large proportion of Brits feel for The Daily Mail then the realm of media distortion can never take total control.

The Lady-killer in a Kimono

2009-08-12T21:11:00.003+04:00

As I was saying yesterday, Putin’s been knocking around right at the top for the past decade. Kommersant took a look back at what journalists in Russia and abroad were writing about the mysterious judo enthusiast just after he was first appointed Prime Minister in August 1999.

“Quiet, like a shrew” – the view from Russia

“He is considered to be very cautious. One of Putin’s constant expressions is: “But is it legal?” (News report on TV channel RTR, 9th August 1999)

“Putin’s appearance – that of a man as quiet as a shrew – right in the centre of the Russian catastrophe will go unnoticed.”
(Zavtra newspaper, 10th August, 1999)

“Appointing the chief of the security services - Vladimir Putin – as the official successor to the presidency can be called nothing other than yet another crazy whim of the President. Putin is a man who is almost unknown in the country and although he seems to be intelligent, he is a military man through and through and devoid not only of charisma, but also of any experience of managing state affairs,”
(Parliamentary Newspaper, 11th August, 1999)

“No other civil servant has ever created so many problems for journalists than Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin. VV, as they used to call him in Petersburg, is one of those people about whom nothing is known except for the things that he wants to tell you.”
(Komsomolskaya Pravda, 13th August, 1999)

“A retired colonel, an essentially non-military man with the reputation as a playboy no worse than Yury Skuratov [ed: then-Prosecutor General, who had recently been discredited after apparently being shown on a secret tape participating in an orgy with prostitutes]... he is only capable of scaring (although he wouldn’t like to admit it) a dissident with memories of repression 30 years back.
(Kompaniya, 16th August, 1999)

“It is well known that Boris Yeltsin has always preferred his politicians big and strong, with fists, wide shoulders and booming voices. Vladimir Putin breaks down the boundaries of the President’s pets. He’s short, balding and generally somewhat unnoticeable.”
(Argumenty i Fakty, 18th August, 1999)

“Women have always liked him: blue eyes, sporty (they say he often used to stay late at work at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and sit in the office in a kimono to relax). The blue eyes obviously had a hypnotizing effect on women – despite his bald patch, they still call him blond. When Sobchak lost the elections and Putin bade farewell to the collective, women cried (actually cried, this is not an exaggeration or a metaphor – they actually sobbed en masse).”
(Profil, 30th August, 1999)

“A man with the face of a rat and mousy-coloured hair” – the Western media have their say
“Always obliging, but not exactly hospitable… he has an unrivalled ability to say everything by saying nothing. He has not one charismatic character trait, not even a negative one.
(La Stampa, Italy, 10th August)

“Vladimir Putin – is rather surprisingly faceless bureaucrat with a background in the security services and who dreams of their rebirth. His most remarkable character trait is his complete interchangeability with his predecessor.”
(The Times, UK, 10th August).

“Before resigning Prime Minister Sergei Stepashin returned from the conflict (in Chechnya) and declared that Russia could potentially lose the region of Dagestan… It is precisely for this reason that Yeltsin summoned a “grey cardinal” and “imperialist” to sort out the situation.”
(The Baltimore Sun, USA, 10th August)

“Putin is a supporter of taking a hard line and his devotion to the President will without a doubt be ruthless. The question is – how far can he go?”
(Japan Times, Japan, 11th August)

“Putin remained in the shadows for 17 long years serving the security services. A man with the face of a rat and mousy-coloured hair, he has a dull, grey outward appearance of a real spy.”
(The Jerusalem Post, Israel, 11th August)

“The 46-year old newly appointed Prime Minister is a little man with a downcast gaze, who cannot stand being in the press and remains unbeknown to the majority of people.”
(Le Monde, France, 11th August)

“The world has been confronted with two, entirely different perceptions of a man who will shape Russia’s 21st century agenda – a spy, planning on trampling freedom of speech, or a valiant pro-democracy, pro-reform warrior.”
(Los Angeles Times, USA, 11th August)

A Collection of Rare Freaks

2009-08-12T20:20:00.008+04:00

Vladimir Putin

Ten years ago, on the 9^th August 1999, a young, little-known ex-KGB major was appointed Prime Minister by the ailing Boris Yeltsin. Who could have foreseen what was in store for that “short, balding and generally unnoticeable” spy from Leningrad and the country that once in his grip, would never be let go.

Vlast’ magazine claims to have somewhat foreseen the whole process. In spring of 1999, the magazine ordered an opinion poll to find out what Russian citizens thought an ideal president should be like. With most of the population lacking in real-life examples, the poll instead asked Russians which film characters they would vote for - if they had the chance - in the presidential elections. The results were somewhat unexpected at the time, but, according to Vlast', rather telling for what was soon to come.

Based on “Ten Years under Putin” by Dmitri Kamyshev in this week’s “Vlast'” magazine.

The film characters that proved the most popular choice for president shared one common trait – they were all authoritarian strongmen with a penchant for violence. Peter the Great as played by Nikolai Simonov came in first, closely followed by three members of the security services: Marshal Zhukov, celebrated Red Army officer; Gleb Zheglov – the ruthless “bad cop” in a 1979 detective series known for his disrespect to the law and belief in the ends justifying the means; and Shtirlitz, the ideal NKVD (Stalinist secret police, later to become the KGB) officer in a televised series. Although one could suppose that the actors in these roles may have influenced their popularity (Vladimir Vysotsky played Gleb Zheglov, for example), as a choice for president it is fairly clear that they are all rather lacking in democratic management skills.

Opinion poll analysts concluded that Russians wanted an aggressive, rather than attentive president, and that they believed that only such a leader would be able to restore order in the country. This is fairly interesting, though far from astounding in retrospect. What is more curious is that according to Vlast’, one day after they published these results, Boris Yeltsin sacked Prime Minister Evgeny Primakov and, contrary to all expectations, three months later appointed Vladimir Putin to his post. Whether or not the opinion poll played any roll in this is anyone’s guess, but, again according to Vlast’, an advisor in the presidential administration earlier this year claimed that at the time such a poll had indeed been discussed within the government.

Two weeks before Putin’s surefooted victory in the subsequent presidential elections, Vlast’ magazine returned to the results of the opinion poll. It noted that from the outset Putin’s KGB roots allowed parallels to be drawn with NKVD officer Shtirlitz. What’s more, he had begun to take on qualities of the other characters named at the top of the poll. Marshal Zhukov’s military victories were mirrored in Putin’s (apparently) successful war in Chechnya. His similarities with Zheglov were clear by his legendary declaration “if we catch them in the toilet, we’ll flush them down the toilet” [referring to terrorists in the Caucasus], which sounded particularly like Zheglov: “a thief should sit behind bars”. His recognition of the necessity of Russian cooperation with NATO harked back to Peter the Great’s “window to the West”.

Continuing the Peter the Great line, Vlast’magazine ended with a prognosis of Putin’s path in the future: “Peter the Great also forced the people to love everything German, created a Navy and the city of St. Petersburg, cut the beards off the boyars and the heads off the riflemen, undertook successful (against Sweden) and not-so-successful (the Persian campaign) wars and started a collection of rare freaks.”

Ten years into the Putin era, Vlast' magazine thinks that the Peter the Great parallel did indeed come true. Many famous and not so famous Russians have had firsthand experience of the second President of the Russian Federation’s love for everything German. Support for the Navy, just as for the Army as a whole, has been a main priority of the state, whilst St. Petersburg has become the authorities’ favourite city and source of cadres. Almost all boyars (regional governors and oligarchs) have had their beards cut off, whilst some lone riflemen (critics of the regime) have even lost their heads. The war in Georgia turned out to be simultaneously successful (according to the Kremlin) and unsuccessful (according to independent experts). The only thing that Putin did not acquire was a collection of rare freaks, although several experts with experience of working with the government and parliament may not necessarily agree.

Under A Nuclear Cloud

2009-07-29T00:47:00.003+04:00

Photo by Ed Ou

In a sobering reminder of the Cold War legacy, the New York Times website this week featured a photo reportage by Ed Ou entitled 'Under a Nuclear Cloud', which examines the lasting consequences of radiation due to secret nuclear tests by the Soviets on the population living in areas surrounding Semipalatinsk in northern Kazakhstan.

The haunting photos capture with a striking simplicity the everyday life of the children of an intentional Chernobyl that everyone forgot. We think it’s worth remembering: Under a Nuclear Cloud by Ed Ou

A Serious Move from Lukashenka?

2009-07-25T16:56:00.012+04:00

Aliaksandr Lukashenka

Another day, another provocative comment from Belarusian President Aliaksandr Lukashenka. On Thursday he announced to the world that the Russia Belarus Union is an ‘incomplete project’ and should be shelved. He confirmed that he would like to establish trade links with the US and that he is seeking further co-operation with the EU, as reported in the Russian newspaper, Kommersant. This comes after a somewhat dubious outburst a couple of months ago following a bitter spat over a loan instalment. Lukashenka then claimed that Belarus would have to try its luck in other parts of the world if things didn’t work out with Russia. Thursday’s comment, however, gives more reason to think that Lukashenka is actually serious about making concessions to the West.

Following the squabble over the loan and the subsequent ‘dairy war’ it could be said that Lukashenka’s proclamations were little more than an effort to get noticed by the international community. Belarus is neither politically nor economically prepared to integrate with the West despite its promising, albeit cosmetic, democratic makeover. There is also good reason for both Russia and Belarus to continue co-operating despite the limp state of the union, namely Belarusian dependency and Russia’s enjoyment of a buffer to the ever-encroaching NATO. Furthermore, Belarus is an important energy transit country whilst Nord Stream remains a project on paper. For the time being, it seems like these squabbling brothers will have to like it or lump it.

However, there appears to be more weight backing up Lukashenka’s latest attempt to woo the West. Last year, the Belarusian government refused to tow the line following the war in Georgia and did not recognise Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states. This indeed seemed like a very bold – and also brave – step away from Russia. Alongside Thursday’s announcement, Lukashenka pushed this highly sensitive issue further by telling Belarusian citizens not to enter the Georgian enclaves via the Russian border.

Although once again this has served Lukashenka’s aim of achieving international press coverage, it really does show that he wants to establish ties with the West. Georgia remains one of the most important obstacles in the way of Russian/Western co-operation and if Lukashenka insists on sticking his oar into the somewhat heated debate, then he is certainly taking his chances by rubbing the Russians up the wrong way. Other more credible evidence of steps towards the West include the release of a US lawyer from prison at the end of last month and an official pardon from the Belarusian government.

But why would a small-town dictator want to pander to the West? After all, he secures his leadership election after election using highly undemocratic methods and yet still enjoys popularity amongst a substantial amount of Belarusian citizens. Other than the fact that Russia is beginning to look untrustworthy following the milk disputes and the loan squabble, Lukashenka has realised that total dependence on Russia is a strategically unsound option.

This is particularly evident with regards to energy following the 2006/7 gas dispute. It is clear that Belarus is keen to diversify its energy supplies away from Russia, shown by plans to build a nuclear power plant. However, it is ironic that Lukashenka has asked for the $9 billion loan to pay for the plant from exactly those whom he is trying to lessen his dependency on; the Kremlin. The desire to diversify has also been shown by the claim that Belarus wants to start trading with the US. A nice idea, but Belarus will have to start producing something that the US actually wants to buy. Nevertheless, the Belarusian leader has identified an important area of weakness and is setting about rectifying this through his concessions to the West.

So, for arguments sake, let’s say that Lukashenka is serious. He’ll make democratic reforms. He’ll stop being a megalomaniac. He’ll release political prisoners and shake up the economy. But should the West trust him? Can a dictator really shave off his moustache overnight? The constitution still states that Lukashenka can run for presidency indefinitely. It is still highly unlikely that the West will embrace Lukashenka, but will simply welcome the move and try to encourage democratic reform with a series of promises of economic help.

And how will those on Belarus’ eastern border react? It is reasonable to think that many Russian politicians will be glad to see the back of this parasitic embarrassment. However, the Belarusian government seems keen to maintain ties and it is also likely that Russia will want to keep a working relationship ticking over. Lukashenka stressed that co-operation with the West was not to be developed at the expense of relations with Russia. Lukashenka is hedging his bets; he wants to lessen his dependency on Russia, but realises that he still needs their help – financially more than anything.

But one shouldn’t knock him too much for such a move. He is simply being realistic; Minsk needs to emerge from its isolationist state, but links with Moscow are too important to make a break. However, Lukashenka seems to think that the only way to please the West is to display animosity towards Russia; the instruction concerning travel to the Georgian enclaves has provoked outrage in Moscow. If he still wants to keep receiving his billion dollar loans, then Lukashenka will have to tread more carefully.

The move should be welcomed, but with caution. Much more needs to be done to improve the state of Belarusian politics and Lukashenka could be in danger of deepening dividing lines if he continues to aggravate the Kremlin. But if making concessions to the US and the EU can invigorate Belarus through increased trade, a more diverse economy and democratic reform, then it will be the people of Belarus who should ultimately reap the benefits. Opening up to the West will also hopefully mean that more aid will be directed to Belarus and those who need the help of the international community – particularly Chernobyl victims.

It would be even better if Lukashenka were to move on, and a trustworthy, democratic reformist were to take care of this oft-forgotten and economically stunted country. However, this really is the stuff of dreams.

All In It Together

2009-07-23T01:27:00.006+04:00

Photo: still from 2008 French documentary Kommunalka directed by Françoise Huguier
It is the 1950s. You are in Moscow. You are walking through a series of rooms, all joined on to one another. In the first, a couple of kids are sleeping; in the second, a group of women are having their morning wash. You enter the kitchen, where a pair of matronly women are standing face-to-face, cooking porridge on identical, shabby stoves, before arriving at the final room, where you are greeted by an elderly man dressed in a white vest and black boxer shorts, merrily playing an accordion, as a pair of adolescent boys perform their morning exercises in the background. The man grins at you before setting off through the apartment, breaking into song as he goes. He is joined by the other inhabitants of the flat, a motley crew made up of men and women of all ages, ethnicities and backgrounds, who follow behind him, parade-like, dancing and smiling in his wake. Welcome to the kommunalka, as romanticised in Todorovskyi’s hit 2008 film, Stilyagi.

The kommunalka, or communal apartment, is one of the iconic symbols of the Soviet era. Dreamt up and implemented during the early years of the Soviet Union, the kommunalka, a pre-revolutionary, bourgeois apartment converted for mass living, was the predominant form of housing for much of the twentieth century. Ask most Russians above a certain age, and they will recall their early years, spent packed in amongst their neighbours, a group of people with whom they had previously had no connection, but whose lives they became to know in the most intimate detail: their dreams, failures, cooking and even toilet habits. The kommunalka was both pragmatic and idealistic, serving the dual purpose of solving the drastic housing shortage caused by rapid industrialisation, whilst simultaneously fulfilling the Bolshevik dream of abolishing that horrible bourgeois habit: private property. It was also hoped that the experience would help construct the new Soviet Man – a tolerant, selfless comrade, who thought only of the collective.

In the 1960s, Khrushchev sought to replace the much-hated communal experiment with individual housing. Large grey apartment blocks (the ones most westerners think of when they picture even modern Russia) sprung up across the USSR. Nevertheless the kommunalka was not to be thwarted and it persisted right up to the present day, still existing today, albeit in a diminished form.

Statistics for 2008 show that, in Moscow alone, there are still 58,000 functioning communal flats. This is a dramatic decrease from 1997, where the same survey showed 148,000, nevertheless it is still 58,000 more than you would see in any other non-ex-Soviet country. Earlier this year, Vladimir Putin promised to rid Russia entirely of the communal curse by the year 2014, a promise he evoked again last week when he stated that it was time to stop “encouraging the communal flat”. His renewal of the promise was in response to proposals that those living in unsafe housing in the Samara region could be re-housed in communal apartments. Putin was adamant that the communal flat was not appropriate in modern day Russia – an idea echoed by many. “In my opinion communal flats serve to humiliate the individual by always forcing them to limit themselves. Any indiscretion can lead to a scandal, if not an all-out fight. Sadly there are still far too many communal flats”, raged Yuri Shevchuk, who lived for ten years in a communal apartment, where he was accused on a daily basis of washing in dangerous chemicals by a paranoid elderly neighbour.

On the other hand, the kommunalka still has its supporters. As the opening sketch of Tardokovskyi’s film suggests, for many the communal flat retains a rose-tinted aura. In such accounts, the daily degradation of human privacy is forgotten and replaced with nostalgic reminisces of the all-in-this-together-folks variety: “I spent my entire childhood in a communal flat and, despite the lack of space, I don’t consider my time there a negative period… We had very friendly neighbours. What’s more I think the experience of living in a communal flat teaches you a valuable lesson in tolerance towards one’s neighbours”, recalled Nikolai Bordyuzha, General Secretary of the Collective Security Treaty Organization. Many recollections and memoirs similarly recall the comradeship between inhabitants, describing how, on receiving individual apartments, alongside the huge sense of freedom, people missed their former neighbours, continuing to see them and socialise with them on a frequent basis.

Where does all this leave the modern kommunalka? Despite an article in the trendy Afisha newspaper, pronouncing the birth of the ‘modern kommunalka’ – a small-scale, bohemian commune inhabited by arty types – for the majority of those living in Soviet-style communal apartments, the experience remains an ideal. It is almost unanimously agreed that in modern Russia, there is no place for communal living. Unless, of course, it is a lifestyle choice.

I’ll leave you with the sketch from Stilyagi and a link to an academic project charting the existence of kommunalki in St Petersburg. You decide which is more realistic.

The Law of the Mountain: Chechnya under Kadyrov

2009-07-20T23:25:00.008+04:00

Ramzan Kadyrov

Sloppily dressed, crudely spoken and more at ease with a Kalashnikov in his hands than with questions on what he does with it, Ramzan Kadyrov is not exactly someone you’d want to take home to meet your parents. The 32 year-old President of Russia’s Chechen Republic is again at the centre of attention for all the wrong reasons following the murder of yet another of Russia’s human rights activists: Natalia Estemirova, a staunch critic of Kadyrov who was snatched outside her home last Wednesday morning and found dead and dumped at the roadside in neighbouring Ingushetia the following day.

Kadyrov, son of the late Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov, who was assassinated in May 2004, has been in power since 2007. A former separatist fighter who switched sides, he has been chums with Putin ever since. Earlier this year and following the end to the anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya he promised to bring prosperity to the republic within 10 years and then resign. Although he has been upbeat about the republic’s potential (sometimes delusionally so after envisaging Chechnya as a “safe place to invest”) he has a tough job ahead of him; Chechnya is plagued by high unemployment and restlessness on its borders as well as within.

At what price stability?

A drive round Chechnya reveals posters and billboards bearing patriotic slogans and photos of Ramzan and his late father. Traces of the war that lead to Grozny being declared the most destroyed city in the world have all but been erased. On the outside then, perhaps, life is on the mend. But scratch away some of the newly painted surfaces and a more harsh reality, one where those who question Kadyrov’s rule are silenced, becomes all too clear.

In Kadyrov’s large repertoire of outlandish comments one finds the necessity of reintroducing polygamy in the republic to boost the population after the wars. Men should take up to 4 wives if they can afford it, he once suggested, although he has been yet to follow his own advice. However, comments with more serious implications are also commonplace: ones that reveal a reverence towards old, lawless “traditions” and indicate a systematic and essentially officially-sanctioned undermining of the already-fragile rule of law. On Friday, another of these comments came out. Kadyrov was reported in Kommersant as saying that it would not be only Chechnya’s law enforcement agencies that would be involved in the search for Estemirova’s killers, but that they would be dealt with by the “law of the mountain”. “In accordance with centuries-old traditions and the mentality of the Chechen people, others will also be searching for the criminals, using local methods, which are sometimes very effective,” he said.

The reality behind such comments has been at the centre of Human Rights Watch’s attention in recent months. Constitutional law is often pushed aside in the republic whilst Kadyrov’s own ideas of justice and order take priority. Investigators have reported being refused entry to a local government building without wearing a headscarf. This is despite the facts that she is not Muslim and that by law Russia is a secular country.

Further accounts reveal the reality of the “law of the mountain” when put into practice. These were published earlier this month in the report ‘What Your Children Do Will Touch Upon You': Punitive House-Burning in Chechnya (click to view) and were added to by further reports last week. Families of those alleged to have links with insurgents are subject to persecution and punitive house-burning. Reports were given of the police visiting distant and often aging relatives of the alleged criminals and blaming them for not having brought their child up well enough. HRW document an example of such “justice” that occurred earlier this month (abridged version).

On July 2, Madina Yunusova had been critically wounded in a special operation carried out by Chechen law-enforcement agencies in a house where she was staying. The law-enforcement personnel surrounded the home and killed a man reported to be her husband [and allegedly involved in a plot to assassinate Kadyrov].

Yunusova was taken into custody, placed under surveillance in a prison-type room of a hospital in Grozny, and reportedly underwent successful surgery for her wounds. However, she died under suspicious circumstances less than three days later.

On July 4, between 3 and 4 a.m., a group of armed servicemen broke into the Yunusov family compound, locked Madina’s parents and two younger sisters, ages 4 and 6, in a shed, doused the house with gasoline from inside and set it on fire. Soon afterward, they unlocked the shed and left. The Yunusovs fled several hours after the burning.

The next day, July 5, soon after dawn, Madina's corpse was delivered to her parents already-burned home. Law-enforcement officers reportedly said to neighbours, "Where are your neighbors? We brought a corpse for them."

When informed that the Yunusovs had left, the officers took the body, which was wrapped in a shroud, from their vehicle and gave it to the neighbors, cautioning them not to unwrap it. The neighbors notified the Yunusovs, who buried the body.

Add this to the further murky territory of public extra-judicial executions, such as one of a man accused of giving a sheep to insurgents being shot by law enforcement officials in front of a group of young men they had forcibly gathered to watch and the justice brought by the “law of the mountain” doesn’t really seem as such.

Reports in Kommersant of the reactions of witnesses to Estemirova’s abduction sum up everyday life in the republic. Those standing at the bus stop at 7:30am when Estemirova was bundled into a car by several armed men shouting “I’m being kidnapped” did not bother alerting the police to this event, which – one might have thought – appeared rather suspicious. Why not? They thought she was “just being arrested by some local security officials (kakie-to mestnye siloviki)”. Is this the face of Chechyna’s return to normality?

Cheating the System

2009-07-16T21:10:00.006+04:00

Artwork: Alex Brodsky

The student sitting in front slips folded 1000 rouble (£20) notes in between the pages of his end-of-term coursework paper; students whisper, text, check their iphones and sit with open text books during a mid-term exam; a girl in the toilets adjusts cheat-notes (shpargalki) pasted over her thighs, hidden under her skirt and held in place with semi-opaque tights – just a few examples of my first-hand experience of corruption in the Russian higher education system over the past year.

Over the past few years in Russia there has been a lot of debate over the introduction of the new General State Exam (Edinnaia Gosudarstvennaia Examen, or EGE). A computerised, standardised test such as the SATs we have in Britain, this is aimed at rooting-out corruption in university admissions and improving accessibility for students from lower-income families. This year the EGE is to be fully implemented across Russia, yet it has come up against tough opposition since the idea was first mooted. The argument against the test’s corruption-busting potential indeed seems to have been prophetic. For a kick off the federal department responsible for the EGE is itself suspected of embezzlement of over 33 million rubles. Not exactly setting an example from above. Furthermore, there have been numerous discrepancies with EGE results, including cases of answers being known beforehand and posted on the internet or of concentrated levels of suspiciously high or low results in certain regions of Russia. Other criticism has been based on the unsuitability of a one-test-fits-all style approach to evaluating students’ knowledge.

How many, how much… and how?

The extent of corrupt practices is difficult to measure due to the nature of the problem and corruption within universities can take on many guises. The most common - and all of which I witnessed - include bribery, cheating, plagiarism, preferential treatment and discrimination. On higher levels, we’re getting into the realm of embezzlement, extortion and fraud. According to Ararat Osipian in his paper “Corruption and Reform in Russian Higher Education”, in 2005 over 3000 economic crimes in the education sector were reported, of which there were 849 cases of bribery and 361 cases of embezzlement of central budget resources. 20% of students used corrupt practices to gain admission to university. This is certainly but the tip of the iceberg.

The magnitude of the problem is also reflected in the population’s perceptions. A survey by the All-Russia Centre for the Study of Public Opinion last year showed that whilst 33% of respondents considered that knowledge was the most important thing needed to get into a higher education institute, 49% considered that it was money. Meanwhile, 13% of those who had a child in education said that they had had to pay admissions tutors for their entry. 27% had been forced to hand over money to teachers to ensure the necessary results during exam time. A study by the Higher School of Economics in Moscow showed that during the 2002-2003 academic year Russians spent around 21.4 billion rubles on bribes in admissions and in grading at university. It’s worth nothing that the abovementioned opinion poll showed that only 14% of respondents thought that the EGE would help combat corruption.

Greasing your tutors palm may be an age-old trick, but new, elaborate ways of cheating are also becoming commonplace. Friends of mine told stories of a radio earpiece worn hidden under the hair. As they pull their exam question at random from the pile students read it out loud, and those on the other end of the radio look up the question in the textbook and recite the answer into the earpiece. Add this to the hundreds of adverts posted round university buildings offered ready-made coursework on every topic imaginable and one gets the distinct feeling that education irregularities are a profitable business.

So the problem is widespread, yet with all this in mind let’s spare a thought for those who really do knuckle down to make the grade. Is it possible to get through the system with your conscience clear? Anything is possible, but even those with the best intentions in the world may end up getting out their wallets when faced with a “fail” from an exam official after sitting an exam they, and everyone else, knows they passed.

Why does the geek peek?

Which all leads us to ask – why? Professors’ salaries are often pointed to by means of one explanation – pay them more and they’ll do their job properly, right? Yet the institutionalised nature of this phenomenon points to deeper-rooted issues. Where do you draw the line between a lecturer turning a blind eye to whispering during a final-year exam, bumping up his friend’s son’s marks and accepting £200 to pass a lazy student? At MGIMO, depending on the extent of the tutor’s apathy or how much he was in need of a new washing machine for his wife either goes; a soviet-era mentality valuing personal relationships and links – svyazi – continues to prevail. In Britain, free from a burdensome past of pervasive corruption, the system is clear: exams are presided over by strict external moderators; students sit apart from one another, and write on official-use paper only identified by a candidate number. The slightest suspicion of unfair play leads to immediate disqualification from all exams that year and possible permanent exclusion full stop. Although favouritism can undoubtedly play a part, coursework papers are double-marked, checked through an electronic system for plagiarism and periodically sent to external moderators. A system that I would say is fairly effective (I can safely say that neither I, nor any of my friends would have even dreamt of attempting to cheat at university in Britain).

But apart from habit, and, well, just because they can, in my experience, honest students are often forced to cheat because of the set-up of the education system itself. Take high contact hours (compare approx 30 hours/week in Moscow to my 11 in London) and a heavy work load and add a demanding administrative system and often chaotic (or lack of) programme/workload/course coordination, even the most hard-working geek might be tempted to, say, sneak a peek at their notes in order to pass an un-announced exam that requires regurgitating hundreds of facts on a topic that the programme has not actually covered. Eventually a briber-bribed relationship is constructed; as both sides settle into the unspoken arrangement each is increasingly dependent on that system continuing to work for them.

Paying your way from the cradle to the grave

The implications of corruption in the higher education system are as serious as the problem is widespread. As a recent study by the Institute of Economics of Education in Dijon, France shows, corruption in higher education institutes seriously damages their competitiveness. The cost of corruption in higher education is analogous to reducing the economic productivity of a university and thus its rate of return by 2 – 15% as its quality is reduced.

Furthermore, corrupt practices in higher education institutes nurture corrupt attitudes in students that they take with them into the professional world. At a time when Russia is in dire need of modernisation and innovation, efficiency-crushing corruption is a two-sided sword, creating extra costs and undermining a healthy work-ethic. It will ultimately serve to completely devalue degrees from Russian universities.

Finally, a widespread acceptance of corruption feeds the image – and reality – of Russia as an increasingly polarised society: one of have-nots, still marginalised by years of cut-throat capitalism, and good-for-nothing haves living an empty existence, producing nothing and continuing to deprive the country of some much-needed real creativity and innovation.

But I think that my smart Russian pals who have worked their way through this quagmire of a system with their consciences still (as) clean (as is humanely possible) would agree with what our grannies in England would remind us – at the end of the day if you cheat, you’re just cheating yourself.

Poor Show in The Commons

2009-07-13T16:22:00.007+04:00

Artwork: Claude Monet, "Houses of Parliament, London"

Last month I was invited to a discussion panel at the Houses of Parliament entitled Russia A Year On – Testing Medvedev’s Democratic Credentials. Having never been inside that elaborate building dominating the Thames, and as a fan of both democracy and Russia, I was pretty keen to attend.

The evening sunshine soaked the busy streets of London as I made my way through the heartland of British politics, dodging both tourists and traffic at Parliament Square. I was in good spirits and looking forward to a constructive debate. But the feeling did not last long past the moment that I entered Committee Room 11, where the panel was gathering. The event was oversubscribed, the bottle-green room was stuffy, attendees were tip-toeing not-so-subtly through the creaking door thirty minutes late, and those who were already sitting down were either texting away on their phones or kicking the back of my chair. Or so it seemed. But more importantly, the event turned out to be a no holds barred Russia-bashing session. And there was very little mention of either Medvedev or democracy.

The panel comprised of an exasperated Russian dissident, the hot-blooded prime minister of the resistance Government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and two Western foreign policy experts. It was only the dissident who actually referred to the intended subject matter. Some interesting comparisons were made between the expectations of Medvedev’s supposed liberalism and those of past leaders. He concluded that with every new leader there has been renewed hope for a Western-friendly attitude, but every time this has ultimately proved to be a disappointment. I particularly enjoyed his reference to Andropov’s understandable fondness for whisky and jazz.

As valid as his points were, he was more of a downbeat entertainer than someone who could open up fresh debate. But because of his experiences (he was arrested and imprisoned for defending human rights in the 1960s and his application to run for the Russian Presidency was rejected in 2007), I found it hard to blame him for his cynicism. Nor did I blame the Chechen for his anger, having learnt what he had seen and experienced. But the attitude of the foreign policy buffs was another story. These were young, Western academics at the forefront of their field who should have taken the opportunity to lead a well-balanced discussion in order to make some progress in what sometimes seems to be the ‘inevitable’ confrontation between Russia and the West.

However, these two experts simply rehashed the same negative views about Russia, poorly justifying their opinions with unhelpful, sweeping comments such as ‘Russia refuses to co-operate’ and ‘Russia is dangerous’. Not only was this something that I had heard countless times before, but the speakers also made no attempt to propose what could or should be done to improve relations. Comments from the audience, which questioned Western policy towards Russia, were ungraciously slapped down. Such one-sided discussion serves no purpose other than to entrench mistrust in the West and hostility in Russia.

Certainly, Russia is far from perfect; it has many serious issues to address and the Georgia story has rightly provoked a wave of jittering. But if foreign policy experts working in think tanks and academic institutions continue to promote an attitude that smacks of Cold War divisions, then Russia will simply retreat further away from what is already a quasi-democracy and continue to regard the West with suspicion. Fortunately, there was someone last week who successfully managed to avoid such hackneyed rhetoric.

Although US President Barack Obama’s visit to Russia did not go down with the frenzy of hope and expectation as his presence has done elsewhere in the world, it was a positive step forward and one that should be emulated by all those dealing with Russia. His discussions with the Kremlin were positive, yet honest. He admitted and highlighted points of contention – namely the US proposed missile defence system – but made it clear that this would be worked around, as the issues of Georgia and NATO expansion will have to be. The summit converged on important areas of co-operation – nuclear warhead reductions, US transit to Afghanistan and combating terrorism – that can be built upon in the coming years and hopefully be used a basis to improve relations.

I honestly believe that Obama has it right here. There is little point trying to impose on Russia what we deem to be correct or right. The West needs to accept the differences and cope with them accordingly, but without selling out. Areas where interests do overlap must be emphasised and used as the point of departure for a relationship to be developed. Although it may not be for many years to come, the bitter aftertaste of the Cold War may finally be sweetened as co-operation progresses and the barriers of mistrust are broken down.

It simply serves no purpose whatsoever for us to discuss Russia in the terms that were used at the Houses of Parliament that June evening. However, an about-turn in the West will not be enough. Introspection from Russia is also necessary if genuine co-operation is to occur; many cite Obama’s cool reception as the result of anti-Western propaganda in Russia, which has only been exacerbated by the Kremlin pointing fingers at the US as the financial crisis has engulfed the world. A renewed relationship requires a change in attitude from both sides.

Perhaps these ideas are a little naïve and I know that many believe this summit will change nothing (and admittedly I do find Obama somewhat charming). But the Russian-Western partnership has failed over the last twenty years and it is certainly time to try a new, open, positive approach. And if we fail, at least we tried.

A Year in Russia

2009-06-28T14:05:00.007+04:00

Artwork: Viktor Pivovarov, "Bread roll to have with tea"
I’m back in England for a short while and it has given me the chance to reflect on the past year spent living in Moscow. Russia itself has certainly changed in this time, but I was wondering – how has it changed me?

The automatic reflex to put on my seatbelt as soon as I sit in the car has been completely lost. Not only do I no longer feel uneasy not wearing one, but when I do buckle up I feel my personal freedom is being compromised and worry that the driver may interpret such an action as a snub to his driving skills.

If the car I am in does not weave its way through traffic or drive flat out whenever possible I get impatient. The idea of undertaking or cutting someone up has faded from memory. For this same reason I now never attempt to cross the road without using the underground pedestrian crossing.

Although I still adamantly refuse to believe in “cross draughts” and their supposedly illness-inducing qualities I do now think twice before sitting with my back to an open window.

I only now realise why when I first started learning Russian the main thing we learnt all year was how to say “Russians like going to the forest and collecting mushrooms in their spare time.” And I like it.

Not only can I name all the countries in Central Asia but I can now tell an Uzbek from a Tadjik and a Kazakh from a Kyrgyz.

The pub has been replaced as my favourite hobby by going for a walk (“pogulyat”) and taking photos of myself and friends (“fotografirovatsa”).

Consequently, although I still find it amusing I no longer find it bizarre to walk through a park and for it to be full of girls in miniskirts and stilettos taking photos of themselves in compromising positions next to a tree or, say, writhing on the grass near some flowers.

In the same way, I never, ever have to ask myself the question: “Am I overdressed?”

I am no longer shocked or surprised to see fellow students at university with cheat notes up their skirts/sleeves/blatantly lying on the desk or shoving 1000 rouble notes in between the pages of their coursework before it is handed in (more on this in a separate post soon).

It now seems perfectly normal that my university professor’s mobile rings during a lecture… and he answers it… several times in one lesson... sometimes proceeding to have a conversation right there in front of the class. Although it’s still distracting, I no longer pay much attention to the fact that students also receive several phone calls during class and will get up to answer every time.

“Going for an Indian” has been replaced by “going for a Georgian” in my Saturday night out vocabulary.

My skin has become extremely thick against any type of abuse coming from a middle aged woman in a position of “authority”. My ears are deaf to her rants.

I cannot be sure that a rule exists unless I try breaking it. Even if I am ranted at by the above-mentioned middle aged woman in a position of “authority” whilst breaking this “rule” I still cannot be sure that there is a rule or whether she just wants something to rant about and thus I will continue doing whatever I am told I am not allowed to do in the expectation that she will quickly get bored and give up.

My English attitude towards queue etiquette has taken a rattling. Although I still often feel that my personal space is being invaded, I am no longer shocked when someone pushes right in front of me. I certain situations I find that it’s even me doing the pushing in.

I feel uneasy and self-conscious when my shoes are unclean. I feel like everyone on the metro is staring at the dirtiness and judging me.

I am not surprised to see policemen smoking, buying hotdogs, eating sweets and flirting with girls when they are in uniform and on duty.

Polittechno

2009-06-16T21:47:00.008+04:00

A friend of mine recently introduced me to Polittechno, a genre of music dreamt up by Petersburg-based musician/producer, Alexei Vishnya. The name, 'Polittechno', comes from a compound of the words 'political' and 'techno' and consists of putting politicians' words to techno beats. You're more than likely to have seen Vishnya's most famous clip, 'Kto mog by byt' Prezident' (Who could be President), doing the rounds on You Tube, but there is much more where that comes from.

Vishnya, a sound director who produced about half the albums of legendary rock group Kino, started experimenting with politicians' voices back in 2000, after hearing a news presenter talking about Putin: I was watching TV, listening to journalist Sergei Dorenko, when he said: “Putin and only Putin.” I thought to myself, “that's rap” and started experimenting with famous people's voice, putting them to music. My first song was called “Putin and Only Putin”, with Dorenko performing as lead singer.

Four years later, Vishnya released an album, “Viagra for Putin”, showcasing all the good and great of Russia’s political glitterati: Putin, Zhirinovsky, Gorbachev, Chubais and Irina Kharmada amongst others. Of the 11 songs on the album, my favourites are ‘Russian Pigs’ (see below) and ‘Who’s Boris Berezovsky?”, feat. V.V. Putin, in which Putin disses the disgraced Russian oligarch, currently residing in London despite repeated Russian requests for extradition.

Russian Pigs, featuring Irina Khakamada and Vladimir Zhirinovsky
Essentially Zhirinovsky talk about 'Russian Pigs' - drug addicts, prostitutes, alcoholics and disabled people(?) etc., amongst others. To which Khakamada replies: 'Vladimir Volfovich, you are a coward.' The two argue then argue throughout the song, as Zhirinovsky's accusations of who exactly is a Russian Pig become even more all encompassing: all opposition parties, Americans etc.

Vishnya claims to have no real political agenda, calling his political subjects ‘muses’, responsible for inspiring musical creativity rather than political expression. When asked in a recent interview about his attitude to the Putin-Medvedev tandem, he replied: As philosophers say, I experience total objectivity towards these people – they exist outside my consciousness. Towards the Putin-Medvedev tandem, I am also entirely objective… As regards Putin, I have been observing him for a very long time now – even as far back as when he worked for the Communist party in what was Leningrad. However politics really didn’t interest me at all during the 1990s… Then at some point it became impossible to ignore politics any longer The informational field became so multifaceted that the muses from this sphere came themselves to visit me. I’m sure you understand how funny it is to observe them, their laughability and all their ridiculous pre-election debates.

And what do the ‘muses’ feel in relation to puppet-master Vishnya? His videos attract a lot of attention which can come accross as either positive or negative PR. Vishnya related a story to the newspaper Izvestia about how Irina Khamada invited him to Moscow following her starring role in Viagra for Putin. On one of the songs, entitled Techno Woman, she sings, "I met the president and I gave it to him. This isn’t our first year in politics and we’ve been around." To which Putin replies, ‘She’ll no longer be any one’s political toy.’ According to Vishnya, Irina praised the song as ‘funny’ and described him as a ‘talented boy’ (he was 39 at the time!) but when he suggested she collaborate with him on further songs she retorted: “I’m not a little girl – I’m a representative of the state Duma!”

Although he is yet to release another CD, Vishnya remains prolific, regularly posting new videos on his You Tube channel and on a Live Journal blog. His most recent post, which stars President Medvedev singing about the stability of the Russian political system, has already been viewed almost 6000 times. Nevertheless, despite his popularity, the money is not rolling in - his music (including his album) remains a non-commercial project, distributed for free on the internet : "the fanatical project of a man who’s gone crazy for politics."

The album in it's entirety, if anybody is interested.

Hello, Officer

2009-06-14T00:58:00.004+04:00

Photo: einarorn on flickr.com
Yesterday I had my first run-in with the Russian police. Unlike many of my other foreign friends, I am not routinely stopped and hassled for my documents so this was my first direct experience of the renowned MVD, although of course I’d heard thousands of stories about how corrupt the Russian police are. This time around, however, I was definitely in the wrong, although I’m not entirely sure to what extent the police were in the right either.

Picture the scene. It was the start of a long sunny weekend and some friends and I decided to buy some wine and have a little drink in a park in the sunshine. Now, usually you can drink pretty much anywhere, anytime in Saint Petersburg, however we somehow hit upon the idea of taking our wine to the Summer Gardens, one of the few places where it is strictly forbidden to drink alcohol. We sort of knew it was forbidden, but this being Russia, where rules are made to be broken, we decided we’d probably be alright. So, we found a nice bench and after finding the requisite pieces of paper on which to sit (Russians have a peculiar horror of dirt and who knows what sort of diseases lurk upon benches) we poured our wine into plastic cups and started our evening. All was going swimmingly until a couple of policeman with joy in their eyes, descended upon us, shouting “you’re nicked!” (or at least the Russian equivalent).

Your Documents, Please

I suspect that the first lesson taught at Russian policeman school is how to ask for the documents of any law-transgressing (or potentially law-transgressing) (or indeed not Russian-looking thus potentially law-transgressing) character. It is perhaps the average Russian policeman’s favourite activity and they are at it everywhere: in the metro, on the streets, in the park, you name it. And so, true to form, we were asked to hand over our passports.

Not really wanting to do so, my Russian friends all immediately claimed not to be carrying theirs, whilst I stood there smiling stupidly, not having my passport with me and not really wanting to give away that I wasn’t Russian. The police, however, were adamant. No documents were produced at this point but we were told that it would be necessary to go with them to the station, to sort out this little problem. The police seemed remarkably happy about all this and didn’t in the least insist that we should pour the wine away. Instead, as we set off towards the station they told us to bring the wine with us, and so we we walked through the park drinking our illegal wine in their presence. They were also very cheerful, joking away as if it was all part of the picnic.

When we arrived at the station – a small hut/office in the park boundaries – we were told we would have to show our passports. In gallant, Russian-man style, my friend assured the police that the devushki (girls) hadn’t been drinking and so it really wasn’t necessary. Alas, the fact we were holding cups of wine somewhat negated this and the policeman insisted we show them. At this point I had to admit that I wasn’t Russian and unfortunately didn’t have my passport. To which the policeman astutely replied: “And how do I know you’re not a foreign terrorist?” Good question, to which I had no proof illustrating the contrary. He seemed to accept my promise that I wasn’t, but all the same made us go into the little hut, where a matriarchal mama of a policewoman sat looking at us severely.

“You do realise you are not allowed to drink in this park?” the woman asked. Well, yes. And then, the horrible fate that surely must arise from a meeting with the Russian police after such unlawful activity never happened. “Devushki, you must read these rules and then you can wait outside on the benches.” This was clearly a man's problem. And so Anna and I dutifully read the Park rules (which somewhat bafflingly included ‘no killing of swans’ despite a notable lack of swans in the park) and then went outside leaving the men to do their stuff. The men were offered a choice – 500r official fine per person, including noting down of passport information, or 300r under-the-table, straight in to the policeman’s pocket. A no-brainer really. The boys paid up as the girls waited quietly outside.

All’s Well That Ends Well

And so our police escapade ended. I learnt a few important things about how the police in Russia work: first, they really do love that little bit of money. The system of slipping the police a couple of hundred roubles and avoiding any further trouble is so entirely engrained in the minds of both the police and Russian citizens as to make it an almost officially sanctioned law. Second, when there’s a promise of some money the police are friendly. I mean, really, really friendly. Third, the Russian police are rather sexist. And for once, I was glad of it!

Mr Medvedev

2009-06-04T11:08:00.005+04:00

Art Work: Jose Maria Cano Photo: EFE/Sergei Chirikov
I went on a little jaunt last weekend to the wilds of the Russian countryside in search of bears, but alas my search was not very fruitful. Fortunately, my disappointment was curbed when I got home and found my news feed full of little tales about that other Russian bear-related character: Mr Dmitry Medvedev. I do like a good presidential story and here are some of the best from last week.

Why Women Love Medvedev

A recent survey by the “Social Opinion” foundation (FOM) has shown that Medvedev’s approval rating amongst women has risen by 10% over the last two months, giving him an overall 67% approval rate amongst the fairer sex. FOM put the question, “How do you think the president has changed over the past year” to women across the country, receiving amongst it’s replies, that: the head of government has “become more decisive” and “demanding”; “he has matured to become more competent”; “he is more active and business like” and some women even noted that his exterior appearance had changed. All in all, the consensus was that Putin’s protégée has grown up, at last adequately filling the presidential shoes. He might not have his prime minister’s good looks, but as political poster boy number two, Putin should start watching his back.

According to psychologist Sergei Makelov, the reasons for Medvedev’s increased popularity are quite obvious. “Most woman like an action-man type of character”, he told popular newspaper Argumenti i Fakti, “the kind, who is capable of solving any problem – or, at least claiming to be able to, since to the female ear the two are one and the same.” [whaaaat?] Apparently, Medvedev’s resolute pronouncements on education, healthcare and the ongoing struggle with wayward provincial bureaucrats have won him over the female electorate. Whether he follows his promises through remains to be seen, however, according to Makelov, this part of the bargain is not so important to women anyway. What a wonderful position for a politician to find himself in!

Mummy, I’ve Painted Medvedev

Over at Russian Livejournal (the place to blog in the Russian Federation), blogger fima-psuchopadt writes of a bumper-crop of children’s drawings that he has stumbled across, depicting respected Dmitry Anatolevich Medvedev himself. Now, I know traditionally Russians have always gone in for cult-building around its leaders (the proliferation of Lenin statues and Stalin's cult barely need mentioning here, although the tradition actually stretches back to Tsarist times) but in this day and age, I was a little surprised to learn that primary school children had been painting their president. Is this usual behaviour? (Side note: in the primary school I teach in there is a large picture of Dmitry Anatolevich over the door. Lovely stuff)

To return to fima-psuchopadt’s post, he has selected some of his favourite entrants amongst the art works, which he, somewhat ironically, sees as an uncanny representation of Russian truth, as depicted through childish eyes.

1. Medvedev frolicking past the three essential stages of a Russian's life: school, university,and, erm, Gazprom. As firma-psuchopadt points out, Medvedev is interestingly positioned so as either to be going backwards or leading a song and a dance on the spot. Uncannily indicative of the direction of Russian politics?

2.
“Medvedev Reads the Constitution to Children”. Apparently a wonderful example of respected Dmitry Anatolevich's greatness – note how even the cat and dog look upon the mighty president with rapt attention. However FP spots a bit of anti-state feeling in the over accurate attention to Medvedev’s diminished height and oversized tie knot.

That’s all on the weekend’s bear spotting, but there’s sure to be more soon.

I live in Russia!

2009-05-30T18:28:00.004+04:00

Picture: Film Poster for "Molodaia Gvardia"
Now the big raving Brit in me means that I have rather mixed feelings about England being dissed, especially when it includes having accusations of bourgeois-imperialism levelled at me. However, when it’s in a catchy song endorsed by a pro-Kremlin youth group and sung by one of Russia’s most notorious chanson artistes then I guess I can let it lie. “Ya zhivu v Rossii!” (I live in Russia!) is the latest single out by Sergei Trofimov and rather popular on the Molodaia Gvardia youth movement website. It won me over, see what you think:

(You can read by (very badly translated) transcript of the lyrics in English below. If anyone can do any better you are more than welcome!)

Somewhere in London it’s been pouring with rain since the morning
Pavements, streets worn out by cabs
You won’t find any place in the pubs, and on the stock exchange,
The game turns into the usual British gambit

The order of things here is unchanging and simple
Like the parliamentary throne of the Queen
And the influential pound continues the rise
Of the bourgeois-imperial tree

*** Chorus ***

But I live in Russia!
At the furthest point of being
I live in Russia!
It’s simply my motherland

In this untamed great power
Constrained by dreams of days gone by
It’s unlikely that life will become more substantial or simpler
But it’s my home

***

On the Saint-Claire Boulevard chestnuts are flowering
And in the Boulogne forest the cold wind has gone astray
And the glass turns red from Burgundy wine
As if the Holy Grail has been discovered again

Here a united people respect themselves
And their freedom attained through suffering
And they live from day to day, not bemoaning anything
Earning a profit from goods from year to year

I had a friend, he went away a long time ago
To that place which did not have shocks and misfortune in store
For him, our life is like a bad film
Where the budget can’t save the mediocre plot

Sometimes he calls to find out how things are going
And, having heard the latest gossip
Doesn’t understand why we are burning to the ground

In order to once again rise from the ashes

News from the Caucasus

2009-05-29T21:09:00.003+04:00

Photo: Sergei Maximishin, Kabardino-Balkaria
Russia is the biggest country in the world. Fact. And it’s with this in mind that I’m going to start blogging more news from the more far flung regions of the motherland. In the days to come I’ll be taking a look at the Russian Far East, Siberia, the Urals, who knows - I might even make it to Murmansk. But for now, I’ll start where I left off on Wednesday – down south, in the Caucasus.

Kavkaz-uzel.ru is an internet news portal for the Caucasus region with constant updates on breaking news stories. I read through the news posted over 24 hours yesterday and picked out 3 stories to tell you about.
___________________________

A Gun Battle has Broken out in the Capital of Kabardino-Balkaria
May 28, 3:35am

The sound of explosions and gunfire can be heard in central Nal’chik, capital of Kabardino-Balkaria, near to the central market and bus station.

“Law enforcement officers have blocked militants into a privately-owned building on Mechnikov street,” explained one source.

The shootout in central Nal’chik started at 1:30am Moscow time. At the current moment single gunshots can be heard.

The situation in Kabardino-Balkaria has again escalated. On the night of the 10th of May in the village of Dugulubgia after a special operation by the FSB three fighters were killed. According to unofficial sources, one of those killed was later identified as a former Imam of the Kabardino-Balkarian Jamia, Mussa Mukozhev.

On the 14th May the vice chief of the pre-trial detention facility of the federal penitentiary service Vitalii Bogatyrev was shot dead nearby his home and 500m from his workplace, by a gunman in a passing vehicle.

On the 20th May in Nal’chik gunmen opened fire on traffic policemen in a police car. The policemen returned fire but the gunmen managed to get away.

****

Markov: strengthening Abkhazia’s border with Georgia will ensure security
May 28, 9:11am

Reinforcing the border between Abkhazia and Georgia with Russia border guards will allow a higher level of security for Abkhazia to be ensured, will improve the economy and raise the number of tourists to the region declared Sergei Markov, MP.

According to the Markov, the Georgia’s government, under President Mikhail Saakashvili “has not let go of the idea of bringing Abkhazia back under control by force.”
The agreement signed on the 30th April to guard the border between Abkhazia and Georgia with both Abkhazian and Russian border guards is “legal, obvious and expresses the interest of the peoples of Russia and Abkhazia” declared Markov. “The border guards not only guard the border but also create the conditions for peaceful work and development of the people of Abkhazia.”

On the 1st May NATO declared that the agreement with Abkhazia and South Ossetia on guarding their borders is in conflict with the agreements from the 12 August and 8 September and is not conducive to long-term peace and security in the South Caucasus.

Markov also mentioned that he had been involved in the preparatory stages of a expert-youth forum that will take place in Abkhazia in July with the participation of “United Russia” [Russia’s ruling party], “Young Guard” [a pro-Kremlin youth group], students and professors from Russian universities and Russian experts.

****

Preparations continue in Chechnya for the municipal elections
May 28th 2009, 13:34pm

Preparations for Chechnya’s municipal elections which will be taking place on the 11th October are currently underway. They are being taken particularly seriously due to the fact that this is the first time that municipal elections are being held. The regional Central Election Committee is undertaking a lot of work preparing brochures as well as seminars to ensure that voters, candidates and the media understand the election process.

Observers have expressed scepticism with regards to the results of the voting in the parliamentary elections that took place on the 12 October 2008. What bothered them in particular was the unconditional support shown by the population towards “United Russia”, the leading party that received 88.4% of the votes.

Meanwhile, the voting situation for two contested regions remains unclear. Sunzhenskii and Malgobekskii are currently under the jurisdiction of Ingushetia, but before 1934 were administrative parts of Chechnya. Chechnya’s head of parliament has previously made clear that the status of these regions need to be decided in a fair manner. However, there are no documents other than those from 1934 that determine whether these two regions belong to Chechnya or Ingushetia. Official commissioner on Human Rights to the Chechen Republic Nurdi Nukhazhiev has also declared that Ingushetia does not have the right to lay claim to Chechen land. Nevertheless in recent times the question as to the status of Sunzhenskii and Malgobekskii has not been raised.

Hotting up down South

2009-05-27T19:39:00.001+04:00

Photo: Sergey Maximishin

Since President Dmitri Medvedev triumphantly declared the end of the anti-terrorist operations in Chechnya last month, leading the republic’s leader Ramzan Kadyrov to envisage a bright future of foreign investment and economic growth, things in the Causcasus have gone a little bit iffy – it might not yet be quite time for a summer break in Grozny. Over the past month or so the daily news has been highlighted by intense gun battles between the military and the “bandits”, who have been hiding out in the forests of Dagestan or involved in shootouts in the capital of Ingushetia.

According to Vladimir Mukhin of Nezavisimaia Gazeta, despite attempts by the southern republics’ leaders to give the impression that everything is under control by underestimating the numbers of “bandits” participating in battle, the numbers of terrorists killed or detained recently as reported by the Ministry of Internal Affairs tells a different story. According to official figures, since the 16th of May, when anti-terrorist operations in the regions were stepped up, 28 bandits have been killed and more than 20 detained. Around 12 members of the Ministry of Internal Affairs have been killed. The Ministry of Defence stopped publishing figures for its members killed in Chechnya last year and so the final tally of law-enforcement victims is uncertain, but nevertheless the situation is considerably more serious than the leaders of these regions would like to admit.

RFRL Week in Facebook

2009-05-26T17:51:00.010+04:00

Meet the Gopniks

2009-05-24T16:59:00.006+04:00

Photo: okya1.ru
A group of young men wearing pointy-toed leather shoes, gold chains and shiny tracksuits with fake brand names – think Abibas not Adidas - squat around a mobile phone that blares out Russian techno, chewing on sunflower seeds, drinking beer and occasionally spitting massive gobs of phlegm to display their manliness. Meet the Gopniks, a so-called youth sub culture (although no one would ever actually describe themselves as a gopnik) of young, not-very-well-off, Russian men.

It is impossible to live in Russia very long without hearing about the gopniki: newspapers, blogs, even my friends, talk constantly about them, but exactly who they are is a bit of a mystery to me. Gopniki.net , an online ‘museum’ of gopniks providing a cod-anthropological expose of the group, gives the impression that they are a defined criminal group, whilst another site describes them as 'a post-Soviet subculture educated in the criminal aesthetic and brought up in a working environment.'

And yet my friends' use of the word 'gopnik' is far wider: anyone from the working classes, who seems to be getting a bit lairy or causing a bit of a trouble can be classed as a gopnik. Could it be that gopnik is the Slavic equivalent of the British chav? Is that even possible in Russia, a country which apparently doesn't share Britain's complex system of class snobbery, as epitomised by the much-debated division between chavs and chav-nots?

The exact origins of the term ‘gopnik’ are unclear, although it is generally agreed that it comes from the addition of the suffix –nik to the acronym GOP. However to exactly what GOP refers remains a contentious issue. One version has is that it stands for Gorodskoye Obshchestvo Prizreniya (the City Society of Care), the name for the network of poor houses set up by the Soviets following the October Revolution. Another version translates the acronym as Gorodskoye Obshchezhitiye Proletariata (The City Hall of Proletarian Residence), referring to a large hostel set up in the 1920s in Saint Petersburg in the Hotel Oktyabrskaya, to house the tidal wave of peasants and small-city dwellers that flooded into the capital during the chaotic dislocation of the post-revolution years. According to Petersburg folklore, the once-grand hotel soon became became renowned as a hubbub of criminal activity although historians have never been able to find proof of it’s existence.

In any case, whichever acronym GOP refers to, the term gopnik evolved as a word to describe poor young men, whose backwards ‘provinciality’, criminal behaviour and general loutishness conflicted with Soviet rhetoric, which called for ‘culturedness’ - a value reaching far beyond our western perception of culture, encompassing certain standards of behaviour such as abstinence from alcohol, traditional sexual morals and a smart and clean appearance. Throughout the Soviet years, the term gopnik was invoked as an insult to those on the margins of society, who drank, committed crime or were just generally considered uneducated and uncultured.

The term gopnik survived the collapse of the Soviet Union and throughout the 1990s it evolved to refer to the hard men who reigned throughout this lawless period – the reason why most Russian flats have at least three locks, as gopniki, shaved-headed heavies provided the muscle in business and politics. During the 1990s gopniki had power, if not respect, as they raked in money by any means as many, more educated Russians suffered from the fall out of the Soviet Union and the difficulties of adjusting to the free market.

With the demise of Yeltsin and the implementation of Putin’s iron hand and with no strong cultural yardstick a la Soviet culturedness, it looked as though Gopniki as a social subgroup could be over. Indeed, when a couple of years ago a group of journalists from Exile magazine went on a ‘gopnik’ safari they concluded that the gopnik movement was as good as over: Just as the mighty Tyrannosaurus Rex evolved into the rock pigeon, right before our eyes we're witnessing the rapid devolution of the gopnik into something that can only be described as "skinny dude with a bad mullet who tells everyone he's a brand manager but for now he works at a Evroset kiosk where he managed to five-finger enough cash to get himself a used Nissan Almera, which he loves more than anything which ever was, is, or shall be." And so from a feared group of fairly hardcore criminals, the gopniki have become a mocked group of not-very-wealthy Russians. Gopnik has become a cult idea, spawning books, music, the works... Take a look at this clip by Syava, a rapper who parodies ‘Gop Hop’ artists (think Goldie Lookin’ Chain meets the Russian Provinces) a current you tube sensation.

The label ‘gopnik’ is assigned to anyone of low income and low education, who, in the eyes of society, don't have the nouse to sieze the opportunities available to them in society. Today's Russian gopniks are no different to England’s chavs or America’s white trash: they are not a cultural sub group – indeed, they can not even be defined as one group - but a reflection of social snobbery very much alive in Russia today.

News from the Eastern Face

2009-05-14T20:57:00.008+04:00

I'm going to be posting Radio Free Europe's "This Week in Facebook" every week now. For anyone who's interested in following events in countries of the former Soviet Union RFE's website http://www.rferl.org/ has got tonnes of information, much of which you cannot find elsewhere in the press.

The Treats, Trials and Tribulations of the “Taxi”

2009-05-13T23:17:00.004+04:00

Photo: "Lada in Belarus", carolinephotography.co.uk

There’s no better way to experience the delights of the Russian automobile industry than by hailing a “taxi” on the streets of any town or city of Russia. In the short period of time that it takes you to journey to your destination you are free to admire the finer details of various car models the likes of which are unseen and unheard of (for good reason) in the West. During this time you will also experience a momentary insight into the life of those who drive such a vehicle. Trapped in a confined space with a total stranger for whom you have momentarily become a long-time friend, you are unable to escape hearing his whole life story / personal reflections on the financial crisis / evaluation of the state of the country and/or world today / extensive opinion on immigration / complaints about the price of groceries and/or government pension schemes.

The most convenient thing about taxis in Russia is that most drivers are potentially ready to become one. Stick out your hand and negotiate your price and destination with the first person who stops. If the first car does not fancy this price/destination combination fear not – there’s probably already a queue forming behind him waiting to get their chance. This standard practice of negotiating your price with the driver beforehand niftily saves you from the agony of the London black cab as you sit watching the little red figures on the metre rise exponentially every couple of seconds and is one of the main reasons why I am a fan of the “gypsy cab”.

The ubiquitous Lada “Zhiguli” model (yes, it’s the one whose inventors were clearly inspired by the cars they drew in crayon as children) in various states of disrepair or, more comically, with tinted windows, shiny hubcaps and leopard-print furry seat and steering-wheel covers is the first “taxi” that you will probably come across. My favourite Zhiguli experience so far (and there are indeed, many) was one with a tinted rear windscreen etched with a line drawing of Tyra Banks running through a forest accompanied by wolves. The driver really didn’t look the type. Indeed, whilst hailing a car, although it is easy to pick out from a distance which car in the line of traffic will be the one for you (bets are on that it won’t be the guy in the Mercedes), predicting the conversation in store is more of a refined ability.

The price of your journey will depend on various factors, including whether the driver is going that way anyway, how small his normal wage is, how keen he is to have someone to rant at, whether you can show them how to get to where you’re going and how direct the road is. If your destination is straight on then you’re in a good position to negotiate. If your destination is to the right then, at least in Moscow, the city where it is impossible to make a right-hand turn, getting to where you want to go will involve 3 left hand turns and/or u-turns and so your price is likely to be higher. In any case, you can be sure that you will get from A to B in the fastest possible time by weaving in and out of traffic, tailgating the car in front, or even better, tailgating an ambulance passing through a red light. Don’t be surprised if you driver tells you that you don’t need to put your seatbelt on when he sees you making an attempt to do so. Don’t be surprised either if he sees any attempt at putting on a seatbelt on as a personal insult to his own driving abilities. And don’t be too surprised if your car happens to have a portable police siren stuck to the roof. It’s all part of the experience.

Putin: Good Evening, will you take me to the Kremlin?
Driver: D’you know the way?
Putin: Not really, I’m from Petersburg myself.
Driver: How much you payin’?!
Putin: I don’t know… 200 rubles?
Driver: Call it 300 and let’s go.
Putin: No, I won’t pay 300 sorry
…
Driver: Alright then, let’s go.
Putin: Excuse me, can you…?
Driver: It’s alright… I’ve got one myself.

Happy Victory Day!

2009-05-10T13:48:00.002+04:00

Yesterday Russia celebrated the end of WWII with parades and parties aplenty. Here is the video of the parade on Moscow's Red Square. As Caroline already posted (but about which I'm still in shock), it was a lovely sunny day because the Moscow authorities have ways of dispersing the clouds - if anyone knows how you could possibly do this, please get in touch!

Still, they do put on a good show!

С ДНЕМ ПОБЕДЫ!

News from the Eastern Bloc

2009-05-06T22:12:00.009+04:00

Artwork: Sinie Nosy
What would happen if Eastern European countries had Facebook accounts and updated them as much as the average British student with an iphone and a yearning to share their every feeling with the outside world? Radio Free Europe tried to imagine the result and this is what they came up with for this week. Love it!
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Who’s afraid of the Russian Police?

2009-05-03T11:43:00.012+04:00

Photo: Valerii Nistrov
The Russian police hardly have a good reputation and in the light of a recent incident, in which an off-duty Russian police chief opened fire in a Moscow supermarket, killing three and seriously wounding four more, the newspaper Kommersant posed the question: Who’s more dangerous than the Police? Here are some of the responses.

Sergey Katanandov, Head of the Republic of Karelia
Fools, that’s what I’m afraid of. A fool thinks nothing of shooting out the window of his flat – and unfortunately there are such examples. That’s why it’s essential to ensure that anyone purchasing a firearm undergoes a medical examination. But people in Karelia aren’t afraid of the police, they trust them.

Anatolii Kulikov, Chairman of the International Anticriminal and Antiterrorist forum. Former Head of Russian MVD (police) 1995 – 1998
Bandits are more dangerous than policeman. I don't agree with people who think otherwise. You come across villains in any sphere, but there are many decent people within the police force. It is essential that any crimes committed by policeman are heavily punished to prevent ordinary people thinking that the police can just get away with it.

Magomed Tolboev, Pilot, Hero of Russia
For me there is nothing more terrifying than a policeman. When I see someone in uniform I cross to the other side of the street. It doesn't matter who they're dealing with – a Hero of Russia, Pensioner or General – they' can easily humiliate or rob him. Only about 10% of officers in the police force are honest, decent people. And after this bloodbath in the supermarket the minister and his deputies should resign.

Valerii Engel, First Vice President of the International Congress of Russian Speaking Jewry
I, like any normal person, fear our custodians of law and order, just as I fear bandits and skinheads. It’s hard to imagine a situation in any other developed country when the police would start shooting at citizens.

Andrei Lugovoi, Deputy of the State Duma
The employees of Scotland Yard, who are unfairly persecuting me. If you're going to be scared of anyone in the law enforcement agencies, it should without doubt be them. There's no reason to fear our policemen – this is an isolated incident.

Lev Ponomarev, Leader of movement «For Human Rights.»
The authorities. The police are unlawful, but they're carrying out the authorities' orders. The mayor behaved so cockily because he knew that it was sanctioned. The police hide their bad eggs.

Rainer Muller-Hanke, Chairman of KMV Bank
The corrupt. The Russian police aren't dangerous. They have only ever helped me. When my documents were stolen in a hotel, although they were unable to find the thief, the police really tried to get my documents back. [This tragedy] could occur in any country.

Saving for a Sunny Day

2009-05-02T11:11:00.008+04:00

Artwork: "Garden", Asya Nemchanok
The economic crisis is taking its toll in Russia, yet people are keeping faith and the authorities will not let a looming budget deficit get in the way of a sunny Victory Day parade. Well, at least that’s what the “Russia in Figures” section of this week’s Vlast magazine seems to indicate.
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According to the Russian Home Office, on the 19th of April (Orthodox Christian Easter Day), an Easter church service was held in 9,300 churches across Russia with a participation of approximately 4.5 million people and an extra 106,600 thousand police officers on duty (or one extra police officer for every 42 people). Between 60 to 70 per cent of Russians consider themselves Orthodox Christians (85 to 99 million people), of whom 1 in 19 attended an Easter service.

Compare this with Christmas church-going. On the 7th of January (Orthodox Christmas), 2.1 million people (or one in 40 of those who consider themselves Orthodox Christian) attended a service at one of the 8011 churches open that day. An extra 85,700 police officers were on duty. This means that at Easter 2.4 times the amount of people attend Church than at Christmas. The proportion of police officers to visitors however is 1.68 times higher at Christmas than at Easter, leading the writers of Vlast to conclude that Easter is celebrated more widely in Russia than Christmas, but rather less riotously.

15,280 rubles [£310 / €348 / $462 by today’s exchange rate] was the average income in Russia for March of this year. This was 13.3% more than in March 2008.

According to Alexei Kudrin, Russian Finance Minister, the Reserve Fund of the Russian Federation [Note: which peaked in January 2008 at $157 billion] “will be practically completely run dry” by 2010. On the 1st of April 2009 the fund was still over $121 billion in the black.

Inflation over the period from the 1st of January to the 20th April 2009 stood at 6%. This is the same as over the same period last year.

The Moscow authorities will be spending 65 million rubles [£1.3 million / €1.48 million / $1.96 million) this year on cloud dispersal treatments for the 9th of May Victory Day celebrations and Moscow City Day celebrations [Note: on important bank holidays planes are sent up around Moscow to disperse the clouds and to ensure sunny weather. Boris Johnson should really take note.]

2,700 kilometres of road will be built in Russia in the upcoming year, which is 17.4% more than last year.

2.26 billion people were registered unemployed by the 15th of April – 1.6% more than the amount registered by the 9th of April. According to official statistics since the beginning of October last year 329,000 people have lost their jobs.

The foreign trade turnover of Russia in January and February of this year stood at $50.5 billion – only 56% of the turnover taken during the same period of last year. According to official statistics exports stood at $36.7 billion (52.3% of last year’s amount) and imports at $23.8 billion (64.5% of that of last year).

The price of medicine rose 14.2% in the January to March period of this year in comparison with prices in December 2008.

Sparkling Socialism

2009-04-29T16:41:00.010+04:00

Ickily sweet, bubbly and dirt cheap, no Russian celebration would be complete without the obligatory bottle (or two) of Shampanskoe, Russia’s answer to the rather more famous and – dare I say it, more palatable – French Champagne. There are many, many different varieties available in Russia today, but, beyond a shadow of a doubt the most popular is Sovetskoe Shampanskoe, available in various degrees of cloying sweetness – Brut, Semi-Dry, Semi-Sweet and Sweet – all at less than three pounds a pop. The product’s black and gold label is so ubiquitous that I assumed it had been around for years, however it was actually only in 2004 that it became a registered trademark. Nevertheless, the story of its creation is a good one, reaching back to beyond the 1917 revolution and stretching on right up to today.

Champagne (which, due to EU licensing laws that restrict the application of this title to products made in France’s Champagne region, we should technically call 'sparkling wine') first appeared in Russia during the eighteenth century. It wasn’t until the turn of the twentieth century, however, that production really took off. Prince Galitsyn, a Belarusian aristocrat, garnered international acclaim when his version of the fizzy drink, produced on the shores of the Black Sea in Abrau-Dyurso, won the Grand Prix de Champagne at the Paris World Fair in 1900, beating off stiff competition from the French Champagne region itself. Russian-produced Champagne, Russkoe Shampanskoe, quickly became a symbol of prestige and the high life – an example of how Russia could produce luxury products on a par with France, whose culture and way of life were so esteemed by the Tsarist court.

Then the Russian Revolution arrived, aiming to sweep away the injustices and excesses of Tsarist luxury and, along with it, champagne, which was clearly somewhat lacking in proletarian credentials. For the first ten years or so of the Soviet period, a puritanical aesthetic reigned as party loyalists attempted to purge the country of Tsarist era inequality. At a time when Communist Party officials dressed in grey overalls and stark leather coats and simply wearing a snazzy jacket was enough to incur the title ‘bourgeois’, which would likely lead to swift deportation or worse, it looked like this could be the end for Russkoe Shampanskoe.

But then something remarkable happened during the 1930s. In 1934, just one year after the Ukrainian famine during which approximately five million people starved to death, Stalin announced that the time had come to bring cultural and material prosperity to USSR. In an infamous speech, in which he claimed, ‘life has become more jolly!’, Stalin spelt out the new guidelines for Russian socialist society. No longer would people live by the principles of self-sacrifice and abstinence; the time had come to celebrate the gains of socialism. If capitalist societies could provide for their citizens, then surely the Soviet Union, with its vastly superior system of production and distribution, could too. Moreover, in contrast to their capitalist counterparts, luxury goods would be available to all citizens, not just a privileged few. And what better way to toast this new life style than with a glass of Soviet-produced Champagne, the ultimate symbol of the high life?

And so the party apparatchiks turned their attentions to the mass production of Sovetskoe Champanskoe. Under the watchful eye of the Minister of Trade, Anastas Mikoyan, Prince Galitsyn’s former employees were put to task creating a widely available Soviet variation of champagne, which they achieved by altering the fermentation technique so that champagne was made in small reservoirs rather than bottles. In 1937 the first bottle of mass-produced champagne popped off the conveyor belt – now everyone could enjoy the (achingly) sweet taste of champagne.

Of course, whilst in theory champagne was now available to everyone, things in the Soviet Union rarely occurred as they were officially described. Throughout the Soviet period a two-tier system existed, whereby those with connections could enjoy access to goods, whilst the majority went without. Certainly, champagne did not immediately appear on your average Russian’s table. Nevertheless, the widespread availability of champagne had a certain propagandistic appeal – Look! We give our citizens the best of everything – meaning that the authorities did their best to make sure everyone could experience it. Indeed, following victory in WWII, Stalin decreed that the people of Russia should celebrate with a glass of Sovetskoe, and by-and-large, they did. And so from herein, from 1937 right up to collapse in the 1991, champanskoe remained predominately available. Bizarrely, as queues built up for arguably more essential items (bread, potatoes, milk), champagne continued to be produced.

When the Soviet Union fell, Sovetskoe Champanskoe remained the generic label for any sparkling wine produced in Russia and a prerequisite for any wedding. In 2004 the name was bought by a state owned company and to this day if you ask for a glass of Shampanskoe, any barman will know exactly what it is you have in mind.

The Year of the Bear?

2009-04-29T00:40:00.006+04:00

Photo: Sergei Maximishin

As he stepped into office exactly one year ago, few could have guessed the events that were in store with Dmitri Medvedev at the helm of Russia’s leadership. Many speculated about the possible changes within Russia and in her relations with others under a new, possibly liberal leader. Attentions were soon directed to the practicalities of the Putin-Medvedev tandem; who would take the leading role and was political conflict or instability in store? One year on and a question mark still hangs over many important questions. This week Russian Newsweek evaluated the power dynamic that has defined Medvedev’s first year in office.

Political commentators had a field day with Medvedev’s various antics a few weeks ago; first he was pardoning political prisoners, next he was giving an interview to the oppositionist “Novaia Gazeta”, then meeting with human rights defenders or liberal economic research centres. Overall it was certain comments made to Novaia Gazeta that got some fired up the most [read extracts from the interview on this blog here], with Medvedev declaring “I made this decision – and everyone else has to carry it out.” Did this mean that the young President had stepped out from under Putin’s shadow, defying his former master and the man he owes much of his career to, in order to take firm control of the country?

According to Russian Newsweek, things are not quite so clear cut. The above comments are indeed representative of Medvedev’s attitude towards state employees in general; they should simply come to work and do the tasks that are assigned to them, a far cry from the personal relationships favoured by Putin during his time as President. However, as a consequence many point out that Medvedev has failed thus far to surround himself with a close personal team such as that which Putin successfully created for himself whilst in power and retains to this day.

And these are just some of the reasons that Newsweek sees as indicating that Putin is making a comeback. As he was sworn into office, Medvedev started off promisingly, redoubling efforts to combat corruption and reform the judicial system. Yet any illusion of this “soft style” of rule being around to stay quickly faded with the August war in Georgia and the Ukrainian gas crisis. It was at this point that Medvedev slowly started to fade into the background and, as Newsweek points out, as the amendment to the constitution extending the presidential term was pushed through parliament it all became increasingly clear – Putin was back pulling the strings, and he was around to stay.

A quick look at the areas of competency of Prime Minister Putin; the country’s financial resources and key foreign policy decisions in Putin’s hands as well as control over aid to Russia’s regions and industry and the power to push forward initiatives such as that to amend the constitution, all begs us to ask the question: what is it that the President does? According to Newsweek’s enquiries, the truth of the matter all lies in initiatives.

Indeed much of the political manoeuvring in Russia of late has been on Medvedev’s initiative. Whether such initiatives have lived long enough to bear fruit however, is another matter. It was Medvedev who prompted the initiative of replacing numerous regional governors and mayors who have been rusting in their official positions for a good part of the past 20 years, yet only one of those on the list of those up for the chop was finally let go. Similarly, the anti-corruption package of measures proposed by the President was not passed through parliament until it had been severely modified. Medvedev’s power is thus limited to proposing reforms; with many of those executing his decisions reporting directly to the Prime Minister, the scope for the President’s orders to be carried out as he intends is restricted.

Moreover, in foreign policy Medvedev has his hands tied, Dmitri Trenin from the Russian Carnegie Centre told Newsweek. In order for him to make a decision, he has to go over the head of the Prime Minister, something that he is loathe to do given the potential conflicts, not to say embarrassments that could arise from such uncoordinated political assertiveness.

It seems therefore, that whilst Medvedev wants to assert himself, he wants to refrain from placing himself in direct opposition to Putin. As Newsweek reported last summer, in order to do so, Medvedev has been concentrating on areas that are further removed from Putin’s general domain, such as the judicial system. Accordingly, Medvedev’s reforms of the judiciary are part of his attempts to tease the courts out from under the influence of the siloviki [note: Russian politicians still in power often with a security services background] and in particular, the siloviki surrounding Putin. Moreover, sources close to Newsweek indicate that in creating an ever-increasing amount of Presidential Councils on various matters, Medvedev is conveniently avoiding the issue of having to pass his decisions past Putin. The Foreign Office, which, as do these Councils, reports directly to the President is similarly out of the Prime Minister’s reach.

Thus to some extent Medvedev’s attempts at scratching back some influence are beginning to pay off, albeit with some areas of confusion; the old rules are still in place whilst new ones are already in full swing which had lead to a degree of unpredictability in the system as a whole. Whilst the Putin and Medvedev tandem was previously careful to avoid any signs of contradiction between the two camps, having let their guard down conflicts are becoming increasingly apparent.

Yet Newsweek points out that despite the contradictions and difficulties, the Putin-Medevedev duumvirate seems to be in no danger of collapse. In fact, the situation seems to suit everyone. Putin is happy as he holds the reigns. Medvedev is happy as he gets some respite from the responsibilities of being President whilst still retaining all the privileges that come with such a post. If the situation does not change significantly, then despite Medvedev’s increasing confidence, he will still be prepared to step aside to allow Putin to become President again in 2012.
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You can read the original article upon which this is based here.

Not So Happy Birthday, Comrade Lenin

2009-04-22T15:01:00.006+04:00

Bringing you grave news from the Eastern Blog. On this notable day, the birthday of the late-lamented Vladimir Il’yich Lenin, the Russian blogosphere has been alight with rumours that this year, the Communist leader, safely tucked up in the Mausoleum as he is, will not enjoy a change of clothes, due to the economic crisis.

Under usual circumstances, Lenin’s clothes are changed every 3 – 4 years, to keep the old boy fresh. However, one report sensationally revealed that the last time Lenin’s clothes were changed was in 2003. High time for some new ones then, but alas the funds just won’t stretch to it. Another paper reported that, Yuri Denisov-Nikol’skii, vice director of the scientific-institute of medicine and plants, the organisation that maintains the mausoleum, had said:

'the government has not given a single kopeck to the organisation since 1992. Since then, [upkeep of Lenin’s body] has been funded by the fund of the Mausoleum… under such financial conditions, what kind of change of clothes can we expect?’

And yet, when questioned on the matter, Denisov-Nikol’skii had no memory whatsoever of making such a comment. Then, when, the sleuths at Sun-style tabloid, ‘Komsomolskaya Pravda’ investigated further, they were informed that Lenin’s clothes were changed approximately every ten years, when the embalming oils had to be reapplied. Lenin’s niece was not impressed by the furore:

‘Lenin’s clothes not to be changed because of the crisis? My goodness, what utter nonsense! I have visited his body several times and everything is in order… why is everyone always having a go at Vladimir Il’yich?’

Why all the fuss then? Is this a conspiracy on the part of disgruntled communists to disgrace the government? Another Lenin-based prank, a la blowing up his statue in St Petersburg? Or simply a way to grab some attention on Lenin’s birthday? We wouldn’t want to forget him now.

Stalinists vs. the Truth

2009-04-21T10:36:00.004+04:00

Photo: Danil Golovin
Last week an article by Igor Chubais, academic and estranged brother of Anatolii Chubais, (prominent businessman and politician known for being the chief orchestrator of the economic “shock therapy” privatisation of the 1990s), was published in Nezavisimaia Gazeta, in which he expressed his opinion on the recent controversy surrounding proposals made by government minister Sergei Shoigu to bring in a law that, much like laws banning holocaust denial, would make denying the victory of the Soviet Union in the Second World War a punishable offence.

Shoigu’s suggestions created quite a controversy in the Russian press, with many observers seeing an attempt to eternalise the “victories” of Stalin, who is highly credited for leading the Soviet Union to victory in the Second World War. Chubais, among others, sees something more than this however. In his opinion, the law in question is not, as it may seem at first, a means of glorifying Stalin, but rather a way of preventing the revelation of the “truth”. This truth can be found in the recently published memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, which disclose that amongst the Soviet political elite it was a well-discussed fact that had the USA not joined the war effort when they did, the Soviet Union would never have stood up to the German onslaught and would most certainly have lost the war.

The Soviet Union, despite its massive army, was pitifully prepared and led, consequently losing almost 27 million citizens (nearly 14% of the population) during the course of the war (compare this with approximately one million lost by the UK and France combined), most of which need never have perished. In considering the needless losses on the Russian side it suddenly becomes much more difficult to speak of victory and makes the war look significantly more like a national disaster.

This, according to Chubais, also makes Stalin one very ineffective leader. And ineffective leaders in Russia still abound to this day. The law banning denial of the national victory therefore has a much more contemporary significance. At the same time as Russia is witnessing the rebirth of the cult of Stalin due to media manipulation and new school textbooks presenting Stalin in a more positive light, the country is also witnessing the rebirth and re-emergence of an ineffective neo-Stalinist leadership. The law is therefore not just about glorifying Stalin, but about legitimising Russia’s ruling elite of today.

As a direct result of today’s ineffective leadership, Chubais notes that Russia’s main problems are now:

Not low birth-rate (it is in fact higher than in the West), but rather an
excessively high death-rate and the gradual extinction of the Russian nation
(and that’s without even mentioning the 4 500 000 homeless);
Not a global economic crisis, but rather an economy that is incapable of
developing as it is suffocated by bureaucracy and corruption;
Censorship, insufficient research in social sciences and decomposition of
the education system;
An unbelievably low quality of life in the richest country in the
world;
An oppressive atmosphere of apathy and amorality sown by television;
A counterproductive foreign policy that has left the country with neither
friends nor allies.

And here Chubais again quotes Khrushchev in his memoirs; “Stalinists are today painting Stalin as a genius and a great leader, and this is most dangerous. They are, intentionally or unintentionally, not only covering up the crimes which have been committed, but also opening up the future to the use of the very same methods used by Stalin himself.” Put in today’s context, the only way to break out of this vicious cycle of ineffective leadership and to put Russia on the right track for the future is for the Russian ruling elite to publicly condemn Stalin and thereby enable a distancing of the methods of leadership that are continuing to create needless losses in Russia to this day.

Portraying Petersburg

2009-04-19T11:26:00.016+04:00

Photo: Boris Smelov, "Spirit of the Neva"
The Hermitage Museum is currently hosting a retrospective exhibition of the works of Boris Smelov, the quintessential Petersburg photographer. The exposition comprises more than 90 black and white photographs that together make up a sort of love song to Petersburg and how it appeared in the final quarter of the twentieth century. Boris Smelov was born in Leningrad in 1951 and lived there until his death in 1998, by which point it had of course become Petersburg, forever documenting this ever-changing, yet strangely constant city. He is accredited as one of, if not the most, important Russian photographers and his influence can be seen in the works of other more contemporary artists. The Hermitage Website him thus:

He was a living classic who evoked veneration from all who were somewhat connected to the art of ‘photography’. Critics and professional photographers unanimously acknowledged Boris Smelov as one of the best European masters of photography. The image of St.Petersburg that he created is not only high quality photographs but, undoubtedly, the most eloquent utterance ever said about that city at the end of the last century, the utterance that can be equal to Brodsky’s poetry in its significance.

Here are some of my favourite photos from the exhibition:

Apollo.

Silver Boy

Fontanka in Winter

Dove

Fan of Sour

From Russia... with Love?

2009-04-19T02:06:00.005+04:00

Photo: Evgenii Karmaev. "To the finest and most charming girl ever, with wishes of happiness."

Vlast’ magazine’s question of the week “Does the world love Russians?” gave rise to an interesting array of opinions from respondents. Here’s what some of them had to say:

___________________________________

Dmitri Rogozin, Russian Ambassador to NATO
By my observations the world loves Russians less than Soviets. Even back then, the word “Soviet” was met with more sympathy in the West than the word “Russian”. Ballet – Soviet, cinema – also Soviet. Rather than creating optimism that the meeting will be productive, “Russian” sets off the warning signs in the minds of Europeans and Americans.

Mikhail Margelov, Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs
It all depends on how we behave ourselves abroad. If we behave like Europeans, then they love and respect us; if we behave like newly enriched natives of a third world country, then they look down their noses at us. In the early 90s a friend of mine, on holiday in Thailand, asked some businessmen about their impressions of Russia. They replied “The Absolut was always cold, but we never set foot outside.” With such behaviour we deserve neither love nor respect.

Pavel Bure, Ice-hockey player
We are not loved, but we are respected and that’s the main thing. Russia is a strong country, everyone respects our opinion. The Americans are now intending to reset US-Russia relations - they understand that it’s long since been time to get working positively together. We will deal with the financial crisis quicker if we work together.

Georgii Boos, Governor of Kalingrad Region, Russia
Normal people all over the world love Russians, and politicians and businessmen respect us. Russia is a strong country; we are the West’s competitors and that’s why they don’t let our businesses onto their markets.

Ralif Safin, Federation Council Minister
The world both loves us and fears us. They started to fear us after the fall of the Soviet Union. When we turned up in the West we were uncivilised and rude; we thought we were so great, but were incapable of saying hello politely; couldn’t speak any foreign languages; never opened doors for women… They still fear us now because they know what kind of revolutions we start. But they love us all the same for our big hearts and souls.

Efim Malitikov, Chairman of the Intergovernmental Committee of the Commonwealth of Independent States for Spreading Knowledge and Adult Education; General Consultant to the UN
I don’t think they love us, but exploit us - for Russians are very talented and support the economies of leading countries. They don’t love us because God gave us the ability to adapt to anything. In Britain and in America our emigrants have high-level positions in the economic sphere and this makes them jealous. Moreover, our country is big and powerful, with massive natural resources. Many would like to be in our position. They don’t love us because Russians can go to war or to work not for money but for ideas.

Leonid Zamiatin, Soviet Ambassador to the United Kingdom 1986 – 1992
What do we need to be loved for? We need to be respected. They didn’t love the Soviet Union; they were afraid of it due to its massive nuclear capabilities. In the 1990s we sold that all away in return for metallurgy. But we need to do everything possible so that our opinions are respected, not so that we get showered with compliments. We should clearly lay out Russia’s stance on the issues of creating a world currency and taking cooperative action against terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan. We need to clearly specify where our interests lie.

Marina Bukalova, Managing Director, Airline Company Sky Express
The world is wary of Russians because in the minds of people in the West, a Russian is still someone in a fur hat and paralytic drunk. They don’t love us because Russians are unpredictable, impulsive, brave and a lot more talented than others. No-one likes a competitor. This is compounded by the fact that Russians don’t know themselves, and people are scared of the unknown.

Lilia Chekhover, First Secretary; Embassy of Israel in Russia
In Israel Russians are very much loved. We have a lot of immigrants from Russia and the USSR and strong cultural links. We highly value works by Tolstoi, Pushkin, Lermontov. We remember how much the USSR did for the formation of the Israeli state.

Anzori Aksent’ev, Businessman
What love can you talk about when even our closest brothers – Georgia and the Ukraine have turned away from us? He who is loved is not left alone. The West doesn’t love us because it sees us as competitors. The East traditionally respects us. Of course sometimes they don’t like us for unsubstantiated reasons - the US has been refusing to grant me a visa for years, accusing me of god-knows-what. It’s the same for any Russian citizen. The 22,000 warheads our country is armed with however can only be a cause for respect.

Democracy has been, is, and will continue to be.

2009-04-17T12:56:00.008+04:00

Artwork: Konstantin Latyshev: "Russia. Elections 2008. Kommunyaki Socialistovich Revengerov vs. Efesbee Kaygeebeeovich Spyov

Earlier this week President Medvedev gave his first interview to a Russian newspaper - his publication of choice seemed to be a significant one. He spoke fairly extensively with Dmitri Muratov, editor of Novaia Gazeta – one of the few papers in Russia to maintain a staunchly critical stance towards the Kremlin and an inquisitive nose for sensitive stories. Novaia Gazeta might not have a massive distribution in Russia, an interview might not change the world and the responses given by Medvedev may not have departed from the general rhetoric, but for the optimistic amongst us, pushing aside the plethora of potential ulterior motives, the very fact that Novaia Gazeta was granted this interview signals perhaps a start towards a more conciliatory era in relations between the state and the press.

I’ve picked out a few bits of the interview that I found the most interesting. You can read the full text (in Russian) here: http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2009/039/01.html

________________________________

On the upcoming elections in Sochi – destination Winter Olympics 2012.

Muratov: Don’t you think perhaps it would be best to just cancel the elections in Sochi, rather than stage them? It would be less cynical to do so. Lebedev who was running for Mayor has been forced to step out of the race by the courts, whilst Nemtsov (also running) has been denied the chance to run his election campaign.

Medvedev: I don’t yet know who has been removed from the race or how, but I do know however, that at this moment in time there is a fully rigorous political battle going on in Sochi, and it is a good thing that there are representatives of various political groups taking part. In my opinion, the problem with many municipal elections is that they are too uniform – people don’t have anyone to choose from and find them dull.

On the social contract and presidential Council on civil society and human rights which took place on April 15th.

Muratov: Am I right in thinking that civil society is today more important to you than a society of government officials?

Medvedev: You know - civil society is something that we still haven’t entirely learned how to comprehend properly in Russia […]. But gradually we are beginning to understand that civil society is an integral social institution of any state. It is a feed-back institution; organisations of people who do not have a post in government or in the civil service, but who actively participate in the life of the country. […] I’d like to point out: such relations [between state and civil society] are never simple for any government. This is because civil society and representatives of human-rights organisations have many bones to pick with the state and the government. They want to ask a lot of questions; and one doesn’t always want to have to answer them. And this is precisely why such an exchange should be of an official nature - this is the aim of the Council. I am expecting that the discussion will be most interesting. Obviously, it will be tough. But this is precisely why it is important.

On the new law requiring civil servants and members of the government to declare their income.

Muratov: It has not really been made clear who it is that will be checking these declarations for their authenticity. It seems that over the past few days in Russia a powerful community of “impoverished” husbands with very affluent wives has appeared…

Medvedev: You know, the task of controlling the bureaucracy and government officials is one of the fundamental tasks of any state. We started doing this quite a long time ago and I can’t really say that we have had much success. Although if you were to compare with the situation in the 1990s and the situation today, I most definitely think that there has been an improvement. […] In my opinion, the main problem today is not the lack of normative acts on control, but lack of rigorous implementation of these acts. This is, of course, where the difficulty lies - because bureaucrats are never very satisfied when they are obliged to control themselves. However, these procedures must be followed despite the fact that no-one likes controlling themselves, no-one likes confining themselves within strict frameworks; they must be followed because this is what distinguishes a civilised society from an uncivilised one – a civilised society doesn’t like it, but it has learnt to do so all the same.

[…]

Muratov: Have you personally felt a negative reaction from bureaucrats? Or have they been understanding over your decision to enforce the publication of their declaration of income?

Medvedev: Well, you know, the post of president frees one of having to hear the negative reaction of bureaucrats. I made this decision – and everyone else has to carry it out.

On the independency of the judiciary and the Khordokovskii affair.

Muratov: I’d like to ask you about the second YUKOS trial. Did you find its outcome predictable? The outcome of the first trial, for anyone who took an interest in it, was, alas, rather predictable. Someone wrote in to me and said: perhaps in the beginning Medvedev is just going to ring up the courts, including that involved in the YUKOs trial and say “you’re independent, you’re independent, let me remind you, you’re independent, you’re independent, you’re independent! "And that will be a manual kick-start for the restoration of the judiciary system.

Medvedev: I can tell you now, that any manual kick-start is very costly and I’m not just talking about the courts system here. It is simply necessary to strive towards a state machine that works in a rational way automatically. [As for the YUKOs trial] perhaps the outcome of one or another trial someone found predictable. This is the freedom and the luckiness of a person who does not have state obligations.
[…]
However, whilst for everyone else, it’s a personal matter, it would be illegal for the president to find a court’s decision predictable. It would be a sign that the law has been broken. For civil servants and for the president there is not and should not be any inkling whatsoever of predictability of the outcome of any trial, and this includes the YUKOs trial.

On the regional authorities… and rumours

Muratov: In the city of Maiskii in Kabardino-Balkaria a rumour was doing the rounds that President Medvedev was soon coming to visit, since Medvedev’s grandmother lives somewhere in the region. And what did the local authorities do when they couldn’t find the said grandmother? Just in case, they re-laid all the roads in Maiskii; cleared out tonnes of rubbish; paved the main square; put up streetlamps; everyone was happy. Why don’t we spread rumours that Medvedev’s, Surkov’s or some other government ministers’ grandmothers live in various towns throughout Russia and perhaps the fear would make more local authorities come to their senses.

Medvedev: That’s quite a good technique… I can see what’s happened here. Once, in Maiskii, if I’m not mistaken, my grandfather worked as regional party secretary. This was 60 years ago however, but perhaps that’s where they’ve got it from.

On democracy in Russia.

Muratov: Today you’ve spoken about the elections, about control over bureaucrats, about the internet. Does this mean that President Medvedev is planning to rehabilitate democracy in Russia?

Medvedev: You know, I think that democracy in its own right is in no need for any kind of rehabilitation. Democracy is a historical notion and at the same time a wholly supranational one. Therefore democracy is not in need of rehabilitation anywhere. It’s another matter that for many of our citizens the very difficult political and, more importantly, economic upheavals of the 1990s at some point fused with the arrival of the first fundamental democratic institutes in our country. For these citizens these times were extremely difficult and this made a scar on their understanding of democracy. But this is just through personal experience, rather than their understanding of democratic institutions as a whole. Therefore I do not believe that we need to rehabilitate democracy. Democracy has been, is, and will continue to be.

Interesting Spheres

2009-04-13T23:23:00.010+04:00

Photo: Lyalya Kuznetsova

Russia’s relations with ex-Soviet states are a mire of opposing and common interests and contradictory feelings. In case the war in Georgia last summer and this winter’s gas crisis had begun to fade into the distant past, riots in Moldova last week yet again brought such relations to centre stage. A small, poor country nestled between Romania and the Ukraine, Moldova retains close ties to Russia, who has troops participating in peacekeeping operations in Moldova’s separatist region of Transdniestria and guarding weaponry left over from the Soviet period. Its authorities, as in many countries of the former Soviet Union, have a hot-cold relationship with Moscow; torn between a rapprochement with Russia or with the West. In varying degrees, these countries have on one hand the tempting promise of NATO or EU membership and the benefits that greater cooperation with the West will bring, but which might, in return force them to face a few home truths on the democracy front, endangering the very survival of their political elites. One the other, there is the legitimising embrace of Moscow, with whom their common past is a source of contradictory feelings, but is common all the same and who, as the stronger, wealthier partner in the relationship can offer the support, without criticism, that many of these regimes require.

The article below was published last Friday in Nezavisimaia Gazeta.

Quick note: CIS = Commonwealth of Independent States, a looser regional organisation formed on the back of the Soviet Union and of which Moldova is a member. Georgia declared its withdrewal from the organisation following last year's war. Ukraine, despite being one of the three founding countries (the others being Russia and Belarus) has never actually ratified the organisation's Charter (Turkmenistan is currently in the same legal situation). The other members are all the former Soviet Republics apart from the three Baltic states.
_________________________________________

The CIS is not Russia’s sphere of influence.
Stanislav Minin, Nezavisimaia Gazeta

Last Thursday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, gave interviews with “Voice of Russia”, “RIA News Agency” and “Russia Today”. Speaking about the fresh start with relations with the US, he said; “It goes without saying that one of the subjects that is being discussed is that of the post-Soviet space. This is an issue that requires that we conduct our activities transparently in this region; that we have no hidden agendas and, whilst defending our interests, we must take into account the legal interests of everyone else involved, in particular the states of the region.”

"It is unacceptable to present [CIS countries] with the ultimatum “either you’re with us or against us,” added Lavrov, “to do so would be to start off a struggle for spheres of influence, which is what no-one wants and which people sometimes try to attribute to Russia’s foreign policy. Spheres of influence are not our policy; our policy is that of relations based on equal rights and mutual benefits with whoever is prepared to engage in this with us.”

The language used by diplomats is very guarded and formal - the real ideas are essentially camouflaged behind the words. The language of the state press however, is somewhat more open. In reality, the discourse used by the Russian state press divides the world into the “spheres of influence” that minister Lavrov claims to be so unacceptable. The political elites of CIS countries are divided into “pro-Russian” and “anti-Russian”, otherwise known as “pro-Western”. Such language reeks of foreign policy games and does not leave any place for economic pragmatism nor for those very same “mutually-beneficial relationships”, which Lavrov himself claims to want.

Today, “The Independent” published a piece on the recent protests in Moldova. The correspondent suggests that the events in Moldova are playing into the hands of Russia. Russia is interested in having Moldova distance itself from the EU and the West and in return for it doing so it is offering the Chisinau authorities an “advantageous” solution to their problems in Transdniestria. Needless to say, such proposals are based on guesswork – the correspondent’s own interpretation and speculation on matters; a third-party evaluation of the situation. But he grasps the nature of Russia’s “mutually beneficial relations” with countries of the CIS perfectly; such relations are merely an exchange of services between political elites. We’ll give you your Transdniestria – and you get tough with the West. We’ll give you money – and you close that American military base [Note: In February this year the President of Kyrgyzstan demanded the closure of the American military base on its territory].

Relations based on equal rights and mutual benefits with “whoever is prepared to engage with us” are a marvellous thing. The only thing is – how can we know who is “prepared to engage with us” and who isn’t? Let’s say that state X (any state taken at random) wants to have strong trade and economic links with Russia. At the same time the said state very much wants to gain EU membership, or join NATO. Is such a state prepared for “mutually beneficial relations” with Russia? In my opinion, there should be no reason why wanting both of these things should be contradictory. However, the Russian ruling elite tends to think otherwise.

Does the US play its political games in the CIS? Does it defend its interests in the region? Yes. But the language that the US uses whilst doing so differs from ours. It differs only slightly, it would seem, but it’s the tiny differences that make it. The American elites divide political programmes in the post-Soviet space into “democratic” and “undemocratic”. Russia divides them into “pro-Russian” and “anti-Russian”. There’s no difference, you might say - “undemocratic” is as good as “anti-American”. However the essence of the difference is in the word itself, in the form, as opposed to the content. By saying “antidemocratic” instead of “anti-American”, you are appealing to the rules of the game in the world today, which, whether you like it or not, have become based on democracy. You are appealing against the violation of these rules. By saying “anti-Russian”, you automatically narrow the group of sympathisers. It is a label, intended for the internal consumer. Charges of “undemocratic” behaviour are intended for foreign consumers and are a far more profitable strategy.

There’s nothing meaningless or shameful in Russia’s struggle for influence and interests in the post-Soviet space. But, it would be much better if in this battle our interests were preponderantly economic, rather than political or historical. And it would be much better if, whilst defending these interests, we used a language that was globally acceptable, rather than inward-looking.

Russia - Atlantis Diplomacy

2009-04-02T13:19:00.004+04:00

Photo: Sergey Gorshkov, Shell Wildlife Photographer of the Year
Who says Russians don’t have a sense of humour? In honour of April Fool’s day, the serious folk over at VTsIOM (The All Russian Public Opinion Research Centre) commissioned a poll to discover residents’ opinions towards proposed diplomatic relations between Russia and Atlantis. 40% of respondents realised it was a joke, but 21% answered that, although they hadn’t heard of the plans, they approved of them nevertheless and another 28% hadn’t heard of them and would not support them. A further 9% stated that they had heard of them and did indeed approve. I wonder how the good citizens of Atlantis are relating to all this?

Person of the Week: Maria "The Mashka" Sergeyeva

2009-03-23T13:27:00.007+03:00

During the American presidential campaign our flat used to enjoy ‘Palin Watch’ - a daily ritual that involved scanning the papers for gems of the vice-presidential candidate’s (non)wisdom. And there were so many of them! Since then, following politics has been pretty dull. The likes of Obama, Putin and Brown et al., are just so sensible in comparison. They lack the, well, complete ridiculousness of Palin. But now we’ve discovered Maria Sergeyeva, Putin’s pink bikini wearing, foreigner-hating, Russia-loving pin up girl. And she has more than filled the ridiculous-things-said-by-people-who-may-one-day-become-very-powerful hole that Palin left behind.

A 24-year-old philosophy student, Sergeyeva does not hold an official political position. Yet. However she is already tipped to become a minister and has expressed her desire to one day become President, or at least Prime Minister. As a member of The Young Guard, the youth section of Putin’s party, her pro-Kremlin speeches and blog posts have become legendary. Indeed, a video of a speech she made in Red Square at the beginning of 2009, in which she shouted out to a crowd that she knew ‘Putin will protect me’ from the crisis, had to be removed from the political site it was posted on, after it attracted so much attention (over 140, 000 hits) that it caused the site to crash.

With her long blonde hair and glamorous good looks, she has become quite the celebrity on the political circuit and, judging by her internet popularity, is responsible for igniting an interest for politics amongst Russian youth. Her speeches, which are generally over-exciteable, unpolished but strangely addictive to watch, without fail praise the current administration, ever underlining that they, and they alone, can get Russia through the crisis.As such it has been suggested more than once that, like Nashi, she is on Putin's payroll as a gimick to win over the largely politically-apathetic Russian youth - a charge which she vehemently denies.

Her politics are firmly to the right and would, perhaps, even make the Daily Mail blush; at a political rally, she infamously held up a checked plastic bag, an object associated with immigrant market sellers from Central Asia, and told all immigrants to go home. Russia is for the Russians, she said. She’s vehemently patriotic (she only buys Russian products and her cause celebre is the protection of the Russian car industry) and believes that America is out to get her beloved motherland: “My love for Russia came with my mother’s milk. I loved listening to my grandparents’ heroic tales from the war. Putin has given us stability and economic growth. It’s good that he’s hardline and tough. That’s what Russia needs. America, of course, wants us to be weak.” Surprisingly she is also currently championing ecological causes, namely the opposition to the construction of a new waste-disposal unit in Moscow.

Judging by her huge popularity, it looks like Sergeyeva is here to stay. Political commentator Alexander Morazov told the Moscow News that he didn't see her going anywhere soon: “I think she will be become a new media figure... she will develop her activities not in the direction of pure politics, but will become ... a Ksenia Sobchak [it-girl presenter] not for the rich but for the poor.”

Here are some of Sergeyeva’s best (worst?) moments. Look out for more Sergeyeva-Watch in the future.

On how to solve the population imbalance in Russia - there are ten million less men than women.

Take men from abroad and bring them to Russian. It’s most important that women look after the family home and bring up children. Russian women are the most beautiful and tenderhearted in the world. We can lure the best specialists from the West with the help of our women’s beauty. That’s how to solve this demographic problem.

In response to the Georgian Eurovision entry, “We Don’t Wanna Putin”

If you don't want Putin, Medvedev will fuck you over. They're a TANDEM, you know.

Proof that she is an internet celebrity, if ever there was one. The caption under the video comes from a speech she made and essentially means that a crisis begins with your attitude towards it.

Spring Has Sprung - Conscription Has Begun

2009-03-21T10:29:00.013+03:00

Photo: Alexei Petrosian
It’s that time of year again when no young man is safe from the roaming militia. Take a trip on the metro at the moment and everywhere you’ll see men aged between 16 and 25 being stopped, searched and questioned by the Militsia. And not, as per usual, just those from ‘the southern countries.’ That’s right, it’s conscription time, and this spring, following a series of military reforms, the army will take in more than 300 thousand young men - twice more than last year, making this year’s conscription period the largest in modern Russian history.

According to Russian law, all Russian men aged from 18 – 27 are supposed to serve a twelve-month period in the army, unless they are exempt for medical or educational reasons. In the past, men with pregnant wives or children under the age of three; doctors; students at specialised secondary schools; rural school teachers and those training to be priests were all officially exempted from military service, but new rules introduced from the beginning of this year mean that they are now all compelled to do military service. Students in full time education can still postpone until they have graduated and receive full exemption if they continue to PhD level.

The Ministry of Defence has justified the increase on the grounds that the army is currently suffering from a severe lack of non-commissioned soldiers, following the 2008 decision to cut the length of military service from eighteen to twelve months. Moreover, the army is also battling against the general trend of a declining population; during the l980s birth rates dramatically decreased, meaning that the number of Russian eighteen year olds is much smaller than 5 – 10 years ago. So to combat this the army will be stocked by masses of young men who don’t want to be there.

To put it mildly, the reputation of the Russian army is not great. In 2007, the BBC reported that 341 Russian soldiers committed suicide, which is about the same as one whole battalion. The practise of Dedovschina – literally rule of the grandfathers – a kind of ritual bullying where older soldiers ‘initiate’ newer recruits can in part be blamed for this. Myths and rumours abound within Russian society about this practise and are believed to different degrees depending on your viewpoint, but human rights groups estimate that it’s highly wide spread and has caused not only suicide attempts but also occasionally results in the murder of young conscripts. Moreover the psychological pressures of being a conscript are well known, however the Russian army offers no therapy or help to those entering or leaving the army.

The result? Logically, such a brutal regime will serve only to brutalise those who experience it, and social analysts and human rights groups have long commented on the fact that young men returning from conscription often find it hard to readapt to civilian life following the harsh demands of military life. Violence, alcohol and drug abuse are prevalent amongst Russian men and it seems probable that there is some sort of connection between this and the brutal regime of military service.

Of course, just because the state has decided that more people will join the army doesn’t mean that there aren't unofficial ways to get out of service. Bribing doctors and military officials in order to get out of military service has been commonplace for years (I’ve lost count of how many of my male friends have ‘flat feet’) although this is something that the authorities are trying to cut down on. Official statistics show that the number of arrests connected to bribe taking in order to avoid military service doubled from 2007 to 2008; however given the level of corruption and the popularity of bribery in all spheres of Russian public life it seems unlikely that it will stop completely any time soon.

What I find particularly scary about all this is the massive divide emerging between those who can afford to bribe (or educate) their way out of military service and those who are forced to enrol because economically, politically and legally there’s no way out. Russia is already a hugely divided society this two-tier system can only serve to accentuate existing social problems.

Some links about Russian military life:

At the end of this article the author prints some comments by Russians about military conditions. They’re pretty different from my (admittedly very Western) viewpoint, but also anything I’ve heard from my friends; but I guess they show the other side of the story.

The website of the Union of the Committee of the Mothers of Soldiers – a human rights groups that seeks to protects Russian soldiers lives.

We Don't Wanna Put In

2009-03-10T15:27:00.005+03:00

What ever happened to Eurovision as a happy, shiny vision of a united Europe?

As Russia prepares itself to host the annual music competition in May this year, political differences between Russia and its neighbours look set to threaten the organisers’ vision of the show as a happy manifestation of united Europe. And not just because of tactical voting and deal making to ensure another Russian win.

The Russian entrant, Anastasia Prihkodko, winner of Star Factory (other famous alumni include Dima Bilan, last year’s winner) has come under fire from the Russian media for singing in a mixture of Russian and Ukrainian. Although the singer won at the preselection committee with over 25% of the votes, the choice as been dubbed a scandal, with many echoing the opinion that «a song performed in Ukrainian can't have anything to do with Russia.» As Russian relations with Ukraine are decidedly frosty at the moment it does seem a slightly odd choice, but pretty suggestive that the Russian public is rather less anti-Ukraine than their leaders.

Rather more scandalous is Georgia's choice of Eurovision entry, 'We don't wanna put in' by Stefane and 3G. (See video clip above.) The group, which is made up of Stefan and three sparkly-hot panted girls, hotly deny that the song has any political implications: « Those who can speak English language at least at the level of 5th grade of school should realize that lyrics has absolutely nothing to do with Russia.» However the lyrics «We don't wanna Put in» when sung in strong accented English do sound remarkably like «We don't want Putin», and have already got the Russian's knickers in a bit of a twist.

The Russian prime-minister press secretary, Dmitry Peskov stated: "If this information is true, we regret that participants from Georgia do not intend to concentrate on musical quality, trying instead to use this popular European competition to showcase their pseudo-political ambitions, or, more simply, for mere hooliganism. We hope that these Georgian guests of the Moscow Eurovision will decide to perform a real, beautiful song, since… Georgian culture is very rich in these"

It is not yet clear whether the Eurovision committee, which forbids the performance of any politically motivated songs, will allow Stefan and his girls to go ahead with their entry. In any case, we can be fairly sure, that the song will be receiving nul points from the Russian hosts.

A Picture Speaks a Thousand Words

2009-03-07T21:15:00.017+03:00

Photos: carolinephotography.co.uk

So I'm a little snowed under with work and Katie's out of action with visa problems, so how about a little cultural break away from the doom and gloom of politics. Russia has a photo opportunity hiding round every corner. Here are some that I took over the past month. Hope you enjoy.

Miles of snow, view from the trans-Siberian

Icy kopecks

Fur Hats

Ice Fishing

A wee bit nippy

Successes of a Managed Democracy

2009-03-06T17:21:00.007+03:00

Artwork: Konstantin Latyshev "GDP doubled"

Below are two articles that were published over the past fortnight, providing quite contradictory evaluations of the current political and economic situation in Russia today. The first is an editorial published in this week’s edition of “Expert”, a political economic magazine sympathetic to the Kremlin. It expresses the official line concerning events of Medvedev’s first year as President. The second article, also an editorial, was published a fortnight ago in “Nezavisimaia Gazeta” and casts any evaluation of Putin’s first year as Prime Minister in a rather different light.

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- Expert -
A Test of Stability

When Dmitri Medvedev won the presidential election on the 2nd March 2008, no one would have guessed how difficult his presidential term was to become. It looked like Medvedev would slowly yet surely continue the excellent developments initiated by Vladimir Putin, and set about fine-tuning those spheres, where noticeable results might have for whatever reason not been achieved.

In a pre-election speech in Krasnoyarsk, Dmitri Medvedev outlined some of his priorities: a significant degree of independence of the judicial system; completion of changes to administrative regulations; handing over certain government functions to the private sector. The main assertion of his speech sounded almost like an aphorism: “Freedom is better than non-freedom.” The plan for the economy was to lessen the tax burden and place the emphasis on “building an independent, powerful, yet open financial system.”

Life, however, made a few amendments of its own. Medvedev did not get an easy ride and he, just like Putin before him, had to first win a war in the Caucasus. The peace-enforcement mission in Georgia showed that Medvedev was a tough politician, capable of making difficult decisions, whilst the Medvedev-Sarkozy agreement demonstrated his ability to succeed in rather precise diplomatic manoeuvres.

It was an unpleasant surprise for Moscow’s Western partners when Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Yet this was absolutely necessary in order to remove the threat to the republics of another attempt to end the dispute by force; an attempt that Tbilisi deemed inevitable after having lost the first war in August. The recognition of independence showed that Moscow is capable not only of reacting on the actions of its adversaries, but also of playing a deterring role. The Kremlin’s next step was to make yet another proposition to the US, EU and NATO about starting work on a new system of security for Europe, which would also take into account Russia’s interests. It is indeed rather showing that after the war our Western colleagues turned out to be much more susceptible to Moscow’s initiatives.

The ensuing economic crisis turned out to be an even bigger problem. A drop in the price of raw-material exports and a drain on capital subjected the Russian economy to a great shock. The rouble had to be devalued by almost a third, and cash reserves dropped by 36% (216 billion dollars). The events showed that the president was entirely right in his intentions to develop the country’s financial system, but that the crisis would make realising such plans significantly more difficult.

Political reforms were of utmost importance during Medvedev’s first year as president. The initiative to extend the presidential term to 6 years and the term for Duma deputies to 5 years was the proposition that attracted the most attention within society. However, under the current arrangement of the political system extending the terms would not have brought about any large changes, although it would have had a significant stabilising effect. Perhaps up until just a few months ago it seemed that there was even too much stability in Russia, so much, in fact, that reforms were unnecessary. However, as recent events have shown, such a backup plan would not have been for nothing.

The most significant changes with regards to the development of democratic procedures are those made to the appointment of regional governors (now only parties that have won in the regional elections will be allowed to present candidates), and also the changes to the procedure of forming the Federative Council (members will be chosen from elected deputies of the regional legislative assemblies). Additionally, moves have been made to encourage involvement of smaller parties in parliamentary affairs – those who did not obtain the minimum amount of votes, but received between 5 and 7 percent will now be represented. All in all, these steps should facilitate the development of a party system – all within the course that has been set out to make the transition towards a proportional election system.

Finally, we must also recognise the successful Medvedev – Putin duumvirate. The numerous speculations on the supposed division between the two leaders have remained for the time being just that – speculation. It is obvious, that however politically different Putin and Medvedev may be - they are two different people, and this will always result in differences in their views and approaches. But the differences are not that great.

Playing on disagreements between the president and prime minister it is a game that bureaucratic clans like to play; clans that see the existence of two decision-making centres as giving them the opportunity of attaining their own egoistic goals. And it is this game that during the global economic crisis Russia’s foes abroad would also very much like to play.
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- Nezavisimaia Gazeta -
The limits of the usefulness of “managed democracy”
Legislators are scared of asking the executive inconvenient questions

The state Duma (lower house of parliament) took three weeks to mull over the first report appraising the government under the leadership of Vladimir Putin’s “Edinaia Rossiia” (United Russia). On the 30th January an evaluation report undertaken by the ministerial cabinet and carried out as part of a presidential initiative was presented to the Duma by first deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov. The result of the long reflection by parliamentarians on the content of this report was a ten page resolution.

The idea was that the state Duma would give a much needed evaluation of the anti-crisis policies of the government. There would be the opportunity to ask as many questions as needed during the meeting with the cabinet ministers. Then the Duma would take the report to bits and examine the Igor Shuvalov’s answers. This would be followed by an appraisal of the effectiveness with which measures that had been undertaken by the government. The plan was to then name those deemed guilty for the failure of any of the initiatives, whilst assigning certain figures the task of carrying out any urgent measures necessary to put the system to right.

However, the deputies did not set about asking difficult questions. The resolution that ensued confirmed the position of the parliamentary majority (United Russia): not one mistake committed by the ministerial cabinet was noted. Deputies got around the trickiest bit in their relations with the government with amazing simplicity. In order to answer the question “who’s guilty?”, whilst at the same time taking their own leader out of the equation, they thought up complex turns of phrase, with the only thing eventually criticised being the wholly abstract “insufficiently high level of discipline in many federal organs of executive power, resulting in bogging down of the timescale of carrying out the President and Prime Minister’s orders”.

And that was the end of the critical section of the Duma’s resolution. What followed were a series of requests made to the executive. Among them is the wholly astonishing remark expressing the need to organise and set up a government programme to encourage the unemployed to undertake work in the social sphere. That is, instead of demanding the government (and themselves for that matter) why on earth, a full half year into the crisis, such programmes do not already exist, deputies preferred to simply meekly express the desire of creating them. They did not even dare to mention the timeframe or name those who would be involved in their implementation.

It seems the deputies’ attitude can be summed up by the age-old saying “good Tsar, bad boyars”. It’s true, that there are now in fact two Tsars, but this is not important for state Duma deputies. It is much more important that the party leader receives the same respect as the president. However, the situation is not quite as amusing as it may seem.

Firstly, such a process devalues the very idea of an evaluation – what was the point of going to such trouble to produce a report just to end up making some insignificant suggestions to some insignificant people? Secondly, this trivialises the workings of the Duma. Tax-payers provide 5.5 billion roubles a year to keep the lower house of parliament running in the hope that its deputies will stand up for their interests, regardless of who they have to confront. Meanwhile, the majority of representatives are worried about only one thing - how to find sufficiently pleasant and inoffensive turns of phrase to describe the difficult relationship between the legislative and executive.

The problem is not just the declarational character of the Russian parliament. The problem is the removal from the political arena of one of the most important mechanisms of democratic control over the executive. It is necessary to have a real division of power not only on the surface, but in reality too. It has a practical use – improving the country’s anti-crisis programmes.

When times are tough, the natural limitations of a regime that calls itself “managed democracy” become plain to see. Sooner or later however the danger will arise that there will be no-one in this “democracy” left to govern.

Person of the Week: Mikhail Leont'ev

2009-02-28T11:06:00.011+03:00

The first in the Person of the Week series I have decided to dedicate to certain well-known television presenter, political commentator, editor in chief of economic magazine Profile and all-round conspiracy theorist. For his uncompromising opinions on international affairs that range from run-of-the-mill America-bashing to outrageous and at times plain hilarious accusations, my choice this week is a public figure who is outspoken, not shy of controversy and not welcome in several post-Soviet states: Mikhail Vladimirovich Leont’ev.

Leont’ev is perhaps best known as the host of the weekly five-minute political commentary program “Odnako” (However). As host of a prime-time slot at the end of the main evening news on state-owned Channel One, you may think that he would have to be rather careful about what he says. However, careful would not really be the right word for it. Leont’ev’s weekly shows may come across to the Western ear as the unrestrained rant of what numerous Kremlin representatives are supposed to tiptoe their way round in public; a diplomatic disaster that has already happened, the fact that he does not hold any state position nevertheless gives the government just enough ground to officially avoid any implication in the event of a scandal.

And scandals are what Leont’ev does best. He is the proud holder of court rulings declaring him persona non grata in Latvia and banning him from entering the Ukraine for five years. In 2003 in an interview on Latvian television, he described the country as “wretched” and likened it to a tiny spoonful of tar spoiling the entire pot of honey that is the European Union. In 2006, a Ukrainian court ruled he pay $500 compensation and publicly retract comments made in reference to the former Prime Minister Victor Yushenko’s wife on “Odnako”, where he insinuated that she was influencing her husband’s politics with American ideas. Having refused to carry out the court’s demands, he subsequently fuelled further anger by questioning the legitimacy and sovereignty of Ukraine as an independent state.

Most recently Leont’ev has been devoting his attention to the financial crisis, observing the rack and ruin of Western economies with more than a hint of schadenfreude. His longstanding predictions of the West’s imminent downfall confirmed, he does remain optimistic as to the solution however, recently quoted as saying; “[t]he only way out of the current crisis is a world war. Who will start it and how is a mere technicality.”

Despite all the bravado and provocation, or perhaps because of it, Leont’ev remains fairly popular, in particular for past achievements in the nineties, having worked as a journalist and more recently on several popular documentaries. He may lack a little diplomatic finesse, yet he is not the only Russian public figure who could be reproached for doing so. Whether he makes any contribution to the pluralism of ideas that the country needs on television right now is certainly another matter however.

Do svidaniya!

This week’s issue of “Odnako” can be found here: http://www.1tv.ru/newsvideo/138823

What's in a Name?

2009-02-25T23:25:00.008+03:00

Photo: Yuri Kommisarov

Since he was born six years ago, one young Muscovite chappie has been at the centre of a dispute between his parents and the Moscow general register office for births, marriages and deaths (GRO). The parents of “BOCh RVF 260602”, an abbreviation of “Biological Human Object born of the Voronin-Frolov families, on the 26th June 2002”, are adamantly refusing to rename the child, despite the GRO’s refusal to provide a birth certificate and officially register the child under such a name.

Several courts, including the European Court of Human Rights have refused to examine the case. Russia currently has no law that would prevent a child from being given such a name. “This is in the child’s interests,” stated Tatiana Ushakova, deputy director of the Moscow GRO, which has taken the matter into its own hands, “the parents should be thinking about the child himself and how he is to live with such a name, rather than their own ambitions.”

The situation seems to have reached stalemate and the possibility of taking custody of the child in order to rename him as in the case of “Tula does the Hula from Hawaii”, a New Zealand girl with a similarly catchy name, has not been raised. Although in a country where paper documents are everything living without a birth certificate or official registration must be rather problematic, none of the reports that I found noted whether the child was nevertheless able to attend school or receive state medical treatment. I can only suppose that amongst the profusion of metro adverts offering everything from passport registration and university diplomas to medical certificates and driving licences his parents have perhaps found an alternative birth-certificate provider.

(Some excerpts from RIA Novosti.)

Village People

2009-02-15T16:48:00.003+03:00

Photo: carolinephotography.co.uk
Living in Moscow it’s easy to forget that for much of Russia’s rural population who do not live in the excesses (or simple adequacies) of the country’s capital, life in the 21st century has not yet begun. A friend and I spent a night living like locals (well, almost) in the Siberian village of Tashtagol and understood rather quickly how male life expectancy out in the sticks of Russia can average as little as 46 years in the worst regions.

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The plan to stay at the datcha for three nights doesn’t get off to a good start. “Firewood’s in the barn and the toilet’s over there,” says Andrei, the next door neighbour enlisted to help us out, nodding over at a small wooden hut around 20 metres away yet separated from us by untouched snow nearly 6 foot deep. “You’ll have to dig your way over,” he adds, with a chuckle. I have other priorities in mind - the temperature outdoors is minus twenty something and although the stove is doing its best, indoors it is still averaging a good ten degrees on the wrong side of zero. “How cold is it forecast to be tonight?” we ask tentatively. “Ooh, around minus 48 I should think,” is the unwelcome reply. I hope that is a rural Russian joke.

Left to fend for ourselves and having quickly assumed traditional gender roles Johann is shovelling snow to clear a path to the barn outdoors and as the female hunter-gatherer I pay a passing motorist to give me a lift to the local shop to buy supplies for the night. Admittedly, had I been true to my Russian villager role I would have braved the wait for a bus, but then my English feet are freezing and my English patience exhausted. My groceries, however, are decidedly “local” (in ‘the League of Gentlemen’ sense and admittedly not out of choice); some dubiously-looking sausage, cheese, black bread, a pot noodle and some instant smash.

On my return it’s already dark outside and the hut has heated up to a tropical minus two; I even have a go taking my coat off. In preparation for the night ahead Johann does some frozen wood chopping and does his best to fill a bucket, which is more hole than bucket, with some frozen coal. Our supply of frozen wood and frozen coal does not fill one with optimism. The buckets of water collected earlier from the village’s only tap have begun to freeze over despite being next to the stove. So has the water that has emptied straight onto the floor from a hole in the sink and that has collected near the entrance. My ideas of a steamy-hot banya and hot chocolate in front of a roaring fire are gradually being replaced by a somewhat colder reality.

Having eaten a dinner of all the above-mentioned ingredients fried together in a pan, exhausted any frozen wood chopping opportunities and even having stomped our way through shoulder high snow to the outside loo, we find ourselves at 6pm and at a bit of a loose end. With no transport, and nowhere to go to in the near vicinity even if there was, we quickly understand the allure of drinking oneself into oblivion and thus the crux of Russia’s rural demographic crisis. Hacking at the ice that has formed around the entrance provides some brief entertainment but we’re freezing in bed by 8pm; the thermometer inside our hut is has reached two degrees. Hourly efforts at keeping the stove alight prove futile; our two degrees Celsius average doesn’t get any better. By morning we decamp to an apartment in town – I’ve already had enough of the “real” Russia.

The most surprising thing about this experience was not our complete ineptness at keeping a stove lit, nor my reluctance to use an outside loo in subarctic conditions but rather the fact that 27% of Russia’s population of 140,000,000 live in rural areas with many in conditions largely similar to that from which we had quickly fled. In Abakan and Krasnoyarsk, two other Siberian cities we visited, just outside the city centre one finds clusters of these traditional wooden houses, which, despite being so tantalisingly close to civilisation have sporadic electricity supplies and no access to running water. Moreover, a large proportion of those living in such conditions are not sturdy youths who can chop wood and fetch buckets of water with relative ease, but the older generation who have nowhere else to go – living in rural poverty since time immemorial, excluded from the Soviet Union’s modernisation drives, brushed aside under capitalism and condemned to an existence below the breadline.

Such impoverished living conditions for so many of Russia’s citizens have clear implications for the country’s pretensions to superpower status on the world stage. The facts are contradictory; a member of the G8 that is, in parts, a third world country. A UN report published in 2006 presents some sobering statistics; the poverty rate in Siberia averages 35%. In one district this was as high as 77%. In another, nearly 16% of housing was classed as being in dilapidated or dangerous state of repair. Progress has been made over the past ten years yet many households remain excluded. The future prosperity of the country as a whole depends on lifting the most backwards areas into the 21st century and providing running water to rural communities is one of the important tasks that Russia faces today.

Why I'll Never Understand Russia

2009-02-09T19:21:00.017+03:00

Photograph: Aleksei Petrosian

There are many, many things that I don’t understand about Russia. Clichéd as it is, I still find it difficult to get away from Churchill’s old description of a ‘riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.’ Nothing seems more apt to describe a country that is so inexplicable, so full of contrasts. A country that professes to hate US culture but glorifies McDonalds, that claims to have the most beautiful women in the world yet celebrates Western pinups; that pays lip service to democracy but, well… quite. Even beyond this, on a day-to-day basis there’s so much I don’t understand. Why, for example, do the hand runners on escalators in the metro go faster than the escalators themselves? Why the hysteria over an unpolished shoe? And just why will girls insist on matching their hair colour, boots and bag?

At first I thought my inability to understand Russia was just because I was a foreigner, an outsider. Just as I couldn’t understand Russia, nor could my Russian friends understand the UK. “Why do you have two taps instead of one”, I have often been asked. “What does the Queen actually do?” is another. Or just simply, “House of Lords?” To none of these questions could I give a proper answer. Maybe all countries and cultures are just totally incomprehensible to any other, anyone not born there.

Then I read an article entitled “Why we don’t understand our own country” by Igor Chubais, director of the Centre for Russian Studies. The article expresses the identity crisis that Russia is currently suffering and tries to answer those questions so often tackled by the good and great of Russian literature: ‘What is Russia?’; ‘What does it mean to be Russian?’ Somehow I find it difficult to imagine an English equivalent.

Chubais suggests that, since it’s generally not acknowledged that today’s Russian Federation is entirely different from its predecessor, the Soviet Union, (he argues that the two states are equally as contrasting as, say, the Third Reich and the Russian Federation), today’s Russian citizens find it difficult to construct a certain identity. When, in 1917, Old Russia ceased to exist to be replaced by the Soviets, propaganda and intellectuals took great pains to emphasise the novelty of the new regime – it was an entirely new system, with its own government, symbols, morals even. By contrast, no such line has been drawn between today and the not so distant Soviet past. It is this ambiguity, Chubais argues, that has deprived current Russians of reference points to construct a new identity: Who are our ancestors? Were we born under the salvo volley of the Aurora or does our history start with the VIII century? Who are our heroes, where are our ideals, which rules guide us? Between historical Russia and the USSR there have been armed seizures of power, a Civil War, tens of millions killed and repressed, 70 years of totalitarian censorship… What Russia does our army defend? Soviet or Anti-soviet?

Russia is left in limbo, uncertain of her direction, equally incomprehensible to her citizens as to visitors. Of course in Britain we have our own soul searching (since the fall of the Empire could anyone really say what we are? Part of Europe, stand alones or just America’s special friends) but our search for identity knows nothing compared to the anguish of Russia, and the situation described by Chubais. How is it possible to face up to the past, the litany of repression and change that the country has seen, and assimilate it into today’s history. In short, it doesn’t: We live by rules that are at the same time both Russian and anti-Russian, Soviet and anti-Soviet, Western and anti-Western. [A situation] that destroys any general rules.

The question of what Russia is today and how this relates to her past has obsessed academics ever since the tanks rolled on to Red Square in 1991. Even before that, the difficulties of acknowledging the repressions of the 1930s and other atrocities of the twentieth century taxed a host of Soviet leaders. It is only now that this question of how to relate to the past is coming to the forefront in public (public, here being a very narrow space – the readership of fairly marginal newspapers and websites) and political debate, as the ministry of education seeks to define broad guidelines of how Stalinism is to be remembered in school textbooks. It is only when Russia has decided on what its past is, that it will be able to know its present. And then, maybe, I might start making some headway on working out why so many Russian men feel the need to sport the unattractive-on-everyone mullet.

Siberian Ski

2009-02-08T16:14:00.008+03:00

Photo: The Big Soviet Library (bse.lib.ru)

Despite the financial crisis, this winter has seen a record number of Russians taking ski holidays in Courchevel – over 10,000 so far this season. But don’t the Russians have enough snow at home to keep themselves occupied? Whilst Krasnaia Poliyana, a key destination for the Sochi winter Olympics 2014 might currently be a bit of a building site, further East into Russia Siberia’s freezing temperatures combine with a picture-perfect mountain range to give the ideal natural conditions for a jolly good ski holiday. I’ve just got back from Sheregesh, Siberia’s most developed downhill skiing resort and was able to see how skiing in Russia can give the Alps a run for their money.
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Squint a little on the approach to Sheregesh and all those little wooden dachas look a lot like chalets. As the bus winds its way thorough the snow-covered mountain roads one could be forgiven for failing to notice the profusion of fur hats on board, or for overlooking the telltale abundance of birch trees in the surrounding forests; all signs that indicate that you’re not actually in the Alps, but in the depths of Siberia.

On arrival at the base of the pistes the ski rental shops have the same up-to-date equipment as one would expect from any European ski resort; the ski techs are helpful, professional and (unusually) smiling. Look around you and there’s the very same chairlifts, cable cars, long winding slopes and latest ski suit fashion as further West.

Yet despite the similarities at first glance, Europe this is not and daily temperatures that range from a chilly minus 5 to a lung-freezing minus 40 and beyond are only the start of the story. Take the town itself for example. There may be some new chalet-style hotels appearing, but the main town of Sheregesh consists almost entirely of low-rise 1970s apartment blocks; those who are not so lucky to live in such luxury make do with ramshackle wooden dachas with outside toilets and no running water. In case you missed it on the approach, the view from the mountain reveals the town to be surrounded by active local industry with lone chimney stacks of small run-down factories bearing inscriptions such as “Work for the Glory of the Motherland” billowing black smoke into an otherwise pristine mountain air. On the short taxi ride to the base of the slopes you pass the army posts of the local high-security prison. That your taxi is an ice-encrusted lada with a cracked windscreen, no seatbelts and nothing but an orthodox icon glued to the dashboard for protection is also a dead giveaway that you’re not in St. Moritz.

On the slopes themselves, snippets of conversation between other skiers point to the fact that we’re rather east of Berlin. “What a pleasure it is to snowboard drunk,” exclaims one teenager, as he and his friends contribute to the collection of beer cans near the lift entrance. A skier stops at the side of the slope to answer his hands-free mobile, “it’s alright, I’m free to talk” he says, heading off down the slope, a fur tail (a bizarre fashion item sold at the base of the slopes) clipped to the back of his pants waggling in the wind.

On closer inspection there’s also something not quite right with the ski lift system. For a start, it is impossible to buy a lift pass for the whole ski domain. In fact, rather than a unified network, the lifts have instead been built by different private firms, each competing with each other and boasting the cheapest tickets or longest runs. “Each company fears they will miss out on some potential profit,” explains Konstantin, our ski tech, as we point out this fatal flaw in the valley’s coordination. What results is a rather annoyingly large proportion of time queuing at various ticket booths at the base of each lift in order to buy a ticket for that precise lift. Whilst some lifts have a top-up card system, others just provide a paper ticket to hand to the attendant and none offer unlimited ascents which, for those who want to do a day skiing all the slopes on offer means spending a lot of time rummaging in ones pockets for the correct bit of paper or plastic card for the particular lift that you want to take at any given time. Russia would not be Russia without its VIPs and so of course most lift queues offer a “VIP lane” for those oligarchs who just wouldn’t feel rich enough having to wait with the masses.

There are also indications that general health and safety may not be quite to European standards. The fact that none of the pistes are marked is the least of ones worries. A skier taking the chairlift in front of us gets tangled up as he sits on the chair and drops a pole. Already a metre or so in the air and with the lift attendant looking on disinterestedly and making no attempt to stop the lift, the skier takes his life into his own hands and leaps from the chair to retrieve the pole himself, ending up in a heap on the ground for other lift-users to try to avoid.

In certain areas the lifts are no longer functional due to the massive quantities of snow that has not been cleared and has been allowed to pile so high that the lift cables themselves are nearly submerged. In others, the chairlift is still just about high enough to keep people off the ground, but low enough to present a hazard for those forced to dodge their way between in order to pass underneath.

So all is not les Trois Vallées, but then if it was why would one bother hiking thousands of miles to Siberia for a ski break? Sheregesh’s geographically isolated location has both its upsides and downsides. Flights and transfers are not only costly, but also time-consuming. For the European market, a flight to Moscow (four hours from London) followed by a five hour internal flight to Novokuznetsk still only brings you three hours by bus from the resort. A trip to Canada suddenly doesn’t seem quite so distant.

Yet skiing in Siberia has its fair share of advantages. The remoteness of the resort means that during the week even in peak season (bar the New Year period) there are practically no lift queues and the slopes are uncrowded. You don’t have to get up at 6am to find some untouched powder to ski. The current ski area is big enough to keep an experienced skier occupied for a week, with some excellent off-piste and forest skiing. The surrounding hillsides look promising for further extension of the resort in the future.

The few foreigners that make it to Sheregesh every year will be greeted by metres and metres of light, fluffy powder in daily quantities that will astonish even the most veteran traveller. They may also be treated to an as-yet unspoiled and difficult to match dose of Siberian hospitality. And to top it all off, at the base of the slope - the chance to have their photo taken with life-size cardboard cut-outs of everyone’s favourite snow sports enthusiasts ready for action: Putin and Medvedev.

Oh mamma!

2009-01-22T15:55:00.008+03:00

Photo: Ruslan Shamukov

Amongst numerous other things, the Russian authorities do not like demonstrations, protests, unsanctioned parades or any other form of public dissent. This was clearly indicated by the swift and high-handed termination of the recent “Dissenters’ Marches” of members of the political opposition by police. The forceful suppression of the latest demonstrations against the tax on imported cars served to show that any public display of opposition to the Kremlin’s policies, even by those not officially involved in the political sphere, would not be put up with either. Now, as this most recent incident demonstrates, the government’s intolerance extends to any form of protest however small, harmless and comical it may be. (Extracts from Kommersant 21 Jan.)

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30 People in Mummy Costumes Arrested in Moscow

Approximately 30 people attempting to carry out an unauthorised demonstration demanding the removal of Lenin’s body from the mausoleum on Red Square were detained on Manezhnaia Square in Moscow on Monday. Approximately 30 members of the “Orthodox Monarchists” group had previously declared their intentions to organise a “flash mob” dressed in Mummy costumes on Red Square on the 85th anniversary of Lenin’s death.

According to the representative of the city’s police force, “A group of around 25 young people carrying a cardboard coffin were arrested by members of the police force."

Before the event, the organisers had stated that “this will not be a mass demonstration. There will not be crowds of people standing round and creating a scandal and so we hope that we will not be dispersed. The mummies will join onto the Communist’s march... Our demonstration is to demand that the government and communists rebury Lenin in a modest grave at Voklovskoe cemetery in St. Petersburg where there is enough space for him to be placed and where the communists will be able to come and pay their respects to Vladimir Il’ich (Lenin) in peaceful surroundings.”

Chocolate Alenka

2009-01-21T22:57:00.009+03:00

Photo:www.romantiki.ru
As pretty much anyone who has ever read a newspaper will know, Russia’s main exports are industrial: gas, oil and other natural resources. Exportation of domestic goods is rare – ask most Westerners to name five Russian domestic goods and they’ll probably struggle. After Baltika and perhaps the odd obscure brand of vodka, they’re likely to draw a blank. Nevertheless, Russia’s homegrown food industry is thriving. Certainly, Coca Cola, Pepsi, McDonalds et al. have made their (dramatic) mark here, however Russia’s domestic food industry remains one of the fastest growing within the market sector.

It should be no surprise then that most food brands dominating the Russian market at the moment are relatively new, having sprung up throughout the nineties, filling the gaping economic void left by the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian brand names may make up a substantial proportion of the market, however they are yet to build up the sentimental consumer base enjoyed by their counterparts in the West. There are few equivalents to the likes of Cadburys, Hovis and Bisto, whose branding and packaging evoke feelings of nostalgia across generations of Brits. In Russia, brand-based nostalgia is reserve for Soviet goods, most of which are now defunct or mere shadows of their former selves.

This is where Alenka comes merrily skipping in. Alenka (a fairly common girls’ name) is one of the most successful brands of chocolates in contemporary Russia. Described on the official website as a symbol of a happy childhood for several generations, they’re of the few Soviet products to make it through the collapse of socialism and ensuing economic chaos and still come out smiling. First produced in 1966 in Moscow’s Red October Factory following a Kremlin directive to create a new brand of milk chocolate, Alenka became a sign of the good times. Following the austerity of post-war years, the Brezhnev years (1964 – 82), when Alenka first appeared, were embraced by many as a period of relative stability and prosperity. Alenka fitted right in with this general mood and is remembered fondly by Russians of this era, as well as my contemporary Russians. The brand (along with several others) is still made by the Red October factory, which, uner a different name, both predated and outlived the Socialist experiment.

The story of how the Alenka packaging came about adds a further later of whimsy to the brand, giving it a cockle-warming quality that many of the new brands, whose teeth were cut on the brutality of the 90s market lack. The packaging shows a smiling Soviet child, a character as instantly recognisable to Russians as the Coco Pops monkey or Tony the Tiger. Unable to come up with a suitable mascot, Red October launched a competition to find the face of Alenka, whose image would adorn the chocolates. Entries arrived in droves and unable to decide on an overall winner the company initially used several in rotation. And then came an entry from an photographer who had rendered his daughter, Elena, who was to soon become a household face.

In the 1990s, as part of an advertising campaign, Red October ran a feature, 'Alenka, where are you now?' to find the original little girl. Again, respondants replied in droves, but eventually the scores of pretendants were whittled down to just one – Elena Gerinas, the daughter of a famous Soviet photographer. The company greeted her with open arms, lavishing chocolates upon her and feting her in the media.

And then the story turns a little sour. In 2000, the real Alenka, who had inherited rights over her father's estate decided to try and make some money, demanding recompensation for the use of face on the company's packaging. In her opinion, the brand's success was in no small part due to her and her father's work, and she was determined to receive some sort of payment for her participation. She initiated a costly dollar law suit against Red October for violation of author's rights, but was unsuccessful due to lack of evidence that it was really her, or even her fathers' work. Since then other 'Alenka's' have appeared, but it has not been decisively resolved who the real Alenka is.

In any case, Alenka remains a cult brand with spin off versions popular in lots of ex-Soviet countries. You also know you’re successful when parodies appear, and Alenka land is full of them. Here are two of my favorites: Voldoka (diminitive of Vladimir) and Bono…

The New Brits Abroad?

2009-01-17T18:31:00.006+03:00

Artwork: Diana Machulina
Us Brits are well known for our shameful reputation abroad. There’re the all-day drinking sessions, complete lack of cultural awareness, inability to muster up enough linguistic ability to pronounce a simple “merci” or “gracias”. Then there’s the peeling lobster red skin as we get our once-a-year exposure to the sun... It’s probably best not to even get started on our football supporters. However, as this article from the December issue of “Russian Reporter” magazine seems to indicate, the Russians may be trying to beat us at our own game. The shame of it!

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A Cultural Break
Sasha Denisova

Like all Russians, I’m on the edge of a nervous breakdown by the time I take my yearly vacation. I head to Egypt, to a hotel where Italians and Russians along with a couple of Swedes and English are holidaying. However, the hotel staff know exactly who to say “buongiorno” and who to say “dobry dyen” to. I decided to master this art.

In the pool the men are playing water polo. Three of them are throwing themselves after the ball in a particularly violent manner, making the water overflow. During lulls in the game they manage to make a dash for the side of the pool, pour themselves some “Absolut” in plastic cups and with the cry “Vovka, you’re being marked!”, block the goal with their chests, all without spilling their precious liquid. One manages a one-handed save; this, of course, calls for another drink.

The Italian referees whistle and the Swedish players are frozen with shock. The Italians try to grab the vodka off the Russians and only then do they slither out of the pool on their own accord and set off to finish drinking on the sun beds, miffed. It’s midday.

You can tell a Russian a mile off from the glass in his hand and his outward appearance. Italians, without exception, are dressed like members of a golf club: summer jumpers, polo shirts and white sneakers. Italians are always well-groomed, even those on their pension.

A Russian man is noticeable from a distance. He’s sleeping with a cap on. He’s gloomily mooching along the edge of the surf with a pair of flippers hanging from his hand, like a dead fish. He throws himself like a deadweight from the jetty into the sea and swims three metres in a style that only he alone can identify as butterfly stroke. And afterwards, wheezing and panting, he lies on his back bobbing on the waves.

Russian women on holiday are a bit more active. At midday the zombies crawl out to the gym, to dance or do yoga - that is, to hopelessly drag their bluish legs up to their foreheads. Up comes an Italian and you can see straightaway that life is in full swing; she has a personal masseur, card club membership and her own vineyard. Up comes one of us; we have gastroduodenitis, thrombophlebitis, arthritis. Neither gold bracelets, nor self respect. All we do is violently wave our legs around whilst our grandchildren are sleeping and our husband is still out cold.

A Russian goes through two phases – self-destruction and self-realisation. In the city he smokes, drinks, and is completely immobile. On holiday he does his best to get back in shape. The personal trainer in the gym, having seen how I was dangerously teetering over a set of weights, darts over to catch them and, discovering that I was Russian, almost burst into tears; “You’re the very first Russian tourist we’ve had in here! They don’t come in the gym – only the sauna!” Out of a heartfelt pity he offered to let me use the gym for free.

In the sauna, the notices are displayed in Russian: “Dear guests, the sauna and jacuzzi may only be visited in swimming costumes.” They say that there were cases when a couple of stark naked Russians, sniggering, burst into the fitness club; the Swedes made a swift move out of there. A group of Italians sit in the jacuzzi merrily chattering about something or other. To the side – two men with stern expressions; you can just make out the words “payment” and “dispatched”.

The main thing that you don’t come across in a Russian’s face is relaxation. If he goes somewhere it’s on business. For example, going for a beer: he gets changed right there on the beach with a forbidding look on his face; the hotel is three metres away, but he wraps himself up in a towel anyway and gets tangled up in his underpants, hissing at his wife.

Soviet holidays have left us permanently damaged. Once upon a time our holiday-makers had to fight claw and nail to obtain their little piece of happiness from the state. A holiday permit, hotel voucher, canteen meals and a deckchair in the sun. That’s why to this day we still get up early in the morning to reserve the sun beds. It’s not so easy to get us out of that habit.

A Russian is an untrusting type. He doesn’t know any languages and that’s why he’s so sullen. He wants to get what he wants without beating around the bush. So arrogantly, in his great and powerful native tongue, shouts in the Egyptian chef’s face: “You worried I might get fat or something?” The chef doesn’t understand a word of course, but places another burger on the Russian’s plate just in case. A three-year-old boy with a threateningly barrelled tummy hides from his dad under the table. Dad wants to feed him kebab and fried aubergine. But the young organism is no fool – he’s trying to survive. “That’s the fourth day he’s not eaten anything,” complains the inhabitant of the Central Russian Upland to the Egyptian waitress, “only drinks that kefir of yours!”

In general, all hope lies with the children; it’s possible that they’ll manage to survive the aubergines and learn how to take a real holiday. They’ll take peaceful walks in Baden-Baden with dignity, just like Turgenev, Gogol’ and Russian aristocrats used to do.

Contemplating our national way of holiday-making, I look down at my compatriots with a feeling of superiority, and, in a fit of healthiness, jump into the sea and onto a rock hidden beneath the surface. Result: five stitches in my foot.

The rest of my holiday I sit off on the bank, sipping beer and pondering the fact that holidays are generally dangerous for Russians. In any case, in the form that they take at the moment.

Happy Campers

2009-01-11T13:20:00.006+03:00

Photograph: Oleg Klimov
I’ve just got back from a week at that thoroughly Russian institution – the children’s camp. Present all across Russia, from St Petersburg to Vladivostok to the Black Sea, most Russian kids will spend at least one week of their lives at a children’s ‘rest camp.’ This seemed a pretty good opportunity to see Russian children’s life firsthand.

Today’s camps morphed out of the old soviet system of Pioneer Camps, which were initially dreamt up by the Soviets - partly as a means of rewarding parents (factories and organisations would send their workers’ children to camps throughout the USSR) but primarily as a form of ideological indoctrination. The Young Pioneer movement sought to educate Soviet youth in the ways of Marxist-Leninism and so mould future socialist society. The camps were a residential extension of this aim. As such, they were organised around the entire rigmarole of Communist propaganda: morning marches to rousing Soviet music, an oath of allegiance, walls adorned with absurdly large portraits of Lenin and other Soviet heroes and successes, and an extensive program of good, clean Soviet fun.

The Pioneer Camps are remembered in scores of memoirs and novels, which recall a whole host of different experiences, ranging from nostalgic recollections, to vitriolic tirades describing force-fed ideology, terrible accommodation and horrific food. I wonder what all the legions of former Pioneers (most of today's Russians aged over 30) and indeed, Lenin and co. themselves, would make of today's children's camps?

Camp Day Break, where I was working, is a direct descendent of the Pioneer Camp system. Located about 80 km from Saint Petersburg on the Gulf of Finland, the basic infrastructure is left over from its former days as a genuine Pioneer camp, although, as it is keen to point out, all its rooms are newly renovated to 'European standards'. Certainly, despite the rackety buildings, it no longer looked Soviet, but rather similar to children’s camps I’ve been to in the UK (if somewhat colder). So far, all change.

Then I was taken to the cafeteria. Manned by unsmiling matrons dolling up mass-portions of tasteless stodge, the cafeteria seemed to fulfil every stereotype of carb-heavy, Soviet cuisine. Next, I was presented with the camp timetable: wake up at 8 am sharp; callisthenics at 8:10; room tidying; breakfast (probably half-solidified porridge); lessons; walk; lunch (carbohydrates and something pretending to be meat); activities; break (teeth-rottingly sweet tea plus some variation of cake); more lessons; dinner (same as lunch, but less); activities; svechka (a bizarre occurrence, where the entire camp sits in a circle and a candle is passed round as everyone recounts their highs and lows of the day); lights out at 11 pm. It looked like a strict return to discipline, with little time left for just messing around. Perhaps, despite appearances, something of the Soviet era lingered on?

But then again, perhaps not. As with many of my experiences in Russia, there was little correspondence between the official description and how events really unfolded. Sure, we were woken up at 8 am sharp and dragged to the hall for exercises, but in the face of mutinous teenagers, brought up under capitalism and do-what-what-you-want culture, these were half hearted and mainly consisted of the camp counsellor prancing about in front of a horde of sullen teens. By the end of the week they had been scrapped, to be replaced by a lie-in until 9 am. The meals did take place, but were not to the taste of most of the kids, who preferred to pick at it, before begging a leader to take them to the local shop so they could stock up on junk food. Whether or not camp food has got worse since Soviet times I couldn't say, but certainly, Pioneers would not have access to coke, snickers and pot noodles, so would have had to make do or starve. Attempts at making the children study or participate in any of the activities were fairly futile and the camp quickly descended into 'free time' – i.e. playing Nintendo, fighting or flirting. Not to mention the one thirteen year old who some how got his hands on a bottle of vodka, which he promptly downed, giving himself dramatic alcohol poisoning and a nasty, nasty hangover the following day. Dear oh dear, what would Lenin say?

The modern Russian camp is a far cry from its Soviet counterpart. What was once fuelled by ideology is now powered by e-numbers; pop songs have replaced Soviet anthems; the focus of the camp is now fun, not ideological training. Of course, this has resulted in a break down of discipline within the camps, as kids are allowed to pursue their own agendas rather than conform to a state-wide pattern, unanimously imposed from a central, Moscow location. This transition and break down of order can be seen as positive or negative depending on your viewpoint, but in any case the departure from ideological brainwashing can, in my opinion, only be a good thing.

There has been much written about the revival of children's camps as a form of ideological brainwashing under Putin, with special Nashi (the pro-Putin youth group) run camps being hailed (if that’s the word) as an example of a Kremlin plot to inveigle its politics into innocent young minds. Certainly these camps exist, but it should be remembered that they are the exception, not the rule. My experience of camp (admittedly, nothing to do with Nashi, or indeed any political organisation) tells a very different story. Here, kids are just kids and there is no agenda. For the vast majority of Russian youth this is the reality of camp, not an ideological experience.

New Year... New War?

2009-01-05T20:41:00.006+03:00

Photo: Oleg Klimov
Since the war in Georgia this summer and the declaration of independence by South Ossetia and Abkhazia, there has been a lot in the Russian news about events in these areas. We’ve seen the newly-appointed Russian ambassador to Abkhazia show us around the planned site for the Russian embassy, the tangerine farmers from towns along the Russian border queuing to daily cross the border to sell their harvest for a better price (a terrible daily wait to pass customs – wouldn’t it just be easier if Abkhazia and Russia just… shh, don’t say it!), the rebuilding of the ruins of Tskhinvali, capital of South Ossetia, courtesy of the Russian taxpayer. With the amount of news coverage that has been dedicated to these two regions, one could perhaps be forgiven for thinking that they were already another part of Russia. A new threat from Georgia might be the last push needed for Abkhazia and South Ossetia to finally unite with Russia. Such a threat might arise in the very near future if we were to judge by the article below, published on 28th December in “Kommersant”.

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The Ministry of Defence of South Ossetia has issued a statement claiming that Georgia is amassing military equipment along its border with the state. Georgian armoured personnel carriers have been sighted in the village of Nikozi, situated in the immediate vicinity of the border with Ossetia. Georgia has claimed that the tanks in the Tskinvali region are needed to monitor the situation in the area and that EU observers have already been informed of this.

According to the Ministry of Defence there are now 28 tanks situated in the town of Gori, where Georgian tank battalions are based. There are now also “Cobra” armoured police vehicles in villages in the Tskinvali region. The Georgian Home Office has confirmed these claims, stating that EU observers have already been informed. According to Shota Utiashvili, head of the Georgian Home Office Department for Analytics, the vehicles are being used for patrols and monitoring.

On the 22nd December the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe announced its decision to withdraw its observation mission from Georgia by the 1st of January 2009. At the same time, the deputy head of the Central Command of Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, Lieutenant General Anatoli Nogovitsyn noted that a new military undertaking by Georgia against South Ossetia and Abkhazia could not be ruled out. According to the lieutenant, this would be possible should Georgia restore its military potential with the help of NATO.

“That Georgia is amassing military equipment close to its borders with South Ossetia and Abkhazia, indicates that her leaders have not renounced their plans and intentions of restoring at any price the so called “constitutional order” in these newly independent countries and restoring Georgia’s territorial integrity that was lost as a result of the August war”, claimed Nogovitsyn. He has indicated however, that it was unlikely that Georgia would “again undertake such a wide-scale military operation against South Ossetia and Abkhazia, after Russian soldiers and officers had crushed the Georgian Army.” In Nogovitsyn’s opinion, “if Tbilisi decides to go for all-or-nothing (to restore the situation to its pre-war status) then they would most likely resort to some kind of secret military operation led by the Georgian army and special task forces.”

Medvedev: 2008

2009-01-03T13:15:00.006+03:00

On Christmas Eve, Russia’s three main state-owned television channels; Channel One, Channel Russia and NTV interrupted their normal schedule of programmes to air President Medvedev’s round up of the events of 2008. In a live interview with one leading journalist from each channel Medvedev spoke extensively on the war in the Caucasus, the financial crisis, his relationship with Putin, Ukrainian-Russian relations, Russia’s national interests and Russia’s position in the world today. The questions were uncontroversial, the journalists understanding and sympathetic; Jeremy Paxman it most certainly was not. Below are a few bits from the interview that I thought were particularly interesting (original transcript from kremlin.ru).

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Kiril Kleimenov (Channel 1): Dmitri Anatol’evich, were you sure that the military operation (in Georgia / South Ossetia) would be successful?

Dmitri Anatol’evich Medvedev: We had of course supposed that our neighbour (Georgia) wasn’t quite right in the head, but we had not realised to what extent. In retrospect, I think at some point I had begun to feel that our Georgian colleagues had simply stopped communicating with the Russian Federation. Before that they had been asking to meet us in Sochi to discuss matters, but then they simply disappeared off the radar. At that point I started to suspect that they were thinking of carrying out a military procedure.

So we were prepared for the event. And I think that as a result of our preparation the costs of the operation were minimal. The Russian army destroyed Georgia’s military infrastructure and still managed to avoid any acts that would have been of an inhumane character.

[…]

Tatiana Mitkova (NTV): Recently you have been in close contact with other world leaders. Do you feel that Russia as a country sits comfortably in the world today? I’m referring in particular to our return to defending Russian interests in such a practical, if one can use that term, military way.

Medvedev: Russian interests should be guaranteed by all available means; that is my deepest conviction. First and foremost they should be guaranteed by international law, by international institutions such as the United Nations and by regional institutions. But when necessary they should be defended by military means. The world is a very contradictory and complicated place; there are a large number of internal conflicts, a very significant number of threats such as terrorism and international crime. We need to be ready to respond to all of these threats and, when necessary, our response should be strong and forceful otherwise we will not be able to guarantee our state sovereignty. However, this does not mean that we should resort to only one of the available means; on the contrary, we should try to come to a compromise, to an agreement with various world powers, so long as they do not present an open threat to the Russian Federation. In this sense, we are most comfortably placed to talk with our colleagues abroad.

The thing is that nowadays, sometimes I really do feel that there is an attempt to cut Russia down to size. And whilst not so long ago, when Russia was in a different situation, such attempts were to some extent successful, now such attempts are impermissible. We do not like in any way the desire, for want of a better word, of our colleagues and partners in NATO to infinitely extend its limits; we have told them this clearly. We think that this does nothing to improve international security; on the contrary, it is necessary to take a different approach, it is necessary to create new mechanisms, modern mechanisms and this is what my idea of creating a pan-European agreement on security is aimed at achieving. There are different opinions on this; some, such as our biggest European partners say, “Yes, it’s an interesting idea, we want this, we are ready to take part in this,” whilst some are wary and say “What do we need this for? We’ve got NATO and that’s fine as it is.” But then not every country in Europe and most certainly not every country of the world is a member of NATO. The time has come to create mechanisms that will guarantee the security of all states. And I, as president of the Russian Federation, will always, as a matter of principle, take such a position on this subject. Even if some people don’t like it.

There are also other situations. We have spoken quite a lot today about the conflict in the Caucasus, of Georgia’s aggression against South Ossetia. If the lives and dignity of Russian citizens are going to be threatened then Russia’s position will be most simple; we will be rational yet forceful. We will, and I have said this on numerous occasions, assert and defend the interests of our citizens wherever they should be. And this does not infringe international rule of law; it is the responsibility of any country and any leader.

So all in all I have good and perfectly comfortable relations with my colleagues worldwide, but we should not forget about our national interests; that is absolutely clear.

Tatiana Mitkova (NTV): The United States of America have always been one of the priorities of our foreign policy. Next year, Barack Obama will become president. How do you see the future of US – Russia relations?

Medvedev: You know, I want nothing else than our relations to be one of a partnership. As for priorities - when I was on the phone with president elect Barack Obama he told me that he sees relations with the Russian Federation as one of the highest priorities of American foreign policy. I agree with this 100 per cent and I hope that we will manage to successfully build a much more effective and more reliable relationship than what we have had previously, because although we have done a lot in recent years, many possibilities to develop normal relations with America were still neglected. In our opinion this was not Russia’s fault.